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INTRODUCTION
Steve Smith and Janet Jones are born in 1999. Smith was born inJuarez,
Mexico, just south of the Rio Grande River, while Jones was born in El Paso,
Texas, just north of the Rio Grande. Smith is a Mexican citizen, while Jones
is a United States citizen.
IsJones's status as a U.S. citizen, and Smith's as a non-citizen, im-
mutable? If Smith challenges the constitutionality of a particular way
in which the state favors Jones because of her citizenship, does the is-
sue of immutability affect the outcome of his challenge?
Jones's parents, Ruth and Aaron, came to the United States in 1990.
They entered the country illegally and continue to be non-citizens.
Is Ruth and Aaron Jones's status as "illegal immigrants" immuta-
ble? IsJanetJones's status as the child of "illegal immigrants" immu-
table? In either case, does immutability make a constitutional differ-
ence?
Kenneth Bowers and Michael Starr are two men who self-identify as gay.
They have been living together for over twenty years in a monogamous rela-
tionship. Their next door neighbors are Rick Rockwell and Darva Conger,
who met on the night of their wedding, which was witnessed by over twenty
million Americans on the television program, "Who Wants to Marry a Multi-
millionaire?" Starr and Bowers would like to obtain state recognition of their
same-sex marriage, with the same legal effect as that given to Rockwell and
Conger's marriage.
Are the sexual orientations of these four people immutable? Does
immutability make any difference if Bowers and Starr challenge the
state's refusal to recognize their relationship as at least equal to that
of Rockwell and Conger?
Sarah Levy and Michael Jackson are the parents of a child, James, born in
1860. Sarah's father was a white slave owner, while her mother was a black
.Associate Professor of Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louis-
ville. Many thanks to the participants at a panel at the 1999 Law & Society Conference, where I
presented an embryonic version of this article and received vigorous and helpful comments, to
the faculty at the University of Leeds (particularly Javaid Rehman and Peter Seego) who gra-
ciously hosted me in the summer of 1998 while I conducted some of the research that led to
this piece, and to Nancy Levit and David Cruz for their encouragement and thoughtful coin-
ments.
COASTRUCTIAE IALMIILABIIITY
slave. Michael's parents were both white. In 1880, James Jackson lives in a
state which bars interracial 2marriage, and which classifies a person as "black"
if he or she has a single drop of "black blood." Even though James Jackson is
extremely light-skinned and has always considered hinself white, tie law treats
him as black and bars him from marying his while fiancie, Jennifer.
Is James's race immutable? If he challenges the constitutionality
of the anti-miscegenation law, does it make any difference whether
his racial classification is immutable?
For many years, the concept of immutability in equal protection
law has been in decline in the eyes of constitutional scholars and ap-
parently the Supreme Court, to the point where there is now a strong
consensus among legal scholars that immutability is not relevant to
analysis of claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Where once it appeared that a plaintiff
moved a considerable distance towards the "Holy Land" of strictjudi-
cial scrutiny by establishing that her defining characteristic %as im-
mutable,' in the last quarter-century scholars have argued that the
immutability of a characteristic really does not explain when the
Court has applied heightened scrutiny. At the same time, post-
modem scholars have criticized as essentialism the very concept of
immutability, because of its claim that a characteristic is timeless
across cultures regardless of whether and how a particular culture
perceives and treats it s It is difficult to find the last academic defense
I The force of immutability in equal protection law probably reached its apex uith the
Court's decision in Fronfiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973), a sex discrimination case in
which the plurality opinion stated that sex should receive heightened judicial scrutiny because,
among other reasons, "sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic deter-
mined solely by the accident of birth."
- SeeJOHN HART ELY, DMIOcRACVANDDISTRUST 150 (1980);Janet E. Halley. Sexual Orienta-
lion and the Polities of Bioloo,: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STA.K. L RE . 503,
510 (1994) ("[I]mmutability remains a factor, but it is not dear that the Court wvill ever again
make even an asymptotic approach to a claim that discrimination based on a clhracteristic the
bearer cannot shed is intrinsically repellent to any '"basic concept of our system.-" (quoting
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686)); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protetrin: The Visibility
Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell", 108 YALE LJ. 485, 518 (1998) ("[R]ecent aca-
demic commentary seems univocal in calling for its retirement even as a factor."): Jonathan
Pickhardt, Note, Choose or Lose: Embrating Theories of Chaie in a.y Rights Litigation Srtegits, 73
N.Y.U. L REV. 921, 942 (1998) ("Arguments for suspect classification status for sexual orienta-
tion based on immutability have been almost completely rejected."); E. Gary Spitko. A Biologic
Argument for Ga), Essentialism-Daenninisom Implications for Equal Proirtion ant Substantiv Due Pta-
es, 18 U. HAw. L REv. 571, 598 (1996) ("A careful analysis of the Supreme Court's equal pro-
tectionjurisprudence reveals... that immutability ofa characteristic is neither a prerequisite to
nor a sufficient condition for heightened scrutiny of a classification relating to that claracteris-
tic' IEdward Stein, Condusion: The Essentials of Construcionisn and the Construion of Essmtal-
ismz, in FORMS OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSRUCnONIST
CoNTRovERsY 3-5, 326 (Edward Stein ed., 1990) [hereinafter FORM.tS OF DEStR] ('Essentialists
think that being a heterosexual or homosexual is like having a certain blood type or being a
person taller than six feet. ... Even though people in past cultures may have had no idea what
constitutes a gene, a hormone, an Oedipal complex or whatever te relevant properties are,
they either did or did not have such properties, and thus the essentialist would claim that they
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of immutability or the last call for stressing it in constitutional litiga-
4tion.
At the same time immutability has been in decline in equal pro-
tection analysis, there has been a surge in consideration of the equal
protection ramifications of legal classifications based on sexual orien-
tation and, more recently, gender identity.5 The Supreme Court,
lower federal courts, and commentators have been assessing the way
in which the equal protection claims of lesbians, gay men, bisexuals,
and transgendered (LGBT) people should be resolved. Importantly,
the wide consensus of scholars that sexual orientation (and, where
the analysis has included them, gender identity and transgender
status) should be a suspect classification subject to the most exacting
judicial scrutiny has been met by an even stronger counter-consensus
were thereby either heterosexual or homosexual .... "). The connection between essentialism
and immutability is not-forgive me-immutable, as Professor Stein notes. Id. at 326-27
("While there are no doubt some connections among whether or not the property of being a
homosexual is an objective property and whether or not a person can choose [it] ... these vari-
ous claims do not amount to the same thing."). Nevertheless, critics of immutability often treat
the concept as if it entails a claim about the origins of the characteristic, and even more often
assume that a socially constructed category (e.g., sexual orientation) cannot produce classifica-
tions (e.g., heterosexual) that are immutable. One of my purposes in this article is to break
down that premise by more carefully probing the effects of certain kinds of social construction.4 In fact, even Professor Gary Spitko-who accepts and would rely in significant ways on
evidence that sexual orientation "speaks to the reality of an irreducible essentialist conception
of homosexuality" and that it "involves no volition," Spitko, supra note 2, at 621-22-eniphati-
cally rejects invocation of the immutability argument. See id. at 601 (calling immutability "nei-
ther necessary nor even [a] significant factor[] in the suspect classification analysis").
5 The first discussion in a law review of the notion that discrimination against homosexuals
could, in some fashion, be the subject of strict scrutiny appeared in Volume 91 of the Harvard
Law Review in 1977. See The Supreme Court 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. 141, 151 (1977) (discuss-
ing case involving minors' access to contraception as potentially having implications for consti-
tutional claims of homosexuals). That was the first relevant "hit" produced by a Westlaw search
using the search terms "homosexual" and ("strict scrutiny" or "suspect class") and (beforeJanu-
ary 1, 1980). That discussion-tangential at best to the subject of the article-was the only
treatment of the matter prior to 1980. On the other hand, an identical search limited to arti-
cles between 1980 and 1990 produced 300 hits, the vast majority of them relevant to the issue of
the proper level of scrutiny for consideration of discrimination against gay men and lesbians.
And since 1990 (as of August 17, 1999), the search produced 1,646 articles.
6 As Professor Lynn Wardle pointed out in 1996 and 1997, the scholarly literature on the
subjects of same-sex marriage and parenting has been "drastically imbalanced" in favor of ex-
panding the legal rights of gay couples to marry and gay people to adopt, gain custody, enjoy
visitation rights, etc. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children,
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 836-37 & nn.10-17, app. A & B (describing and collecting articles re-
garding parenting rights for lesbian and gay parents); Lynn D. Wardle, A CritiralAnalysis of Con-
stitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 3 n.3, app. B (collecting articles re-
garding same-sex marriage). Virtually all of the articles noted by Professor Wardle advocate
applying heightened judicial scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation, as do an
impressive array of articles on other areas involving discrimination (e.g., the military's "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy) against sexual and gender minorities. Professor Wardle attributes the
imbalance to "[a]n apparent academic taboo against publicly voicing opposition to homosexual
interests." Id. at 18. He never considers the possibility that the imbalance is produced not by a
"taboo," but by the fact that the vast majority of scholars are simply persuaded by, and believe
they can add to, the legal arguments supporting same-sex marriage and protection of the rights
of lesbian and gay parents.
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of the federal courts that classifications based on sexual orientation
are to be reviewed by judges under the most forgiving standard, the
rational basis test.'
In applying the rational basis standard, the courts have rejected
the plaintiffs' arguments urging use of a higher level of scrutiny, ar-
guments that have often included immutability, despite the disdain
academic commentators have shown towards the concept." Indeed,
the perceived failure of the argument as deployed by the litigators is
an important part of the reason commentators have been urging its
retirement.9
And, to further muck the immutability Nvaters, the litigation cam-
paign on behalf of sexual and gender minorities has been only part
of the LGBT civil rights movement. At least as important has been
work on the political (organizing, lobbying, and protest activity) and
social fronts (the emerging visibility of LGBT people and our rela-
tionships, and the transformation of our portrayal in mass media) in
pursuit of a cultural shift in the status and respect accorded to LGBT
people and their relationships.'0 Given the importance of these ef-
forts alongside litigation as part of this (and any) civil rights move-
ment, any reckoning with the immutability argument must consider
notjust its viability in court, but also its implications for social and po-
litical action.
The juxtaposition of the decline of immutability wvith the onset
and growth of the LGBT civil rights movement is ironic and unfortu-
nate. Properly understood and argued, immutability has resonance
both within and outside the legal sphere, and can be of particularly
great force in winning the fight for equality for sexual and gender
minorities.
In this Article, I will argue that the concept of immutability can
and should be revived as an important component of equal protec-
tion arguments. In Part I, I will establish a working definition of im-
mutability, explaining that the concept does not require absolute
7 See WiLiIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, SEXUAL ORIENrTATION AND THE L%,W 610. 641 (2d cd. 1997)
(noting that Watkins v. Pen?; 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988), ims "the first federal circuit court
decision finding heightened scrutiny for lesbians and gay men." and that even this single depar-
ture from the consensus was vacated by the en banc court of appeals in Watkins r. Perry, 875
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc)).
a See Chai R Feldblum, Seual Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Dtin Rrvisital. 57 U. Prrr.
L REV. 237, 277-79 n.189 (1996) (noting the author's own use of immutability in several briefs
filed in the Supreme Court, despite her concern that problems uith the argument ntay mean
the approach is ultimately ill-considered"); Halley, supra note 2. at 510-11 (discussing the star-
ling resorgimento of immutability-based arguments among gay-rights advocates notuithstanding
their anemic condition in Supreme Court thinking and in the academic literature").
See Halley, supra note 2, at 514 (noting the "lackluster track record" of the immutability
argument in gay rights litigation).
10 SeeThomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Refleions on Using the Law to Mae Sodal Change.
72 N.Y.U. L RE-. 967 (1997) (advocating a focus on "culture shifting" rather than "rnle shift-
ing" as the strategy most likely to achieve genuine equality for sexual and gender minorities).
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immutability for it to provide the basis for a powerful legal argument.
In Part II, I will assess the time and context, concluding that this is a
constitutional moment in which immutability can be important, even
if it has not been so in the last twenty years. Even if immutability is, as
its critics argue, of little relevance in whether a trait is subjected to
strict judicial scrutiny, that charge has lesser importance in light of
the diminishing significance of tier-based equal protection analysis
that has marked the Court's most recent Fourteenth Amendment
cases.
Next, in Part III, I will propose a new vision of immutability, which
I call "constructive immutability," which overcomes the objections of
social construction theory by showing that a characteristic can be, for
all relevant legal and political purposes, immutable even if it is the
product of social construction. The underlying premise of construc-
tive immutability-that social and cultural influences shape individ-
ual identity-finds strong support in the leading approaches to cog-
nitive psychology, which explore the great influence of culture and
external relationships on the development of the self. Borrowing in
part from cognitive psychology theorists and their understanding of
how individuals both develop self-concepts and come to understand
the relationship between the self and others, I will argue that the
power of a constructed category can be so overwhelming, and its
terms, assumptions, and normative social requirements so deeply in-
grained into the members of the society, that it is experienced at the
individual level as immutable. Such powerful social constructs are of-
ten the device through which cultures identify, define, and privilege
the society's favored groups, simultaneously creating and maintaining
a disfavored "other." Thus, when government acts on the basis of a
characteristic as to which social constructs have produced the wide-
spread perception of immutability, our alarm bells should go off.
There is good reason to suspect that the classification is a facet of
broader social disadvantaging of a disfavored group.
In Part IV, I will consider the implications of a jurisprudential re-
liance on constructive immutability in the specific context of litiga-
tion challenging discrimination against sexual and gender minorities.
The issue of whether to rely on immutability as an equal protection
argument has been debated most heavily in this context, making it
the obvious case study to examine the strength of my proposal. My
goal in Parts II-IV is to fill the gap identified by Dean Ely more than
two decades ago, a gap that still exists today: "it is often said that the
immutability of the classifying trait ought to make a classification sus-
pect .... [N]o one has bothered to build the logical bridge, to tell us
exactly why we should be suspicious of legislatures that classify on the
basis of immutable characteristics.""
11 ELY, supra note 2, at 150.
[Vol. 3:2
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Finally, in Part V, I will make the arguments more concrete by il-
lustrating how immutability might be used in three contexts: a brief
using constructive immutability in an equal protection lawsuit chal-
lenging anti-gay discrimination; a speech on the floor of Congress
during debate over proposed anti-discrimination legislation; and the
story told by a gay daughter "coming out" to her parents.
I. TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT: SUBSTANrriAL IMMUTABIIny
Immutability: The condition of a characteristic or trait such that it is or
is experienced as (1) either unalterable by a voluntary act of will by the indi-
vidua4 or alterable only with substantial cost or difficult to the individual;
and (2) not having been acquired through the volunta , choice of the individ-
ual.
Any thorough consideration of the relevance of immutability in
the law requires us first to establish a working definition of the term.
The one I have proposed has two elements: the first dealing with the
alterability of the characteristic and the second ith its origins.
The first part of the definition is not confined to what might be
termed "pure immutability," which would include only those charac-
teristics that simply do not change under any circumstances. This
definition goes beyond such traits in two ways.
First, it does not require that a characteristic can never change; it
simply requires that change cannot be brought about by a choice to
be made by the individual with the characteristic. A simple example:
height is not immutable in the sense that it never changes; it changes
drastically for almost everyone from the time they are born at least
through adolescence. People grow up. But for almost all of us, the
changes involved in growing are outside our control or choice. 2 The
fact that Billy is sixteen inches long at birth, five feet tall at the age of
twelve and six feet tall at the age of seventeen is a process of change
he did not control, consciously or unconsciously. Height qualifies as
an immutable characteristic under my definition.
That is the easy case: few would dispute that a characteristic may
be regarded as immutable even if it can change via a natural progres-
sion like growing up. It is more important to recognize that the same
can be true of a characteristic that changes through human intervention.
The key for us is that it is not mutable by the voluntary, relatively un-
aided actions of the individual possessing the trait. Insanity, for ex-
ample, is not (or at least is not always) permanent; treatment through
1. To be sure, some individuals may speed up the growth process through te use of drugs.
See Growth Hormone Treatment: I7at to Ex'pwe, at hup://ww.hgfound.org/grohliormone.htnl
(last visited Oct. 27, 2000) (providing overview of benefits and risks of hormonal drug treat-
ment for children experiencing unusually slow growth). Those unusual cases, typically involv-
ing an urgent medical need created by an abnormal growth rate, are outside the typical experi-
ence and are rare enough to permit us to make the rough generalization that the process of
growing up from infancy to our adult height is not one over which we exercise control.
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therapy and/or medication may restore sanity. But acting on her
own, the insane individual will ordinarily not be readily capable of
changing that status.
The second way in which I depart from pure immutability is that a
characteristic should be treated as immutable even if it potentially
can be changed by the individual, if to do so would involve substantial
difficulty or cost. This departure from pure immutability can be il-
lustrated once again with reference to height: technically, height can
be changed. Assume, for example, that the government disqualifies
from public employment opportunities any person over 6 feet tall. A
person 6' 3" tall could avoid the effect of this discrimination by
choosing to lop off her feet and enough of her legs below the knees
in order to be 5' 11". In that absurd sense, height is not immutable.
But the cost to the individual of exercising the "mutability potential"
and changing the characteristic is extraordinarily high-high enough
that taking such an action should never be a precondition for equal
treatment. For our purposes, height is immutable.
Professor Robert Wintemute of King's College in England has
quarreled with the proposition that anything other than absolute
immutability should count, arguing "difficulty of change is not suffi-
cient and that immutability must mean impossibility of change (com-
bined with absence of initial choice) so as to place a manageable limit
on the number of 'immutable statuses."", 4 It is not clear why "impos-
sibility" is an appropriate standard, and even less clear why we should
even be concerned with placing some artificial limit on the number
of "immutable statuses." It is difficult to believe that Professor Win-
temute really means "impossibility." He would agree, I assume, that
one's height is sufficiently immutable so that the possibility of dis-
memberment would not take it outside the class. Thus, it is really a
question of how high to set the hurdle-of how much difficulty or
cost is sufficient for us to say that the law ought to treat a characteris-
tic as immutable.
More fundamentally, Professor Wintemute implicitly argues for
"manageability" as the basis for answering the "how high" question-
we should set it very near actual, complete impossibility because oth-
erwise the class of immutable statuses will be unmanageable. This
standard reflects his discomfort with the immutability argument itself,
13 See Fernando J. Gutierrez, Gay and Lesbian: An Ethnic Identity Deserving Equal Protection, 4
LAW & SEXUALITY 195, 222 (1994) ("[A] trait is considered immutable if to change the trait
would be at a great cost to the individual, psychologically, as well as socially and economi-
cally."); Stephen Zamansky, Note, Colorado's Amendment 2 and Homosexuals' Right to Equal Protec-
tion of the Law, 35 B.C. L. REv. 221, 228 (1993) ("The immutability element, however, does not
mean literal immutability-the physical inability to change or mask the trait .... All that is
needed to satisfy the immutability element is that changing the trait that defines the class would
involve great difficulties, such as a major physical change or a traumatic change of identity."
(footnotes omitted)).
1 ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMiAN RIGHTS 177 (1995).
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against which he argues at length.' "Manageability," however, is a
function not of the number of statuses, but of the clarit, of the defi-
nition. Whether there are three immutable characteristics or 300, so
long as it is manifest what renders a characteristic immutable in the
eyes of the law, it will be manageable to require government to meet
the same legal test before it classifies or discriminates on the basis of
any of them.
1
6
This in turn raises the immediate question: what constitutes a
"substantial" cost or difficulty, sufficient to render the characteristic
substantially immutable? I intend neither to duck nor to provide a
comprehensive answer to that question. There are certain categories
of cost that should presumptively qualify as substantial: physical pain;
monetary expense that is not de minimis; psychic hardship; disrup-
tion to family or intimate relationships; an extended time period re-
quired to bring about the change. The presence of one or more of
these costs-there may be others as well-renders the characteristic
effectively immutable.
A telling example of how this principle operates is pseudofolliculi-
tis barbae (hereinafter "PFB"). PFB is a skin condition which hap-
pens to be associated with race; 7 for current purposes, it is enough to
note that it is extremely painful and potentially harmful for a person
with PFB to shave. 8 For that individual, a beard may be seen as an
immutable characteristic in the sense that, while it can be changed, it
would involve substantial cost and difficulty to do so.
It is important to recognize one other type of difficulty, one which
will be crucial to our understanding of the relationship between law
and immutability. I refer to legal diffcu/t.-barriers, either absolute
or effectively so, which render it so difficult to change the characteris-
tic that it might as well be immutable. Consider, for example, the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy of the U.S. military, which discrimi-
nates against lesbian and gay servicemembers by subjecting them to
discharge if they engage in homosexual conduct-which is defined to
include statements acknowledging one's homosexuality.' For pres-
is I& at 174-83.
16 As I will make clear in Part II, this does not mean that all immutable characteristics must
be treated alike as either legitimate or illegitimate grounds for governmental action. Tie im-
portance of immutability is not that it overrides all other factors; characteristics tnav be alike in
their immutability but different in some other relevant iamy(s). These other differences can
swing the balance, producing the conclusion that governmental classifications on the basis of
some immutable characteristics are acceptable while others are not. &-e itifra Part IA.
1 SeeBradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 939 F.2d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 1991) ('Tle record sho-ws
PFB almost exclusively affects black males and white males rarely suffer from PFB or compara-
ble skin disorders that may prevent a man from appearing clean-shaven.').
is See ROBERT L HERTINGJR., UNnTErn' OF IOWA FAMtLY PR.AcrcE HANDtroK. ch. 13 (3d
ed. 1999), available at http://%www-.vh.org/Proiders/ClinRef/FPHandbook/Clhapterl3/O2-
13.html (last modified July 20, 1999) ("Scarring may occur with destruction of tie hair follicle
with severe infections. Tenderness, itching, and pain may occur.').
19 SeeAble v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968. 975 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (government -designed a
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ent purposes, the important component of this policy is that it creates
a presumption that the servicemember who has engaged in some
form of homosexual conduct is, in fact, homosexual. It then pur-
ports to allow the individual to rebut that presumption by demon-
strating that he or she is not gay, despite the conduct--it was an ab-
erration, for example, perhaps produced by intoxication. But in
practice, once homosexual conduct is established, the servicemember
is so conclusively presumed to be gay that the label is, for purposes of
the policy, immutable.
2'
The point is that the immutability label is not meant to describe
some Platonic ideal of immutability, and hence does not depend on
the scientific or natural accuracy of the label. We are attempting to
decide how the law should treat immutable characteristics. Because
the characteristic need be immutable only in ways relevant to the law,
substantial immutability is sufficient.
Apart from not requiring pure immutability, the definition I pro-
pose also does not refer to the origins of the trait beyond saying that
it must not have been the product of voluntary choice. It does not
require that the trait be "biologically predetermined."'  Certainly,
there will be circumstances in which the lack of voluntary choice will
be (at least in part) the result of biology. Sex and race are examples
of this possibility, although even these traits are not entirely biologi-
cally predetermined but also result from substantial social construc-
tion, an important point I will develop more fully below. But biology
is not the only producer of involuntariness, as is clear from the con-
cept of coercion in criminal law.2
Nor does it necessarily matter whether it was "fixed at such an
early stage in life" that a person "cannot be held morally responsible
for it. '2 4 The connection between immutability and moral responsi-
bility is not temporal. A medical condition, for example, may be ac-
quired quite late in life-prostate cancer, for instance-but its immu-
policy that purportedly directs discharge based on 'conduct,' and craftily sought to avoid the
First Amendment by defining 'conduct' to include statements revealing one's homosexual
status"), vacated by 8 8 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996).
e Id. at 972.
2 Id. at 976 (concluding that there is no "realistic opportunity to rebut the presumption"),
Paradoxically, this "legal immutability" can make even an inaccurate description immutable-it
can lead us to the conclusion that a self-identified heterosexual individual, whose sexual behav-
ior is with and erotic attractions are overwhelmingly to members of the opposite sex, is "immu-
tably gay" because the law renders him so. To the accusation that this renders my analysis ab-
surd, my answer is that the absurdity lies in the military's policy, not in my definition of
immutability.
-- NICHoLAs BAMFORTH, SEXUALITY, MORALS & JUsTICE: A THEORY OF LESBIAN AND GAY
RIGHTS LAW 203 (1997) (discussing immutability in context of sexual orientation).
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.090(1) (Michie 1999) ("In any prosecution for an of-
fense other than an intentional homicide, it is a defense that the defendant engaged in the pro-
scribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat of the use of, unlaw-
ful physical force against him or another person ... ").
4 BAMFORTH, supra note 22, at 203 (footnote omitted).
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tability (and its moral irrelevance) is identical to a congenital condi-
tion such as spina bifida or Dowrns' syndrome.
The final element of the definition requiring explanation is that it
does not require that the trait actually be unamenable to voluntary
change, but only that the person experience it that way. Theories of
social construction recognize that human perceptions of self are
deeply influenced by cultural context. - If in a particular time, place,
and social structure, individual categories are constructed (uninten-
tionally or otherwise) to create in the individual the lived experi-
ence/perception that the characteristic is immutable, there are two
ways of looking at the claim of immutability. To the observer dissect-
ing the culture from outside, "  it is the product of social construction,
and hence is either unreal or at least is not immutable. However, the
legal and political system that is part of the same culture that created
the category must take the immutability-we might usefully call it "in-
trinsic immutability"-as quite real; indeed, it is virtually certain that
the legal and political structure will have done much of the "con-
structing" that produced the experience of immutability.
Racial identity demonstrates this phenomenon. Numerous schol-
ars have argued convincingly that race is a socially constructed cate-
gory2  However, the social definitions of race have made it impossi-
ble for a person to adopt and live a self-identification contrary to the
classification assigned to them by law or social custom. Historically,
the "one drop" rule classified individuals based on the principle that
"anyone with a known Black ancestor is considered Black. A per-
son treated as Black under this rule, but who self-identified as white
and/or attempted to live that way, was unable to alter the social and
legal classification. Her race was immutable, as Professor Hickman's
story about her Uncle Jack's experience after buying a house in an
all-white neighborhood in 1956 illustrates:
SeeJohn Boswell, Categories, Experiene and Sexualitf, in FoR.S OF DEsIR. supra note 3. at
133, 135 ("[T]he proposition implicit in the constructionist critique (is] that the experi-
ence ... of every human being in every time and place is distinct from that of every other hu-
man being, and that the social matrix in which she or he lives will determine that experience in
a largely irresistible way...."). See also infra pp. 615-19 (discussing cognitive psychology's ex-
planations of the development of the self and the self-concept in cultural context).
-6 Or to the post-modern observer who, despite living and having grown up in the culture,
claims to have transcended its constraints. and so understands the illusory, constructed nature
of its categories, and possesses a deeper insight into reality than those of us who continue to
carj on the discussion as if the categories have meaning.
Se; ag., Cynthia L Naashima, An Invisible Monster The rCnation and Dmial of Mixed-Race
People in America, in RACIALLYMIXED PEOPLE IN AMERIC, 162 (Maria P.P. Root ed.. 1992) (noting
that "social scientists agree that race is a socially constructed, as opposed to a biologically con-
crete, concept"); Christine B. Hickman, The Detil and the One Drop Rule. Racial Categaria, African
Americans, and the U.S. Census 95 MICH. L REV. 1161, 1203 (1997) (recognizing consensus view
of "race as a social rather than a biological category"); Anthony Paul Farley. The Black Body as
Fetish Object, 76 OR. L REv. 457,464 (1997) ("It is the colorline, not nature, which makes peo-
ple white or black.").
8 Hickan, supra note 27, at 1163.
Apr. 2001]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA [.
Shortly after he moved in, however, the neighbors discovered that he was
a Negro, perhaps because his grandchild... had darker skin and curlier
hair. Soon the neighbors were throwing rocks through the windows and
a delegation from the neighborhood "improvement association" arrived
at his door with the offer to purchase the home .... While these "sales
discussions" were underway, "a crowd of 500 milled outside," recruited to
emphasize the consequences of any failure to sell.
In dealing with this appalling situation, Uncle Jack... implicitly denied
that he was Black, telling [a] reporter... that he was "half Cherokee and
half French Canadian," leaving out his African-American ancestry.
But... when he made this denial of his Black heritage, "nobody listened," and he
was forced to move
Uncle Jack was unable to change his racial classification within the
socially constructed category of race, despite his attempt to do so.
His race was immutable, because the legal rules and social response
to him made it immutable30
Nor, it might be added, has this characteristic of racial identity
changed as much in the intervening forty-plus years as we might sup-
pose. The ongoing controversy over adding a "multiracial" classifica-
tion to the census illustrates the continuing power of law and social
rules to govern the experience of racial identity. Individuals who in-
ternally self-identify as "multiracial" can do so without the benefit of
any legal recognition of the classification. But in seeking to change
the social system of categorizing by race, advocates of the multiracial
classification implicitly concede the power of the law and cultural
definitions to control whether and the extent to which people with
multiracial backgrounds will actually be able to live their lives that
way. The social construct continues to exert power over race, and
can do so to the full extent of completely controlling the lived reality
of a person's racial identity, rendering it immutable. Professor
Id. at 1168-69 (citing Buyer Beware, TIME, Apr. 16, 1956, at 24) (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted).
30 Even ifJack had been successful in convincing these social arbiters of his race that he was
not Black, this would hardly have reflected genuine control over his racial identity. The phe-
nomenon of "passing" is a manifestation of powerlessness in the face of racial subordination; as
such, it constitutes taking the racial self and rendering it invisible, rather than genuine racial
self-identification. See Cheryl 1. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1709, 1743.44
(1993) ("The decision to pass as white was not a choice, if by that word one means voluntariness
or lack of compulsion. The fact of race subordination was coercive and circumscribed the lib-
erty to self-define."); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Equal Protection Analogies-identity and "Passing":
Race and Sexual Orientation, 13 HARv. BLACKLMETrER L.J. 65, 89 (1997) (comparing Ms. Harris'
statement to the experiences of gays and lesbians).
31 See Bijan Gilanshah, Multiracial Minorities: Erasing the Color Line, 12 LAw & INEQ 183
(1993) (discussing the multiracial movement); NAONn ZACK, RACE AND MIXED RACE: (1993)
(challenging customary black and white racial designations).
32 Not every culture's construction of race will exert the same degree of control. Some will
allow self-definition to have more power over an individual's classification, see Hickman, supra
note 27, at 1244-49 (discussing shifting ability of W.E.B. DuBois to choose to identify either with
the Dutch side or the African side of his ancestry, depending on his location), in some instances
giving greater flexibility to some racial combinations than others. Id. at 1246 ("[A]n American
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Sharon Elizabeth Rush captured this in describing her realization
that her multiracial daughter will not ultimately be able to control
her racial identity:
Her color is part of her richness; it is a part of who she is. But not every-
one sees her in this loving way, and she knows this, even at such a young
age. She has suffered racial discrimination. I have seen it, and I have felt
it with the pain of any mother who sees her child mistreated. I hope that
my daughter will be proud to identify herself as Black. I also know that
no matter how she defines herself as she grows older, the social construc-
tion of race and reality is likely to define her as Black, and this will influ-
ence her perception of herself.s
For purposes of legal, political, and social discourse within a spe-
cific culture, then, immutability refers to a condition that was not the
subject of an initial, voluntary choice, and either is, or is experienced
as, not subject to change by dint of the free decision of the individual.
Nothing more regarding when the characteristic was acquired, nor its
basis in biology, is necessary.
II. RHYMIES FOR TIMES: THE IMMUTABILrlY STORY IN
CONTrEMPORARY EQUAL PROTECTION AINALYSIS
A. Paying the TolL Immutability as a Factor in Deciding the Appropriate
Level of Scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause
Consider the terrain confronting a plalntiff's attorney in an Equal
Protection Clause case, circa 1980. Her destination, of course, is
"Violation Village," a place where the Supreme Court uill hand out a
decree that the government action she challenges violates the Four-
teenth Amendment. The question she faces is how to get there.
Fortunately, the road map is clearly marked. The only way to the
village is through Tier Town. Upon close inspection of the map, she
notices that there are three roads leading out of Tier Town. The
first, Strict Street, leads directly to Violation Village. It is a modem
superhighway, with nary a pothole nor a cop with a radar gun along
the way. In fact, there's not even a single exit ramp before Exit I
(and only): Violation Village. The only catch is that Strict Street is a
toll road, and her map does not indicate what the fare is.
The second road is Heightened Highway. It too leads to Violation
Village, but winds somewhat tortuously there. It has several exits,
which are not dearly marked on the map and which lead to dead
ends from which one cannot get to Violation Village. The attorney is
of DuBois's generation whose ancestry was half Dutch and half French would have faced few
constraints in choosing either nationality as 'defining' his identity.... (But] history dealt with
people like DuBois, who were part African, in a %ay that it reserved for no other racial or ethnic
intermixture."). The point is that the social construct can exert enough control to pernit us to
conclude that racial identity is an immutable characteristic.
"Rush, supra note 30, at 78-79.
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not certain she has enough fuel to make the longer trip, and (as with
Strict Street) there is a toll of ill-defined amount. Rumor has it that
the highway patrol is active and well-equipped on Heightened High-
way, and frequently stops motorists before they can arrive at the vil-
lage.
Finally, there is Rational Road. There is no toll to take this route,
but that is small comfort, since it winds around forever, seeming to go
everywhere except within view of Violation Village. Worse, the road is
crawling with patrol cars, who are known to enforce the most notori-
ous speed traps in the country. There is a faint rumor that somehow
someone once got to Violation Village via this route, but no one
really knows how they did it-or even if the rumor is true.
If one were to ask that attorney where she will focus her time and
attention, she will respond, "Getting on the right road out of Tier
Town." If at all possible, she must find a way to pay the toll to get on
Strict Street, because once on it, she is all but assured of getting to
Violation Village. And she must avoid Rational Road-the road to
oblivion-at all costs.
My point in this somewhat tedious storys' is this: For plaintiffs,
equal protection law has been almost all about getting the Court to
apply the highest possible level of scrutiny in assessing the govern-
ment's action. Of course, any litigant wants an appellate court to ap-
ply the most favorable possible standard in any sort of litigation. But
the Equal Protection Clause has been the extreme case. As Professor
Fallon observed about the conventional wisdom, "it is commonplace
that suspect-content tests that are '"strict" in theory' will routinely
prove 'fatal in fact.' Conversely, judicial scrutiny under rational basis
review is typically so deferential as to amount to a virtual rubber
stamp. "3  There is, in other words, a difference between a favorable
standard and an outcome-determinative standard.
No wonder, then, that the scholars of the era addressed what fac-
tors were relevant to getting the Court to apply strict scrutiny (i.e.,
the "toll" on Strict Street) more than they asked what constituted an
See City of Clebure v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (finding violation of
Fourteenth Amendment despite conclusion that classifications on the basis of mental retarda-
tion are subject to rational basis scrutiny).
In case it was not obvious, the "tolls" on Strict Street and Heightened Highway refer to tile
showings plaintiffs are required to make in order to lead the Court to conclude that some form
of more exacting judicial scrutiny is applicable to the particular trait. My point in saying that
the amount of the toll was not clear was that the criteria for strict and intermediate scrutiny are
far from settled, as the debate over immutability as a factor illustrates. See Spitko, supra note 2,
at 600 ("[T]he Supreme Court has failed to articulate cogently its means for determining
whether a classification other than race or national origin deserves heightened scrutiny."). The
presence or absence of police represents the likelihood the government defendant will be able
to cut the plaintiff off before she reaches Violation Village; they are absent on Strict Scrutiny,
and omnipresent and well-equipped on Rational Road. Enough.
Richard H. Fallon,Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 Term, Foreword: Implementing the Constitution,
111 HARv. L. REV. 56, 79 (1997).
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actual violation of the Equal Protection Clause. It is against that
backdrop that we must understand Dean John Hart Ely's analysis of
the value of immutability in constitutional argument. In his classic
Democracy and Distrust,s37 Ely asked not whether immutability ws rele-
vant to whether a government action violated the principles underly-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment, but whether it was relevant to the
application of strict scrutiny:
Classifications based on physical disability and intelligence are typically
accepted as legitimate, even byjudges and commentators who assert that
immutability is relevant. The explanation, when one is given, is that
those characteristics (unlike the one the commentator is trying to render suspert)
are often relevant to legitimate purposes. At that point there's not much
left of the immutability theory, is there?ss
In short, according to Ely, the immutability of race does not ex-
plain why race has been held to be a suspect classification, since
other, equally immutable traits have not been deemed suspect. At
most, immutability functions as a proxy for the illegitimacy of the
classification. The important question is not whether the characteris-
tic is immutable, but whether it is often, rarely, or never a legitimate
basis for government action. I call this question "expected rele-
vance," since it asks not whether the characteristic is relevant to the
particular government action, but how often it is likely to be relevant.
The less often it is relevant, the more suspicious courts will be when it
is used, according to Ely. In Ely's formulation, low expected rele-
vance rather than immutability is the toll for entry onto Strict Street."
Certainly, Dean Ely was correct that the relationship between
purpose and action is crucial in the courts' determination of what
level of scrutiny is appropriate in a particular instance.O Neverthe-
7 ELY, supra note 2.
S Id. at 150 (emphasis added).
See also Spitko, supra note 2, at 601 (finding in Supreme Court cases the principle that
government distinctions drawn "on the basis of a characteristic that othertise would be irrele-
vant to an individual's ability to contribute to society [are] inherently suspect ... and
thus... deserving of heightened equal protection scrutiny"). I hasten to add that te simple
label "expected relevance" is an oversimplification of Dean Ely's explanation of strict scrutiny,
which is much more famous for its identification of process failure in general than for its stress
on expected relevance in particular. SeeJed Rubenfeld, The Morwrni and the Milteium 66 GEO.
WASH. L REv. 1085, 1102 (1998) ("From criminal procedure to voting rights to the protection
of minorities, constitutional law could, Ely argued, 'overwlelmingly' be viewed as safeguarding
the democratic process, rather than imposing any independent 'substantive values."). Thus.
the driver seeking entry onto Strict Street is best off if she has both low expected relevance md
other indicia of process failure. But Ely does stress expected relevance as the component of the
test possessing the explanatory force others have mistakenly attributed to immutability, and so I
concentrate on that portion of his argument.
40 An analogy to Title VII is helpful in illustrating this point. In my Employment Discrimina-
tion seminar, I point out to my students that race is the only category for ultich Title VII does
not provide employers a bona fide occupational qualification defense. .Se 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(e) (1994) ("[Ilt shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees ... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin... where religion, sex.
or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification."). What is different, I ask them.
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less, Dean Ely's conclusion that immutability has no force does not
follow from this analysis. His "expected relevance" explanation for
which level of scrutiny is applied falls short of making this case. He
shows that there are some "immutable" characteristics (e.g., intelli-
gence, physical disability) as to which courts treat government classi-
fications with great deference, and from this asserts that immutability
does not correlate with strict scrutiny.4' But this argument is both cu-
riously descriptive and incomplete.
Ely's argument, echoed more recently by Professors Kenji Yoshino
and Janet Halley, " is descriptive in that he merely breaks down what
about race as compared to sex, national origin, and religion? The answer, of course, is that race
is rarely (if ever) relevant to job performance. Title VII manifests a deep skepticism that race
can be a legitimate job requirement-so deep that the statute is outcome-determinative on the
point. See William R. Bryant, Note, Justifiable Discrimination: The Need For a Statutog. Bona Pe
Occupational Qualification Defense For Race Discrimination, 33 GA. L. REV. 211, 213 (1998) ("Con-
gress did not include a bona fide occupational qualification ('BFOQ') for race in Title VII, pre-
sumably because it believed that there were no situations where the race of the employee would
be relevant to job performance.").
More frequently, however, there is a legitimate relationship between the other grounds
prohibited by Title VII and the employer's goals. Congress was less skeptical regarding the pos-
sible legitimacy of sex, religion, and national origin-skeptical enough that they are protected
by the statute, of course, but accompanied by a BFOQ defense leaving some room for the em-
ployer to prevail.
The same notion is reflected in Dean Ely's comment, and in the three levels of scrutiny
the Court has generally brought to bear in equal protection cases. When the Court is most
skeptical that a characteristic is likely to be relevant, the level of judicial scrutiny is highest-
strict scrutiny. Indeed, for the last half-century, strict scrutiny on questions of racial
discrimination has been as fatal in fact as Congress' refusal to provide a race-based BFOQ
defense in Title VII. When the courts are dubious (but not quite so dubious) of the potential
for a legitimate connection between classification and purpose, they employ "intermediate
scrutiny'--a test roughly analogous to an employer's odds of winning a case where tle BFOQ
defense is available: possible, but difficult. And where the characteristic is often if not always
relevant to a legitimate legislative purpose (e.g., a statute requiring that a person must be able
to see in order to obtain a driver's license), the rational basis test reflects this, giving the
challenging plaintiff roughly the same chance of prevailing as a Title VII plaintiff trying to bring
suit based on a characteristic not even covered by the statute. The parallels are illustrated
below:
EQUAL PROTECTION TITLE VII
RACE Strict scrutiny; fatal in No BFOQ defense available;
fact, if not automatically. fatal automatically.
SEX Intermediate scrutiny; may BFOQ defense available;
be relevant; difficult for difficult for employer toestablish.
government to justify.
SIGHT Rational basis; almost always Not covered by statute; automatically
upheld. upheld.
See also BAiFORTH, supra note 22, at 204 ("[W]e do regard it as legitimate-and very far
from morally arbitrary-to judge people on the basis of certain immutable characteristics.... An
immutability argument... is analytically incomplete either as an explanation of what is wrong
with hostile legal regulation or as ajustification for law reform.").
The descriptive voices of Yoshino, see, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 2, at 518 (basing dismissal
of immutability in part on the notion that "courts have begun to withdraw the immutability fac-
tor"), and Halley, see, e.g., Halley, supra note 2, at 513 (urging litigators to cease using immuta-
bility because, in part, "[a]lthough pro-gay advocates often advance the argument from immu-
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the Court has actually done in treating immutable characteristics.
Sometimes, as in Frantiero, the Court has pointed to immutability as
being a factor in applying heightened scrutiny. At the same time,
however, "it [has] stated that man), immutable characteristics, such as
intelligence and physical disability, may provide the basis of legiti-
mate discriminatory decisions."4 Such a descriptive argument, how-
ever, is ultimately unsatisfying. If the Court has been inconsistent in
its treatment of immutable characteristics, that should be an occasion
for critical inquiry into the inconsistency. It is insufficient to say sim-
ply that the inconsistency shows that immutability is not all it is
cracked up to be.
A better question suggests itself: Why are intelligence and disabil-
ity not treated like other immutable characteristics? The Court did
not say in Frontiero that the (relative) immutability of sex is relevant
because it is a proxy for expected relevance; it said without equivoca-
tion that "sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable charac-
teristic determined solely by the accident of birth."" If that w%-as a ba-
sis for subjecting sex-based classifications to heightened scrutiny, then
it ought to have been relevant when it came to intelligence and dis-
ability. To the extent that the Supreme Court limited the signifi-
cance of immutability in the constitutional inquiry in assessing dis-
ability in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,4 Cleburne should be
reconsidered, because it failed to reckon properly with the relevance
of immutability. To the suggestion that immutability is a weak argu-
ment in equal protection litigation, per Cleburne, the answer is simple:
It is Cleburne's treatment of immutability that is weak and should be
abandoned.
The key is that immutability is a relevant factor. Immutability need
not always and automatically produce strict scrutiny to be relevant.
Wholly apart from immutability, there may be other differences be-
tween the supposedly "acceptable" class of immutable characteris-
tics-intelligence and disability-that justify according those traits
less exacting scrutiny than the unacceptable ones-race and sex. The
tability with enthusiasm, it is clear that many judges do not find it pcrsuasive'), on this question
are surprising, given their othenise penetrating critical analysis of the Court's performance in
other respects.
Yoshino, supra note 2, at 504. Technically, of course, Professor Yoshino's description of
what the Court said of intelligence and physical disabilit)-that they may provide the basis of
legitimate discriminatory, decisions"-is true of any classification, including race and sex. I as-
sume that his point, stated more precisely, is hint the -acceptable' characteristics more fre-
quenty provide a legitimate basis for decisions than race and sex.
4Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion). It must be con-
ceded that the plurality opinion in Froniero is oddly schizophrenic, at times referring to the im-
portance of immutability as a basis for heightened scrutiny of sex-based classifications, while at
others suggesting that its importance is limited.
473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985) (rejecting the claim for heightened scrutiny for classifications
based on mental retardation in part because the Court rejected the claim that the immutability
of the characteristic was a sufficient basis for heightened scrutiny).
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existence of other such differences does not mean that immutability
is irrelevant. Thus, Professor Yoshino's confident assertion that im-
mutability "is overinclusive because it is impossible for society to op-
erate without discriminating on the basis of some immutable charac-
teristics"46 fails to prove his point. To the contrary; if anything, he has
pointed to at least one factor that might distinguish some immutable
characteristics from others, under the following rule:
The immutability of a trait is relevant to the constitutionality of
government decisions, unless it is impossible for society to operate
without discriminating on the basis of the trait.
Positing this rule, we can see a regime in which (a) immutability is
relevant, but (b) immutability the rule is not over-inclusive in the
sense that, in Yoshino's words, it "extends protection to more groups
than we wish to protect.
4 7
At most, Dean Ely's observation amounts to a litigator's tip: Do
not count on immutability to do the heavy lifting for a plaintiffs
equal protection claim, because the Court has not been consistent in
taking it into account. But in terms of an assessment of the role im-
mutability should play in equal protection analysis, it is at least as per-
suasive to criticize the Court's treatment of intelligence and physical
disability as it is to use that treatment as a basis for dismissing immu-
tability.
In fact, if we examine expected relevance, Dean Ely's suggested al-
ternative to immutability, it becomes evident that neither intelligence
nor physical disability is relevant to governmental decision-making
often enough to justify the Court's refusal to apply heightened scru-
tiny. In fact, intelligence is irrelevant to most governmental classifi-
cations. Eligibility for social security, for example, is not a function of
intelligence, nor is the classification of someone as entitled to vote in
national elections.
The areas in which intelligence might be claimed to have rele-
vance to government decisions are generally those in which govern-
ment acts most like a private decision-maker: when it is an employer,
for instance, or when it procures goods or services on a contractual
basis. Even in these realms, however, simple "intelligence" is so
grossly overbroad that it nears irrelevance. Actual measures of the
skills, experience, and abilities needed to perform a particular task
are far more accurate, and relevant, measures to guide governmental
decision-making.
46
Yoshino, supra note 2, at 504.
Id. As I will argue presently, I reject Professor Yoshino's implied premise that extending
some form of heightened judicial scrutiny to classifications based on intelligence and disability
would extend equal protection too far.
48 Professor Halley hints at her discomfort with these examples, asserted almost off-hand by
Dean Ely as if their high expected relevance was self-evident. See Halley, supra note 2, at 508
(calling the examples "a little dubious" because intelligence may not be unequivocally immuta-
ble and because disability may not exemplify "the class of unproblematic discriminations").
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Intelligence may be only roughly correlated, or it may even be in-
versely correlated, to a task. As Robert Hayman,Jr., observed:
From one perceived inability we induce a general inferiority- someone
who doesn't do well on standardized tests becomes "dumb" or even
"mentally retarded," and that means not only will they not become very
good nuclear physicists, they also won't become very good citizens, or
parents, or people. Being not smart at that one thing means that they
arejust plain not smart-at anything ....
[But] there are many kinds of smartness, and people can be smart
in many different ways, and the fact that they are not smart-or are not
made smart-in one way does not mean that they cannot be smart in
49
many other ways.
We have, of course, imbued "intelligence" wvith a legitimacy that
explains the casual acceptance of it as a characteristic relevant to de-
cision-making. That is why, almost three decades after Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,s there remains widespread acceptance of the notion that
employers should be able to use standardized tests as job criteria de-
spite their disproportionate impact on racial minorities.
But as a generalized, loose concept, intelligence is meaningless. It
resembles most closely Justice Stewart's characterization of obscenity:
We know it when we see it.5' But our vague sense that "intelligence is
often relevant" (i.e., that "smarter" people are more qualified or will
perform a task better) has no demonstrable basis in reality. There
are far more tasks as to which general intelligence-as distinguished
from specific skills, ability, and training-is irrelevant than there are
for which it is relevant. 52
The same is true of disability, a proposition now enshrined in fed-
eral law in the Americans with Disabilities Act. Most often, people
with physical and mental disabilities are entirely capable of perform-
ing ajob or availing themselves of the goods and serices offered by a
place of public accommodation. "3 It is mere myth, fear, and stereo-
ROBERT L HAYhiAN, JR., THE SMART CULTURE: SociEI, WrELIGENCE., AND THL LXW 25
(1998).
50 401 U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971) (subjecting standardized tests to disparate impact analysis
may violate Title VII).
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (l shall not today
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced %ithin [tie defini-
tion of obscenity] ... and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it
when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not thaL).
52 On top of this point must also be added the profoundly disturbing implications of accord-
ing presumptive legitimacy to our socially constructed notion of intelligence. given that its roots
lie in racialized understandings of merit. Sa'HAAN, supra note 49, at 220-21.
3 SeeArlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regakrd As"Prong. Giving Effect to Congres-
sional Intent, 42 ViL. L REv. 587, 587-88 (1997) ("During the congressional hearings concern-
ing the ADA, Congress learned that employers routinely used employment criteria based on
physical or mental characteristics to deprive otherwise qualified individuals of the opportunity
to work."). From the point of view of tie social constructionist. the attitudes that treat other-
wise qualified people as if they are unqualified effectively create die category of "disabled" peo-
ple, the category having little or no relation to the actual physical or mental capabilities of those
Apr. 2001]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
type that denies this-the very conditions marking low expected rele-
vance. Under Dean Ely's theory, governmental classifications based
on such a trait with low expected relevance should be subjected to
heightened scrutiny.
If we are to base our conclusion on Dean Ely's own examples,
then, only one outcome is possible: The "expected relevance" expla-
nation holds up no better than immutability. If Ely was correct that
the application of rational basis scrutiny to intelligence and disability
demonstrates that immutability is a constitutional illusion, it equally
undercuts expected relevance as the answer.
The same is true for perhaps the least-criticized element of the
traditional strict scrutiny test: the requirement that the group have
been "subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."'
The exact words of Dean Ely's challenge to immutability can be di-
rected at this factor as well, using the model of disability to illustrate:
Classifications based on physical disability... are typically accepted as le-
gitimate, even by judges and commentators who assert that [a history of
discrimination] is relevant. The explanation, when one is given, is
that... [disability] (unlike the one the commentator is trying to render
suspect) [is] often relevant to legitimate purposes. At that point there's
not much left of the [history of discrimination] theory, is there?'5
The point of this analysis is not that either "expected relevance"
or a history of discrimination is meaningless; the Supreme Court has
explicitly addressed them as key reasons why racial classifications
must be met with the most exacting judicial examination.6 The point
is that neither expected relevance, nor a history of discrimination,
nor immutability standing alone provides the full answer. Each, in-
stead, is a factor that influences the outcome."7 The Court is less
likely to apply strict scrutiny when a rarely relevant trait is mutable,
and more likely to do so where the rarely relevant trait is immutable."
Mutability, in other words, makes a difference.
individuals.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
5 ELY, supra note 2, at 150.
5% As I will discuss shortly, the utility of expected relevance is also limited by its narrow focus
on constitutional equal protection standards, and hence on discriminatory decisions by gov-
ernments rather than private actors. Standing alone, expected relevance has little if any force
in the political and social arena in which the legitimacy and legality of private conduct are de-
cided. See Samuel A. Marcosson, The "Special Rights" Canard in the Debate Over Lesbian and Gay
Civil Rights, 9 NoTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 137, 176 (1995) ("When litigating a consti-
tutional claim, the plaintiff wins if she shows that a discriminatory governmental action or pol-
icy was irrational. In the private context, however, it is not enough to show that a decision was
made for irrational reasons.").
57 See Halley, supra note 2, at 507 (asserting that immutability "is not a requirement but a far-
toy in the application of strict scrutiny, and even then functions as "immutability-plus," requir-
ing a link to other factors).
Id. at 508 (responding to Dean Ely's query whether anything is left of immutability by say-
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B. Deconstructing the Hegemony of Tiers
Even if Ely were correct that immutability is patently unhelpful in
advancing an equal protection plaintiff closer to the goal of having
the courts apply strict judicial scrutiny, that would be a dispositive ar-
gument only if strict scrutiny itself constitutes victory, as I have ex-
plained it did when Dean Ely wrote Democra' and Distrust. But on
that key issue-the importance of the levels of scrutiny-the times are
changing. We are witnessing the splendid irony of the Scalia Court
acting as critical scholar-with power. The power not just to decon-
struct in the pages of law reviews, but in the making (read: unmak-
ing) of law.
I refer to the Court's gradual abandonment of the once-rigid
frnamework of equal protection analysis, with its levels of scrutiny serv-
ing as an almost perfect predictor of outcomes (strict scrutiny, e.g., is
"fatal in fact"). At one end of the spectrum, the Court seemed to ap-
ply rational basis scrutiny and yet overturned Colorado's Amendment
2 in Romer v. Evans. On the other, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena,6W the Court adopted strict scrutiny for all racial classifications,
including those employed by Congress in the exercise of its power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,6 ' but stepped back from the
Scalia Abyss of saying that this produces the automatic result that all
or virtually all affirmative action programs are constitutionally in-
firm.ee Instead, the center of the Court-that is to say, Justice
ing, "[w ell, there might be, if there is any reason to suppose thmt an unrelated irmrutable char-
acteristic is more invidious than a classification based on an unrelated mutabheone."). Professor
Halley rejects this possibility by dismissing language from the plurality opinion in Fruntiero v.
Richard=son, 411 U.S. 677,686 (1973) (quoting Weber %. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. .106 U.S. 164.
175 (1972)): that it is a "basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some rela-
tionship to individual responsibility." She is correct that Fronlirm does not provide the basis for
arguing that an immutable, irrelevant characteristic is "more invidious than a mutable one-
but that does not mean no such basis exists.
M 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Ironically it has been argued that Justice Byron White. the author of
one of the most dismissive "rational basis" opinions in the Court's history. Bau-m it Halwidrk
478 U.S. 186 (1986), w-as disposed to see rational basis scrutiny as not constituting a mere rub-
ber stamp, but the occasion for genuine, active scrutiny by the Court. See Bernard W. Bell.
Byron R Ihif4t KennedyJustic 51 STAN. L RMv. 1373, 1390 (1999) (book review) (ForJustice
White.... minimum scrutiny was far from toothless, and indeed had a 'bite' that could prove
'fatal' to the challenged statute .... White held that a zoning ordinance requiring issuance of a
.special use permit' before anyone could establish a group residence for the mentally retarded
failed to meet minimum scrutiny... [and] he issued a dissent arguing that given the disparities
between school districts in the size of their tax bases and the absolute cap on the rate of taxa-
tion for every Texas district, the gross disparities in school funding between Texas school dis-
tricts failed the minimum scrutiny test." (citations omitted)).
60 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
61 I& at 224 ("[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmen-
tal actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting hint person to
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.").
See id. at 237 ("Finally, we irish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory.
but fatal in fact.' ... The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of
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O'Connor-was at pains to explain that the application of strict scru-
tiny in the affirmative action context just might be different: not fatal
in fact, but rather used only to put the state actor to its proof tojustify
what it has done. 3
The revival of the equal protection plaintiffs hopes of victory in a
rational basis case, followed rapidly by the revival of the equal protec-
tion defendant's hopes of victory despite strict scrutiny, suggests that
the era in which the level itself is outcome-determinative is over."
Indeed, it may even suggest the gradual collapsing of the levels them-
selves.65
If this is so, then constitutional litigants and their attorneys must
begin to consider what will replace the long-standing Holy Grail of
equal protection analysis. This, in turn, requires rethinking strategies
racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and gov-
ernment is not disqualified from acting in response to it."); cf. id. at 239 (Scalia,J., concurring)
("To pursue the concept of racial entidement-even for the most admirable and benign of
purposes-is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced
race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one race
here. It is American. It is unlikely, if not impossible, that the challenged program would sur-
vive under this understanding of strict scrutiny, but I am content to leave that to be decided on
remand.").
63 This argument that the importance of tiers is diminishing must not be overstated for two
reasons. First, while it is significant that a majority of the Court may not regard the outcome of
strict scrutiny analysis in affirmative action cases as a foregone conclusion, it is still momentous
that the Court has come as close to that position as it has. The adoption of strict scntiny in
affirmative action cases disassociates that standard from its roots in judicial protection of groups
who have suffered from a history of purposeful discrimination. It thus subjects governmental
policies and actions that are very dissimilar (invidious discrimination on the one hand, affirma-
tive action on the other) to a very similar, even if not identical,judicial critique.
Second, the Court has begun to vest the level of scrutiny determination with a new, inde-
pendent significance, thereby narrowing the scope of congressional enforcement power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000), the Court distinguished traits subject to heightened scrutiny (race and sex) from those
subject to rational basis scrutiny (age) in holding that Congress could not apply the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act to the states. Id. at 83. Though definite conclusions are diffi-
cult to draw from one case, Kimel may well come to stand for the proposition that the states
cannot be subjected to federal anti-discrimination statutes with respect to any characteristic or
practice not already suspect under the Constitution, a breathtaking limitation on congressional
authority. To put it another way, Congress may be limited to statutes that say, in effect, "And
that goes double!" Though the tiers are becoming less outcome-determinative in some re-
spects, the Court is hardly making them irrelevant.
SeeAdarand, 515 U.S. at 268 (SouterJ., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's very recognition today
that strict scrutiny can be compatible with the survival of a classification so reviewed demon-
strates that our concepts of equal protection enjoy a greater elasticity than the standard catego-
ries might suggest").
65 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term; Foreword: Leaving Things Undedided, 110
HARV. L. REv. 4, 77 (1996) ("Romer suggests that rationality review will not always result in vali-
dation; its form of rationality review is far more like the intermediate variety.... [Adarand]
holds that strict scrutiny is not 'fatal in fact' and in that way treats strict scrutiny as if it were
similar to intermediate scrutiny. The hard edges of the tripartite division have thus softened,
and there has been at least a modest convergence away from tiers and toward general balancing
of relevant interests."). But seeYoshino, supra note 2, at 488 n.5 (arguing that the seeming ex-
ceptions to the received wisdom that the level of scrutiny is outcome-determinative "have not
seriously altered the status quo").
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that have been long and widely accepted. They were selected because
of their perceived merit in getting the Court to adopt strict scrutiny.
But this was "merit" in a narrow sense: Their merit as strict scrutiny
indicators may now be less important, or even useless, in the new de-
constructed era.
Levels of scrutiny are generalizations. As Dean Ely suggested, and
Title VII confirms, statutes and judicial tests alike reflect an attitude
about whether a particular characteristic is likely to be relevant in the
aggregate. Courts decide that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifi-
cations writ large, and then utilize that test to pass on the constitu-
tionality of the specific classification. That is why Ely's point about
strict scrutiny refers to the expected rather than the actual relevance
of a characteristic.
The diminishing prominence of levels of scrutiny, in turn, also
signals a decline in the significance of the expected relevance of
characteristics in general. This void is being filled by the Court's con-
sideration of the actual relevance of the characteristic in the particu-
lar case, and to the specific classification being used by the govern-
ment.
This is the best reading of Justice O'Connor's careful, defensive
opinion in Adarand. She responded to Justice Stevens' dissent in a
way that explicitly and implicitly transformed the significance of the
strict scrutiny tier. Justice Stevens urged analysis that would first dis-
tinguish between benign and invidious classifications-not (directly)
for purposes of deciding the case, but in order to determine what
level of scrutiny should apply.66 Implicit in his formulation %%as the
notion that each side was striving for the most favorable level of scru-
tiny-the standard not as means, but as end.
Justice O'Connor, however, turned this analysis on its head, saying
that the Court could not divide benign from invidious classifications
as the basis for choosing the level of scrutiny; rather, the application
of the standard is designed to distinguish the benign from the invidi-
ous classification67 Since Justice O'Connor conceptualized strict
scrutiny as the means "to 'differentiate between' permissible and im-
permissible governmental uses of race,"' s she rejected Justice Stevens'
charge that the Court failed to understand the difference "between a
'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat." 69 Strict scrutiny, she re-
sponded, is the lens through which we read the sign.
6 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for 'ap-
plying the label 'strict scrutiny' to benign race-xLsed programs").
See Adarand 515 U.S. at 228 ("The point of carefully examining the interest asserted by
the government in support of a racial classification, and the eiidence offered to show that the
classification is needed, is precisely to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of race in
governmental decisionmaking.").
Id. at 245 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
10 Of course, the question remains whether a microscope is needed to tell die difference;
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From the other end of the Equal Protection Clause spectrum, a
similar phenomenon can be seen. In Romer, the Court assumed with-
out deciding that rational basis scrutiny should be brought to bear on
governmental classifications that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation. In assessing Colorado's Amendment 2 and finding it
lacked a rational basis, the Court conducted a narrow, context-
specific analysis-so narrow, in fact, that some writers have criticized
Romer because it may have little precedential value other than to es-
tablish that rational basis is the appropriate level of scrutiny for con-
stitutional claims brought by LGBT litigants.7'
But this critique of Romer misses a broader point. Like Adarand, it
may reflect the ascendancy of an analysis that stresses actual over ex-
pected relevance. Instead of looking to whether classifications based
on sexual orientation can often be expected to reflect invidious in-
tent, the Court examined whether Amendment 2 did so, using a Title
VII-like pretext analysis" to find it explainable by no reason other
than animus.
Lest there be any doubt this is what the Court had in mind in Ro-
mer, one need only consult the influential amicus curiae brief submit-
ted by Professor Tribe on behalf of himself and four other prominent
constitutional scholars.73 Tribe emphasized the particular thing
Colorado had done, avoiding entirely any discussion of how the
Court ought to determine whether it was permissible to classify citi-
zens on the basis of sexual orientation. Traditional doctrine asks
about the status of the group; as Tribe explained, consideration of
Amendment 2 "involves a prior and more basic question" than the
choice of a level of scrutiny, and "does not require any inquiry into
the nature of the ... class it might be said to target." 4 The Court
plainly accepted his invitation to remove the spotlight from the con-
stitutional status of sexual minorities, and refused to let that status
control the decision.
This understanding of Adarand and Romer is further supported by
the wide array of commentators who have attributed growing influ-
ence to the Court's "middle"--Justices O'Connor and Kennedy in
Justice Stevens might fairly have responded thatJustice O'Connor was using an extraordinarily
discerning instrument (akin to a microscope) when a mere pair of binoculars should be
enough for courts to distinguish benign from invidious classifications.
71 See Mark E. Papadopoulos, Note, Inkblot Jurisprudence: Romer v. Evans as a Great Defeat for
the Gay Rights Movement, 7 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 165, 201 (1997) (hypothesizing that lower
courts "may well have to conclude that Romer will strike down little more than laws that look like
Amendment 2").
V SeeRomer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996) (dismissing Colorado's claim of Amendment
2's limited scope as "implausible").
See Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WNi. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
89, 117 (1997) (arguing that the Court's reasoning "seems to draw on" the Tribe brief); Papa-
dopoulos, supra note 71, at 192 n.194 ("Tribe's complex and well-reasoned analysis appears to
have greatly influenced the Court.").
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Laurence Tribe et al. at 3, Romer (No. 94-1039).
[Vol. 3:2
COASTRUCTIAF IMMUTABILITY
particular-as the decisive votes between its left (Breyer, Ginsburg,
Stevens, Souter) and right wings (Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas)." It is a
hallmark of the justices who comprise the Court's contemporary cen-
ter that they avoid broad, sweeping pronouncements, favoring in-
stead careful, limited reasoning that is both case-specific and some-
times maddeningly opaque in indicating where the Court might be
headed (and in providing guidance to the bench and bar)." It is to
be expected that a Court controlled by such guarded moderates
would hold close to the particulars of a specific action and eschew
broad, landmark pronouncements on standards for whole groups.
Read in tandem, Romer and Adarand signal the Court's interest in
narrow, case- and context-specific arguments, either about what pre-
cisely the state has done (as in Romer) or about the relationship be-
tween classification and the state's purpose (as in Adarand). The days
of the primacy of general inquiry into how often the classification can
be expected to be relevant are waning.
C. Immutability's Place in the New Environment
As litigants shift their attention awray from levels of scrutiny, they
must reevaluate earlier strategic decisions-including the scholarly
consensus to avoid the immutability argument on the ground that it
is unhelpful in obtaining strict scrutiny. This need for reevaluation
also presents the occasion for further reflection too long absent or at
least insufficiently attended to: How do legal strategies cohere with
social and political arguments? In this section, I will suggest that im-
mutability should play a significantly heavier doctrinal role in the new
equal protection analysis and that it is enormously helpful on the so-
cial and political side of civil rights campaigns.
1. Immutability in Post-Tier Constitutional Analysis
As judges find it less useful to rely on the traditional markers of
strict scrutiny, they are inevitably going to search for other criteria
that identify violations of the Equal Protection Clause. In the previ-
One might quibble with the details--some would place Justice Bre)er into the middle
with O'Connor and Kennedy, while others would place the latter two onto the Court's right
flank and conceptualize them not as being in the "middle," but merely as being open-minded
on particular issues to split away from the otherwise solid fi-member bloc of conservative
votes. For present purposes, it is sufficiently precise to say thatJustices Kennedy and O'Connor
were crucial votes (and voices) for the positions the Court took in both Adamrd and Rnower. put-
ting them in the "middle" insofar as we are concerned.
,6 See Sunstein, supra note 65, at 84 ("The most distinctive feature ofJtstice O'Connor's ar-
gument [in 44 Liquonnar, Ina v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)] is its narrowness. The opin-
ion answers only those questions that are necessary to the disposition of the case."): Patricia M.
Wald, UpstairslDoumstairs at the Supreme Court: Implizations of the 1991 Trm for the C67titultonal
Work of the Lower Courts, 61 U. CIN. L REv. 771, 786-90 (1993) (discussing narrow. fact-spedfic
reasoning of opinions byJustices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter).
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ous section, I suggested that a generalized inquiry into the expected
relevance of a trait-one of the factors identified by Dean Ely as im-
portant to the decision regarding which level of scrutiny to apply-
will give way to a more particularized analysis of its actual relevance to
the particular government action at issue.
In such an environment, immutability takes on increased impor-
tance. Government policies are often enacted in the hope of influ-
encing people's decisions. For example, the Internal Revenue Code
makes charitable contributions deductible from a tax payer's income,
partially in the hope of influencing people to be charitable." Crimi-
nal statutes, of course, are based in great part on the deterrence ra-
tionale-which is nothing more than the hope of influencing people
not to do bad things.78 It is doubtful that classifications based on im-
mutable characteristics can or will often be relevant to government
classifications as to which deterrence is the underlying goal."
This point can be illustrated by considering two criminal statutes.
The first penalizes people for being Methodists, while the second pe-
nalizes people for being over six feet tall. The first would discrimi-
nate on the basis of a mutable characteristic, while the second would
discriminate on the basis of an immutable characteristic. Both would
be unconstitutional, of course, ° but the former only because of the
See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Poliry: A Com-
parison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 711 (1970) ("Many of the tax
expenditures were expressly adopted to induce action which the Congress considered in the
national interest. For example .... the charitable deduction was intended to foster philan-
thropy .... ").
See generally Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUMI. L. REV.
1193 (1985).
In some contexts, this point produces the far more complex issue of the distinction be-
tween conduct and status. A government policy might rationally attempt to influence behavior
associated with an immutable characteristic, even if it would be impossible to affect the status of
the person in his or her classification. For instance, if sexual orientation is immutable, then it
would be irrational for government policy to be driven by the goal of inducing people to
change their orientation. But a policy trying to influence people not to have sex with people of
the same sex (or, conversely, one trying to influence people not to have sex with people of tile
opposite sex) could still be rational. Indeed, this point has been stressed by opponents of the
immutability argument, who believe it will not answer anti-gay forces who argue that homosex-
ual conduct is a choice. See BAMFORTH, supra note 22, at 205 (immutability of homosexual
status "is insufficient by itself to explain why it is wrong to discriminate against people for actu-
ally engaging in same-sex sexual acts"), and that at best it will procure a limited form of equality
in which sexual minorities have the right to "be" gay or lesbian but not to "act" gay or lesbian.
See Pickhardt, supra note 2, at 951 (winning cases on this basis "would earn gay men and lesbi-
ans the right to be gay but not the right to do anything, either publicly or privately, that could
be considered gay"). I will address the difficult problem of regulation of conduct in Part
II.C.2.a. See infra pp. 605-09.
8o Perhaps I should not say "of course." The Supreme Court has permitted governments to
penalize members of certain religious groups if they exercise their religion, notwithstanding the
Free Exercise Clause. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free
Exercise Clause does not protect the Native American religious practice of smoking peyote). If
Methodists sought to smoke peyote as part of their worship, government could penalize them-
which seems awfully close to penalizing them for being Methodists. See infra pp. 607-08 (dis-
cussing the link between penalizing conduct associated with religious status). Nevertheless, the
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Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Absent this explicit
protection of religious beliefs, government would be able to point to
a relevant purpose of the anti-Methodist law: to discourage people
from becoming Methodists and provide them a strong incentive to
stop being Methodists. To the extent that laws favoring one group over
another are motivated by a desire to influence people to change their
behavior or group identification, it is plain that immutability is one of
the indicia of actual irrelevance and, hence, of unconstitutionality.
This diversion into criminal law highlights an important point.
Consideration of immutability in equal protection law has been im-
poverished by its failure to assess its place in other areas of law. Im-
mutability has had a powerful effect across the spectrum of the law,
most profoundly in the context of criminal punishment. If an indi-
vidual did not choose a given trait that is causally linked to activity
that would otherwise be deemed criminal, and she has no control
over its continuation, it ordinarily results in the withholding of crimi-
nal sanction.s- Insanity, for instance, is often grounded in the immu-
tability principle; we hold the insane individual blameless for his
conduct in instances where he "lacks substantial capacity
to ... conform his conduct to the requirement of the lav.";3
Thus, the prominence of "decision-influencing" as a rationale for
government action has deep implications for the place of immutabil-
ity in equal protection law. Immutable traits are uniquely unlikely to
be rationally tied to the Eurpose of influencing people to choose one
path instead of another. The whole point is that there is no choos-
statement in the text is technically true in the narrow sense that the Constitution does still pro-
hibit penalties against people for their religious status.
81 My focus is not on the shopworn debate over whether there is a "criminal personality." by
which some people are predisposed by genetics to commit crimes. S-. e.g., HANSJ. £LNE.NcK &
Gisu H. GUDJONSSON, THE CAUSES AND CURES OF CRINuALTy 17-18 (1989) (rcieding devel-
opment of theory of "homo delinquens," the "criminal man" who was 'thought to be not only
predisposed but predestined to crime"). The question is not whether criminality is immutable, or
even constitutes a definable category given the ever-changing scope of the behavior deemed
criminal. The question is whether, in defining die basis for criminal liability, te law distin-
guishes between individuals on the basis of immutability of certain characteristics, even if in
some instances the judgment of immutability might be tentative, questionable, or even unten-
able.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2) (1962) (exempting from criminal sanction acts such as
"a reflex or convulsion" or "a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep," because such
conduct does not include "a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of uhich he is
physically capable").
8d § 4.01 (1).
84 This point is attenuated somewhat if the characteristic is immutable for some but not all
members of the class; the government policy could be seen as rationally supported by the desire
to influence the decisions of the "mutable" ones. Sre Marcosson, supra note 56. at 177-80 (dis-
cussing ramifications of possibility that sexual orientation can be mutable or immutable).
While that answer creates difficulties for my analysis at first glance, it ultimately cannot cary the
day. It relies on the premise that government can punish one group of people (here, the "im-
mutable" ones) in order to affect choices made by others, a dubious proposition at best. See id.
at 180 (arguing that a policy of this type "is corrupt even if it would influence some people, be-
cause of the immoral manner in which it treats those who could not have been influenced*).
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ing to be done when a characteristic is immutable. In a constitu-
tional regime wherein judges are called upon to assess the actual
rather than the expected relevance of a characteristic, the explana-
tion most commonly offered by governments when called upon to
explain themselves will be unavailable, and actual relevance will be
far more difficult to show.85
2. The Overlooked Role of Constitutional Arguments:
Confluence with Cultural, Social and Political Stories
Even if immutability (or, for that matter, any other argument we
might consider using in constitutional litigation) were deemed to
have little if any value in winning the constitutional argument, a fair
assessment of its merits must nevertheless take a broader view. The
assumption that the fate of an entire civil rights movement depends
entirely upon creating a favorable Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence plainly is untenable. There are so many other fora for political
and social discourse-legislative debates, electoral politics, commu-
nity organizations and activism, personal interactions with friends
and family members-that we must also consider how effective any
particular claim is likely to be in those spaces. 6 A movement may also
express multiple goals, such as seeking changes in legal rules but also
trying to shift social attitudes, and an argument's effectiveness de-
pends on which purpose it is designed to serve.
In the specific case of immutability, its merit as a legal matter tells
us little about its importance in political and social debate. We must
ask different questions: Is there a moral force to the immutability ar-
gument that will prove persuasive to voters and/or legislators? Does
the immutability argument ring true; that is, does it accurately and
believably communicate the experience of the subordinated group?
The answer to each of these questions points us in the direction of
using the immutability argument.
As I will show in the next section, any morality-based arguments in favor of government
use of a classification are also seriously weakened when the characteristic forming the basis for
the classification is immutable. See infra pp. 606-07. This has important implications for the
constitutional issue as well. If, for instance, a government sought to defend a policy favoring
people under six feet tall on the ground that being over six feet is immoral, the fact that people
do not choose and cannot change their height would help to demonstrate the irrationality of
thatjustification. In that way, immutability undermines not only the decision-altering rationale,
but also the morality rationale.
See Mark Tanney, Note, The Defense of Marriage Act: A "Bare Desire to Harm" an Unpopular
Minority Cannot Constitute a Legitimate Governmental Interest, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 99, 101
(1997) ("With almost every legal argument so far unsuccessful in the courts, proponents of gay
rights have suggested that efforts to ameliorate homophobic prejudices on a societal scale can be
as valuable as court battles in the movement toward equality." (footnotes omitted)).
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a. The Moral Force of Inmutabilitq
Few arguments offered on behalf of ending discrimination or
inequality resonate more powerfully than immutability. It reflects the
universal appeal of the concept that it is unfair to disadvantage peo-
ple based on a characteristic over which they exercise no control," a
moral force that explains its role at the core of the justifications we
assert as the basis for imposing criminal punishment. Thus, while we
surely lock away both the murderer and plague victim to keep them
away from the rest of us, and while we do so in both cases (in part)
because we fear their presence may result in the loss of life, we "pun-
ish" and hold blameworthy only the murderer.
This moral argument has a cascading effect. First, once a trait is
shown not to have been chosen and to be immutable, it is extraordi-
narily difficult to make the claim that people with the characteristic
are, because they have it, immoral. s Second, the moral argument
renders the discrimination itself, rather than the characteristic or the
people who have it, "open to criticism as immoral."3
Perhaps most important, the moral force of immutability renders
trifling the criticism that it would protect only the immutable status
and not the outward expressions of the status. In many instances, this
is said to make the protection afforded by immutability quite hollow.
In the case of sexual orientation, for example, the right to "be" gay or
lesbian is all well and good, but it seems to leave the state free to
criminalize homosexual conduct-in which, after all, the individual
chooses to engage. If the state has this power, or even the authority
otherwise to discriminate against people who engage in homosexual
conduct, the right won effectively consists of the right to be celibate,
7 See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164. 175 (1972) (discrimination on the basis
of immutable characteristics violates "the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing); Bhandari v. First Nat'l
Bank of Commerce, 829 F.2d 1343, 1352 (5th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing between race-based
and citizenship-based distinctions on the ground that, because the former is based on an immu-
table trait, it "[represents) an evil, always and everywhere"); RiCHARD D. MOM. GA%5JL StICE:
A STUDYOF ETHIcs, SOCIMTAND LAW 39 (1988) ("[T]o hold a person accountable for that over
which the person has no control is a central form of prejudice.").
See Larry NV Yackle, Parading Ourselves: Frtvdom of Sprercl at the Feast of St. Patrick, 73 B.U. L
REV. 791,856 (1993) ("Of course, if homosexuality is in the genes, then it is ever so difficult to
ascribe moral significance to any individual's gay or lesbian indinations." (footnote omitted)).
9Id.
90 There is a more simplistic version of this argument, which is that the status "homosexual'
is itself behaviorally-defined, thus distinguishing it from characteristics (race and sex) the law
has deemed immutable in Equal Protection Clause litigation. S&gee-raily Feldblum. supra note
8, at 275-76 (discussing cases rejecting immutability argument on ground that homosexuality is
defined by conduct and hence cannot be immutable). That argument is patently false: it is en-
tirely possible (indeed, common) for people to identify themselves as heterosexual or homo-
sexual and yet engage in no sexual acts. Catholic priests who maintain their vow of celibacy are
one obvious example. The class of people with a particular sexual orientation is plainly defined
by attributes other than the sexual conduct in which they engage. However, that leaves for dis-
cussion the more subtle version of the argument noted in the text-even if there is a homosex-
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and as Chai Feldblum gently put it, "surely gay people want more
than that."'
But the notion that immutability leaves the state free to penalize
an individual's "chosen" expression of her immutable status fails to
reckon with the moral dimension of immutability. For the critic who
finds such comfort in the status versus conduct distinction, a diver-
sion into the realm of religion might illustrate the point. Presumably,
we would all agree that the state could not criminalize ordination as a
Catholic priest. This is not, of course, because religion is immutable,
but because of the shared societal consensus, reflected in the First
Amendment, favoring free exercise of religionYw The moral power of
that commitment, moreover, extends beyond prohibiting the state
from making priests into criminals. The state could no more crimi-
nalize the core expressions of status as a priest, many of which are
acts-giving communion, hearing confessions, spreading the Gospel,
etc. Such regulation would violate the same moral principle that
barred the status-based regulation in the first place.
The moral implications of immutability have similar breadth.
They extend not just to the status, but also to the core expressions
without which the status would lose its meaning for the individual. In
the case of sexual orientation, those expressions include sexual con-
duct. This is true even though there can be heterosexuality without
heterosexual conduct, just as, to complete the analogy, there are
Catholic priests who engage in none of the conduct mentioned above
as characteristic of a priest. The point is not whether every member
of a particular class does a particular thing. The point is whether
state regulation of the conduct would violate the very moral principle
that bars state regulation of the status.
The proper question, then, is whether a persuasive case can be
made that penalizing the conduct is tantamount, in design or effect,
to penalizing the status. Plainly, criminalizing conduct typical of
Catholic priests would be morally indistinguishable from criminaliz-
ing their status. And it is perhaps even more plain that penalizing
sexual conduct between persons of the same sex is equivalent to pe-
nalizing homosexuals-that is, penalizing people because of their
ual status apart from conduct, so long as the state distinguishes based solely on the conduct and
not the status, it does not need to confront the immutability argument and its attendant moral
power.
Id. at 296.
'" SeeJ. M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2366 (1997) (acknowledging
that defenders of immutability can justify protection of religion despite its mutability by point-
ing "to the Religion Clauses as an independent justification for protection of religious minori-
ties"). Professor Balkin's response to this argument is to say it "puts the cart before the horse"
in that the Religion Clauses "exist in part because the Framers recognized that religious intoler-
ance was an evil .... " Id. Defenders of immutability thus need to explain the basis for saying
discrimination on the basis of immutable characteristics is similarly evil. That, in fact, is my pre-
sent purpose.
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immutable characteristic. 93 If, for instance, a state criminalizes anal
intercourse between two consenting adults only when both those
adults are men, as some states do,9' it is not the act of sodomy that is
being singled out for punishment. If it were, the state would crimi-
nalize the act regardless of the sex of the participants. It is the homo-
sexuality that is being punished-and that makes it indistinguishable
from penalties that are directly based on status, penalties that are
immoral because of their treatment of an immutable characteristic.
And when the federal government dismisses people from the military
for "homosexual conduct"-defined to include the statement, "I am
homosexual"-again, it is the homosexuality rather than the conduct
that is being punished, and the immorality emerges again. Such
conduct-based discrimination is, in the end, subject to the same
moral objections as discrimination based on a status that is immuta-
ble.95
This is, I confess, a morality-based approach to the problem: Im-
mutability carries with it a moral imperative. A legal system is unjust,
and hence immoral, if it fails to protect individuals from disadvan-
tages that are based on immutable characteristics. That is a part of
the answer to Dean Ely's challenge: to "tell us exactly why we should
be suspicious of legislatures that classify on the basis of immutable
characteristics.""
Of course, grounding the significance of immutability in moral
reasoning of this type risks running afoul of David Hume's centuries-
old argument that morality itself is socially constructed, and hence
that the recognition of rights depends ultimately on the social or-
If that is not a sufficient moral case, there is yet another, more fundamental argument to
be made, specific to the case of sexual orientation. The premise of the status versus conduct
argument is that notwithstanding the immutability argument, the state would remain free to
prohibit sexual conduct, leaving gay men and lesbians with the hard-won but limited right to
remain celibate. There are serious moral implications to such a "deal,* which I have discussed
elsewhere. See Marcosson, supra note 56, at 179-80 n.127 (criticizing the 'moral reasoning"
making "involuntary, life-long abstinence from sex" the price of equality as 'indescribably cruel
and alien to American values of privacy, individual autonomy, limited government, and fair-
ness;" and arguing that such reasoning "condemn [s] a whole class of people to lives that are, in
a central way, empty of fulfillmentjoy, and happiness"); see also E. Gan Spitko, A Bivokgie Argu-
ment for Gay Essentialimn-Ddenninism ImpheationsforEqual Proteriion and Substanliv Due Proees 18
U. HAW. L REV. 571,597 (1996) ("The decision to express a same-sex attraction ... profoundly
impacts the decision-maker's self-identity, happiness, [and] 'personal dignity and auton-
om ' ..) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833.851 (1992)).
SeeNan D. Hunter, Life AfterHardwick, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L L RE . 531.538 (1992) ("Since
1973, eight states have amended their laws to specify that oral or anal sex is prohibited only be-
tween persons of the same sex [and not between opposite sex partners]." (footnote and cita-
tions to statutes omitted)).
95 For this reason, immutability would strengthen the significance of Roirt v. EtwLsu 517 U.S.
620 (1996), which has been criticized as relatively empty for protecting only the status of being
lesbian or gay "without protecting any content the life attached to that name may hav." Todd
Huhes, MakingRomer Work, 33 CAL W. L REv. 169, 173 (1997).
ELY, supra note 2, at 150. The more substantial part of the answvr is discussed infra pp.
635-38.
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ganizations and relationships of which we are a part." I certainly do
not regard my position that it is ordinarily immoral and unjust to dis-
advantage someone on the basis of an immutable characteristic as
somehow based in natural law. Nor do I claim that it must be true
across all legal and social systems.
My claim is more limited than that: It is about the morality and
justice of such distinctions in the Anglo-American legal system. The
point, as Hume recognized, is that despite the society-specific charac-
ter of values, we can continue to reason aboutjustice, and that "a view
of Uustice must be] constructed by the community." 8 While our con-
sideration of the appropriate legal regime must therefore be culture-
specific, it is nevertheless coherent to discuss, in Clair Palley's felici-
tous phrase, "the prevailing moral convictions forming an essential
part of the culture of the society in which we live."9 The moral force
of immutability in our culture is both essential and powerful.
Even if we are uncomfortable with a morality-based argument, the
reality is that we have little choice in the matter. The debate over the
validity of a system of social disadvantaging cannot focus solely on the
slice of that system represented by governmental action and hence-
in the United States at least-subject to constitutional analysis. The
focus must be far wider; any proposed argument must be assessed for
its strength in confronting the legitimacy of the whole network of de-
cisions that privilege one group over another.
When seen in this light, the weakness of the "expected relevance"
approach is most apparent. Even if I underestimate its power for
equal protection clause analysis,' °° it has very little force outside that
realm, unless it is combined with a morality-based approach such as
that afforded by the argument from immutability. As I wrote else-
where:
Since permitting even irrational decisions can be justified out of respect
for a private decision maker's autonomy, something beyond a showing
that... discrimination is irrational is needed ....
... [I]mmutability is one reason why it is irrational to discriminate ...
[but it also shows] that it is not just irrational, but also wrong, to dis-
criminate against people based upon a characteristic they did not choose
and cannot change.10
Government acts may successfully be challenged as irrational
without more; that is what "rational basis" scrutiny means. But when
it comes to private discrimination, irrationality must be paired with
something else, something that distinguishes the permissible irra-
97 See CLAIRE PALLEY, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND HuMAN RiGHTs 8 (1991) (discussing
Hume's argument that "[v]alues ... depend upon human propensities").
98 Id.
Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
too See supra pp. 664-669 (discussing diminished importance of "expected relevance" in con-
temporary equal protection analysis).
10 Marcosson, supra note 56, at 176.
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tionality (e.g., an employer decides to hire only people with red hair)
from the irrationality the society places off-limits (e.g., a'n employer
decides to promote only people who acceptJesus Christ as their per-
sonal savior). In the case of religion, that "something" is a societal
commitment to free, uncoerced religious belief. But as to man)
traits, that something can consist of forceful moral argument of the
sort immutability provides.'Ot
b. The Experience of lmmutability
Public persuasion requires more than legal, doctrinal argument,
and it requires more than carefully mapped lobbying. The minority
group's stories of unfairness, of inequality, and of deprivation must
be told and understood by the wider culture.'""
To the extent that members of a subordinated group experience
their membership as immutable, that experience will comprise part
of their story. In my view this is inevitable and desirable.'0 Included
in the narrative of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s
was the idea of the intense pain and humiliation associated with be-
ing Black in a social structure that made whiteness-a status of course
entirely off-limits to people with "one drop" of "black blood"'t -- syn-
onymous with virtue and intelligence."' The immutability of the ra-
1- In this respect, my proposal can be located within the ongoing consideration of te role
of moral argumentation in civil rights movements. Ser, e.g., Feldblum. supra note 8, at 244 (ar-
guing that "legislative and judicial actions fhat force gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals to forgo
the sexual and emotional gratifications that arise naturally from their sexual orientation run
counter to our society's shared sense of morality," and that lesbian and gay rights activists
should consider making this argument); Carlos A. Ball, MoralFoundationsfor a Discourse on Saje-
Sex Mariage Looking Beond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. .J. 1871, 1934 (1997) (arguing that
"there is no consistent (or effective) •...• of arguing for dte need to recognize same-sex mar-
riage without engaging in a discussion of how those types of marriages are nonnatively valn-
able").
103 See Marc Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gaider, Rae Sttm)p,
and Legal Protedionfor Lesbians and Cay Men, 46 U. MtiMI L REV. 511,516-17 (1992) (discussing
the use of both inclusive and persuasive storytelling as an important uay "to identify and coun-
ter pre-understanding about excluded groups"); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stor. 79
CAL. L REv. 971, 1051 (1991) (arguing that narratives of excluded groups represent "te strug-
gle 'of [their] memory against [the] forced forgetting' imposed by official abstraction").
See Ball, supra note 102, at 1936 ("Presumably, most, if not all, of the gays and lesbians who
seek societal recognition of same-sex marriage believe, as a personal matter, that their relation-
ships are normatively good (or at least that they are capable of having a relationship with some-
one of the same gender which is normatively good) .... The removal of the moral brackets pre-
scribed by political liberalism means that these individuals will be able to incorporate their
'internal' views about the goodness of their relationship into their public reasoning.").
10See supra pp. 654-56.
16 SeeBrown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494-95 & n.l 1 (1954) (relying upon social science
data demonstrating that, for Black children, "[t]o separate them front others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.");
Farley, supra note 27, at 467 ("Race, the 20th century's preeminent formi of pleasure, promises
to be the problem of the 21st century because its many-splendored pleasures are asymmetrical.
Apr. 2001]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA IV
cial identity imposed on African-Americans required them to fight for
equality not as whites, but as African-Americans. 7 This was part of
the impetus for the "Black is Beautiful" and "Black Pride" movements
of the 1960s, which attempted to improve the self-image of blacks by
embracing blackness as a positive, enriching, or ennobling attrib-
ute-a positive mark of blackness. This movement, which focused
largely upon changing the characteristics of the black mark, can be
viewed not only as an attempt to instill black pride, but also as an at-
tempt to convince whites, as well as blacks, that the negative charac-
teristics which they associate with blackness are erroneous.
This leaves us with a dilemma. If immutability constitutes an ar-
gument of uncertain merit in constitutional terms, but has a moral
force and captures the experience of the members of the group, how
should it be deployed? My answer is that consistency in story is cru-
cial. It would be worse to leave out an important component of a
group's "social" narrative when it speaks to judges (who, after all, will
have heard that narrative in their capacity as citizens) than it would
be to include that point in legal arguments, even if it were true that
careful analysis would demonstrate its infirmity as a purely legal mat-
ter. Thus, immutability should be included in litigation as part of the
foundation of a group's identity, if and when immutability is an im-
portant aspect of the self-presentation made by the group to the
broader culture.'
Professor Halley suggests that the multi-forum dimension of civil
rights movements can be handled by relying on the immutability ar-
gument in personal discourse, while omitting it from litigation."'
Her division between personal discourse and courtroom strategy,
however, creates a deep and ultimately fatal strategic tension: It as-
sumes that judges decide cases based solely and narrowly on the ar-
guments the litigants choose to make in court, rather than using the
additional knowledge and insights they bring with them into the
Race is an unadulterated form of pleasure for whites only. For blacks, it is a form of humilia-
tion.").
107 See Rush, supra note 30, at 97 (observing that during civil rights movement, "Black Ameri-
cans revolted and started demanding respect as Black Americans," even if they could success-
fully "pass" as white); Hickman, supra note 27, at 1167 (relating experience of a Black attorney
who fought enforcement of a restrictive racial covenant by challenging its constitutionality, but
"would not deny his identity, he would not claim that his light skin made him any less of a Ne-
gro--even if it cost him his home").
108 Alex M.Johnson,Jr., Destabilizing Racial Classifications Based on Insights Gleaned from Trad,
mark Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 887, 926 (1996).
109 This self-presentation can be seen as a function of the social construction of the category
sexual orientation. Since sexual orientation is constructed so that the members of each classifi-
cation often perceive their classification as heterosexual, homosexual, etc., as immutable, the
members will-to the extent they are given the opportunity-present to the greater community
autobiographies containing an immutability component.
110 Halley, supra note 2, at 567 ("[T]he argument becomes burdened with an ethical problem
it does not have when used privately: When pro-gay advocates use the argument from immuta-
bility before a court on behalf of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals, they misrepresent us.").
[Vol. 3:2
COASTRUCT11F LMMUTABILITY
courtroom. Judges who have heard the private discourse of immuta-
bility Halley describes will expect to hear consistent themes being
sounded in court. Litigants adopting a contrary strategy ill be met
with skepticism if not disbelief, undermining the strength of their
cases.
A separate problem arises, however, when the group is not homo-
geneous. The immutability claim is justified in great part by the ay
in which individuals experience a characteristic." But within some
groups, that experience will vary, effectively creating sub-groups. In-
deed, it is arguable that all characteristics divide in this fashion-i.e.,
that individuals who ostensibly have the same trait in fact experience
it differently. This is obviously the case with religion, in which, for
example, people who identify themselves as Jewish have radically dif-
fering notions of what that means, even to the point where some
deny the claims of others to ajewish identity.'"2 Somewhat more sub-
fly, it is also the case with race, as to which racial groups divide into
sub-groups marked by often-bitter divisions over what it means to be
"really" Black"s or "loyal" to the "white race.""'
One axis along which the group can divide is that some experi-
ence the characteristic as immutable and include that experience in
the story they tell, while others experience it as mutable and voli-
tional. Such a group is faced with a kind of dissonance and with the
risk of transmitting incoherent and ineffective messages.
But that is not the only risk brought about by the divergence of
experience within the group. Perhaps more dangerous is the splin-
tering that can be occasioned by the decision either to argue or not
See infra pp. 633-38 (arguing that when a classification within a socially constructed cate-
gory is experienced as immutable, it indicates a system of oppression of a disadvantaged group).
1 See Daniel Klein, Examining Israeli Pluralism, CHIC. MAROON, Jan. 31. 1998. http:/www.
chicagomaroon.com/artides/a880486523.shtm (last visited Aug. 25, 1999) (report on meeting
of the General Assembly of the Council of Jewish Federations, at which leaders debated over
"the struggle between the rigorously orthodox and non-orthodox movements in Israel over le-
gitimacy of non-orthodox conversions").
is See Clarence Thomas, Civility: A Specth Ddhiterd by Assodalejustier Clan-nre Thomas to Stu-
dents at Washington & Lee University Shool of Laut, 4 RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTsr L J. 1. 4 (1998)
(arguing that during the 1980s, conservative Blacks were "called 'Uncle Tom's.' 'sell-out's,' and
a myriad of other names"); Leonard M. Baynes, izo is Blade Enough For You? An Anatros of
Northwestern University Law School's Struggle Over Minority Faculty Hiring, 2 MIcH.J. ucm & L 205,
205-12 (1997) (discussing controversy over hiring decision because of questions over tie racial
identity of candidate, including opposition by minority students who felt she uus not *black
enough" to be deemed a "minority candidate"); DAvID K. SHIPLER. A COUNTRY OF STPNGERS:
BLAcKs AND WHITEs IN AMEmCA 115-16, 242-54 (1997) (discussing concerns among African-
Americans about interracial dating and friendships as "disloyal" or reflecting a child "pretend-
ing you're something you're not," as well as divisions among African-Americans between lighter
and darker-skinned subgroups).
114 SeeJohn Scott & Catherine Crier, Bombs and Hatrdl, FoxFiles, Apr. 22. 1999. 1999 %%L
18490884 (interview with Neo-Nazi Davis Hawke, responding to question about white Chris-
tians-incuding his mother-marryingjews by stating, "that's race treason. I would send any
race traitor basically to a certain camp designed for race traitors, a camp of elimination. White
race traitors have got to be eliminated because they are traitors.).
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argue from the immutability experienced only by some members of
the community. Those whose experience differs may feel unrepre-
sented by the argument, and fear that any transformation in legal
rules will "leave them behind." This seems a rational fear; if the law
changes in response to immutability, courts and legislatures might
reasonably limit the new protection to those to whom immutability
applies. 5
And there is yet a third risk of the immutability argument when
made on behalf of a "divided" community: It spreads a false message
of homogeneity, which in turn limits the transformative power of the
argument. To the extent that immutability is the basis upon which
equal rights are accorded, it becomes a normative template, fostering
and reifying inequality as to other characteristics and conditions that
are not immutable. Professor Kenji Yoshino has noted the assimila-
tionist quality of this problem, 6 but there is also a "ceiling" problem.
Any condition imposed as a prerequisite of equality automatically be-
comes a hurdle for future civil rights movements to clear."'
These three hazards-ineffectiveness, divisiveness, and restrictive-
ness of transformative potential-are not, however, adequate reasons
to abandon immutability. As I will discuss in Part IV with respect to
sexual orientation, there is a way to frame the immutability argument
so that it is effective, does not leave behind some members of the
community of sexual and gender minorities, and retains the full
power of progressive argument to achieve equality while also trans-
forming the institutions into which previously excluded groups gain
entry.
III. CONSTRUCTIVE IMMUTABILITY: STEPPING BEYOND ESSENTIALISM
It is not enough, of course, to conclude that it would be a good
idea to adopt and advance an argument from immutability. There
must also be a good argument to make. Here, of course, the problem
is that the immutability claim has been subject to the harsh critique
M See Halley, supra note 2, at 528 ("Immutability offers no theoretical foundation for legal
protection of those gay men and lesbians who experience their sexual orientation as contin-
gent, mumble, chosen.").
11 SeeYoshino, supra note 2, at 502 (because immutability "withholds protection from groups
that can convert, [it] leav[es] them susceptible to legislation that pressures them to do so").
117 There is a distinct issue regarding the transformative power of civil rights discourse, focus-
ing on whether subordinated groups should seek equality within institutions, or instead attempt
either to transform or subvert those institutions. The highest-profile instance of this dispute
has been the debate over same-sex marriage within the LGBT community, a campaign some
have opposed as simply reinforcing the patriarchal and oppressive institution of marriage. See,
e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, We Wll Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will
Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage", 79 VA. L. RExv. 1535 (1993). That
particular dispute is, I think, not seriously implicated in the immutability discussion; it has more
to do with whether to select equality-based goals in the first place than which arguments should
be made once that choice is made.
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of social constructionists, who link immutability with essentialism and
hence conclude that characteristics that are socially constructed
(read: virtually all categories upon which our law distinguishes) can-
not be immutable. In this section, I will argue that socially con-
structed characteristics can be, and often are, immutable. Then, in
Part IV, I will consider the application of this new paradigm, which I
term constructive immutability, to the case of sexual orientation.
Ely attacked the explanatory force of immutability as a determi-
nant of strict scrutiny. The social constructionists have argued at a
more fundamental level that immutability is empirically indefensi-
ble-that characteristics upon which government draws distinctions
are socially constructed and thus cannot be immutable."" This argu-
ment linking immutability with essentialism is ill-founded, however,
because even a characteristic that is entirely contingent on the social
reality constructed in a particular culture at a particular time can be
immutable, and can be experienced by individuals within that culture as
immutable. Understanding this point requires careful consideration
of what it means to say that a characteristic is immutable.
To begin with, it is important to distinguish between a category
and a classification. As I will use the terms, race is the category;
white, African-American, Asian, etc. are the classifications. Sexual
orientation is the category; gay, straight, bisexual are the classifica-
tions. Citizenship is a category; citizen and non-citizen are classifica-
tions. Categories manifest the fact that society is drawing a distinc-
tion between people, depending upon the classification assigned to
or descriptive of them. For the pure social constructionist, the cate-
gory exists only as a reflection of the significance a culture has as-
signed to the characteristics that place people in one classification
rather than the other.
Constructive immutability posits that even if a category is socially
constructed, individual classifications can be immutable. In short,
the question is not, "Has this category existed in every time and cul-
ture as a description of an essential trait distinguishing some human
beings from others?" Rather, the question is, "Do people in this time
and culture experience their classification as immutable?"""
11 See Halley, supra note 2, at 503.
19 One might argue that this question is meaningless, since an individual's experience of a
characteristic as immutable depends on the presumption tlt the category itself exists. TIha is.
a lesbian could not really experience being a lesbian as immutable if the categorizing s)stem of
which it is a part (sexual orientation) is incoherent. Professor Halley points to te person who
perceives not only her own sexual identity as fluid, but sees the whole system of categorizing
people as either homosexual, heterosexual, or bisexual as a meaningless labeling process that
distorts rather than describes human beings. See Halley, supra note 2. at 527 (pointing to
"strong currents in the pro-gay movements [which] critique the very impulse to organize
around gay and lesbian identity, either because doing so suppresses a sexuality distinct and
semi-autonomous from hommexuality, or because it obscures the historical, institutional, and
political processes that produce identity" (footnotes omitted)). How, she asks in effect, can one
be immutably gay if one cannot even be gay (or straight or bisexual)?
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The second question is the significant one for several reasons.
First, the fact that the category is constructed does not tell us whether
society has built that construct, at least in part, on top of an existing
set of characteristics (making them meaningful by assigning them
significance, but not creating them), or instead has also constructed
the basis for classification. Even if sexual orientation, for instance, is
constructed by a cultural imperative to privilege opposite-sex rela-
tionships, it remains possible that some of the features that define a
person's classification (same-sex or opposite-sex sexual attraction) are
not similarly constructed. Certainly, it is possible that an entire sys-
tem of a category and its underlying classifications are all socially con-
structed; citizenship is an excellent example. But it is not inherently
obvious that this will always be so, and the constructed nature of the
category is not conclusive evidence that the classifications are also en-
tirely constructed.
We should be asking the second question for a more profound
reason as well. Even if the classifications, like the categories, are so-
cially constructed, that tells us little about the nature of individual
experience with classifications. There is no reason to suppose that a
culture could not construct classifications so constraining and so
powerful that individuals would live their assignment to one classifica-
tion rather than another as wholly unchosen and unchangeable. 2 "
Indeed, authors writing about race, gender, 2' sexual orientation,"
and sexual identity have all identified and described the power with
which social norms are imposed. It would be surprising if that power
could not shape perceptions so deeply that the reality is, to the indi-
vidual, immutable. In such a case, the classification would be muta-
ble in the limited sense that a cultural shift could change an individ-
ual's classification, but not in the (for our purposes) much more
important sense that the classification is within the volitional control
of the individual.
This understanding of constructed immutability recognizes that
At best, though, this argument merely removes the question one step up in generality. At
worst, it is a semantic diversion. Obviously, a heterosexual who experiences his sexual orienta-
tion as immutable also perceives the label to be a sufficiently accurate description of his condi-
don that he recognizes the classification (heterosexual) and the category (sexual orientation)
as real. Thus, we can ask whether the person experiences her own orientation as immutable, or
we can ask whether she experiences the category as real because it describes a distinction be-
tween people that she experiences as immutable. Either way, it is ultimately the same question.
1-0 See Stein, supra note 3, at 328 ("To see how it is possible for some property to be both con-
structed and determined, consider the property of being a peasant. This is surely a paradig-
matic example of a socially constructed property, but it might very well be determined that
someone has this property and will continue to have it whether or not she likes it.. ").
1 See, e.g., NANCY LEvrr, THE GENDER LINE: MEN, WOMEN, AND THE LAW 15-63 (1998) (de-
tailing the "gender separatism" our culture creates from infancy, through which the expecta-
tion of conformity to gendered norms is transmitted and enforced).
12 See, e.g., MARTIN DUBERMAN, CuREs: A GAY MAN'S ODYSSEY (1991) (autobiography de-
scribing personal history of repeated attempts at psychotherapy seeking a "cure" for the disease
of his homosexuality).
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an individual's identity is not merely the product of internal (biologi-
cal, chemical, genetic) characteristics. Instead, the "self" we experi-
ence is the product of a hopelessly complex mix of cultural, familial,
historical, and internal factors. Crucially, another determinant of
true "self' is self-concept.
The "concept" we have of something is distinct from the actual
thing itself. This is true even about our "actual" self and our concept
of self; as Ulric Neisser points out:
Concepts that refer to real but complex things, like war and Ulric Neis-
ser, rarely do full justice to their referents. I am sure that neither your
conception of war nor mine comes even close to comprehending all that
happens in actual wars as they occur around the world.... The same
thing can be said of your concept of Ulric Neisser. More important, the
same thing can also be said of m), concept of Ulric Neisser. Self-concepts
never do full justice to the self.1
As Neisser explains, this distinctive thing-the self-concept-
opens the door for social context to shape the actual self. We all live
and grow in a "specific cultural setting," which provides "the context
in which we developed our ideas about human nature in general and
about ourselves in particular."' And just as social context plays a
great part in the development of self-conception, self-conception
then affects the actual self. 2
The precise significance of the social world in shaping individuals'
self-concepts, and hence in shaping the individual self, is debated
among theorists in cognitive psychology.'6 Professors Robyn Fivush
andJanine Buckner, for example, take the view that the very notion
12 Ulric Neisser, Concepts and Sdf-Concep1% in THE CONCEPrUAL SELF IN CoNTrE- 3 (Ulric
Neisser & David A.Jopling eds., 1997) [hereinafter CONCEPTUAL SE.F].
124 Id at4.
1 Id. (discussing the two-way causality of the actual self shmping the self-concept and the self-
concept shaping the actual self).
1-2 In a closely related debate, psychological theory has considered die role that chemical
interventions play in defining and altering the self. Discussing the effects of Prozac. Professor
Davidjopling notes:
People who have lived for many years with inhibiting but nonpathological character
trats... not only report feeling better than well on the drug-, they also identify whole-
heartedly with the new medicated self, and disavow the old premedicated self, which they
view as alien. The drug, it is claimed, has enabled them to finally be themselves and to
finally know who they really are.
David A.Jopling, Fwe Kinds of Sdf-Ignorancr in ECOLOGICALAPPROACHESTO CoGNMION: FSSms
IN HONOR OF ULRIC NEISSER 313, 325 (Eugene Winograd et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter
ECOLOGICAL APPROACHES].
Responding to this "puzzling claim that Prozac has restored people with no clearly dis-
cernible diagnosable psychological disorders to some original state--dtat it is a neuro-chenical
short-cut to the real self," Dr.Jopling pointed out that "if there is such a state as pharnacologi-
cally boosted insight, then there must also be such states as pharmacologically induced self,
deception and self-ignorance." Id. at 325-26. This point about one specific kind of cultural in-
fluence on the self can, of course, be broadened; if we should not assume that the Prozac-
induced conception of self is the actual self, neither can we assume the accuracy of the religion-
induced self, or the parent-induced self. That is, we can never be certain that our self-concept.
however produced, is our "true" self.
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of self-understanding as affected by cultural context understates the
importance of context: "the very core of self-understanding is con-
structed through, and reflects on, social interactions. Rather than
understanding the self in cultural context or situating the self in in-
terpersonal space, we argue for understanding the self as a social-
cultural process.' 7 While others see the role of cultural context in
the development of self-cognition somewhat less dramatically, there is
widespread acceptance of the premise that concepts of self are cul-
ture-dependent. -
These theories suggest that an individual's culture plays an impor-
tant role in the strength and type of self-concept she developstu '
Some cultural patterns may tend to "construct the person as a [rela-
tively] independent, autonomous entity," while others are more apt
to "construct the person as an interdependent part of a larger social
order."'s° Variation across cultures in the way the individual self is
situated in relation to the society is one dimension of the impact cul-
ture has on self-concept. But it is not the only dimension. It is not
difficult to take the additional step of finding a substantive compo-
nent to the dynamic. That is, if a child's relationships (with parents,
siblings, and others) and experiences (environments, exposure to dif-
ferent types of stimuli) affect the strength of her ability to distinguish"me" from "not-me," and the way she perceives the relationship be-
tween those two spheres, those factors also affect the attributes (psy-
chological versus physical, for example) she identifies as constituting
me.
Moreover, those relational and experiential factors can and do
serve social purposes other than the very general goal of developing
self-awareness itself. Cultures do not want children simply to be
aware of who they are, as distinguished from the rest of the world.
They want them to possess and be aware of certain specific attributes.
Indeed, this process represents "[one of the powerful ways in which
1.7 Robyn Fivush & Janine Buckner, The Self as Socially Constructed: A Cornmentay, in
CONCEPTUAL SELF, supra note 123, at 176.
128 See, e.g., Daniel Hart & Suzanne Fegley, Children's Self-Awareness and Self-Understanding in
Cultural Context, in CONCEPTUAL SELF, supra note 123, at 128, 131-42 (arguing that while some
"types of self-awareness and self-concept... are universal and likely to be found in every cul-
ture," there are exceptions supporting "a broader framework of how the facets of self... might
be influenced by particular vehicles of culture").
" See Kenneth J. Gergen, The Social Construction of Self-Knowledge, in SELF AND IDENTITY 372,
375 (Daniel Kolak & Raymond Martin eds., 1991) ("If the social environment continues to de-
fine a given individual in a specified manner, we may reasonably anticipate that, without coun-
tervening information, the individual will come to accept the publicly provided definition as his
own.").
Hazel Rose Markus et al., Selfways: Diversity in Modes of Cultural Participation, in
CONCEPTUAL SELF, supra note 123, at 13.
131 SeeJohn F. Kihlstrom et al., Situating the Self in Interpersonal Space, in CONCEPTUAL SELF,
su/n-a note 123, at 154 ("Although self-knowledge is generally concerned with the individual's
psychosocial attributes .... it should be clear that it also includes the person's physical charc-
teristics.").
[Vol. 3:2
CONSTRUCTJ1ALIXMTrABI.ITY
cultural systems come to influence individual behavior... Pro-
fessors Markus, Mullally and Kitayama express this as a part of "self-
ways," which is their term for "characteristic patterns of sociocultural
participation," including "ways of thinking, feeling, wanting, and do-
ing."133 These patterns do not occur randomly or haphazardly;
rather, they are the product of "key cultural ideas and values, includ-
ing understandings of what a person is, as well as senses of how to be
a 'good,' 'appropriate,' or 'moral' person.''
To the extent that an attribute is perceived within the relevant
culture as negative, it is far less likely to be included in individual self-
concepts. ' s' While it surely is unsurprising that test subjects would re-
port more positive than negative attributes in their self-concept, this
result reveals something more than the obvious idea that people tend
to describe as positive the attributes they themselves possess. More
fundamentally, it tells us that the broad cultural decision to classify a
characteristic as "positive" or "negative" has immense impact on the
attributes that individuals in that culture will perceive in themselves.
This, in turn, helps to shape and transform the actual self.
In short, cognition-particularly of the self in relation to the ex-
ternal world-is constructive of identity. The external world makes a
deep contribution to the developing self early in life, transmitting
expectations and understandings that become integrated into the
self. And just as cognition is constructive, "remembering is recon-
structive."' s" Thus, the same phenomenon of cultural influence on
the self is also at work in memory. An individual's memory is not
merely "the registering, maintenance, and retrieval of internalized
states."13' Rather, just as cognition is "a process in which the individ-
ual self encounters.., other individuals in that environment," mem-
ory is the process by which "we not only encounter the past environ-
ment, but... we keep in contact with our past selves in their
surroundings. " ss At the same time we integrate our past selves and
experiences via memory, we also project this integrated self/selves
outward; memory serves the important purpose of "establishing and
sustaining a particular identity within relationships."" Indeed, "memo-
13 Markus et al., supra note 130, at 13.
13 Id. at 16.
134 IdL
1 See i4. at 23 (reporting on study suggesting "that the self-concepts of Americans contain
about four to five times as many positive attributes as negative ones7) (citing A.R. Herzog et al.,
Sociocultural Variation in the American Sdf Paper Presented at the Meeting of tie Gerontological
Society of America (1994)).
S6" William Hirst & David Gluck, Revisiting John Dean's Alema, in EcOLOGICAL APROACHES,
-a note 126, at 253, 255 (discussing how memory acts in a self-serving fashion).
Edward S. Reed, Perception is to Self as Memoz " is to Sthwe, in THE RkLtEE1UNG SELF:
CONSTRUCrION AND AccuRAcy IN THE SELF-NARRATIvE 278 (Ulric Neisser & Robyn Fivush eds..
1994) [hereinafter THE RtEMEIBERING SELF].
33 Id. (citation omitted).
1s9 Kenneth J. Gergen, Mind, Text, and Soiety: Self-.Mernori in Semial ConteaL in THE
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ries and forgettings operate as means of establishing oneself in a rela-
tionship as a particular kind of person, with particular privileges and
duties.' '4 0 Thus, just as the concept of who we are is shaped by cul-
tural forces and social interactions, so too is our memory of who we
have been. That memory in turn contributes both to the perception
of who we become tomorrow and to the actual person who exists to-
morrow. In both the realms of cognitive construction of the self and
memory-based reconstruction, social context has a profound effect in
shaping the individual self, up to and including creating characteris-
tics lived as immutable.
Finally, we should ask how individuals experience their classifica-
tions for another reason as well, one that goes to the core of what it
means for a category to be socially constructed. Post-modern scholars
posit that a category exists because of the social and legal significance
assigned to it. Citizenship is an archetypal example of this, as a sim-
ple comparison demonstrates. In the example with which I began
this article, Janet Jones and Steve Smith were distinguishable because
Smith was born in Juarez, Mexico, while Jones was born in El Paso,
Texas, making Smith a Mexican citizen, 4 and Jones a United States
citizen. If there were no social or legal significance attached to the
difference between Smith and Jones then the category "citizenship"
would not exist. Since the distinction does make a difference, the
category exists, as do the classifications of citizenship that constitute
it.
The primary social purpose of many categories is to privilege one
classification over another (or to create a hierarchy among multiple
classifications) . Hence, the existence of the category often entails
the creation of a disadvantaged "other."43 Such categories give rise to
REMEMBERING SELF, supra note 137, at 78, 97 (emphasis added).
140 Id. (citing J. Coulter, Two Concepts of the Menta in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE
PERSON (K.J. Gergen & K.E. Davis eds., 1985)).
1 Assuming that, apart from place of birth, Smith possesses no qualities for citizenship in a
country other than Mexico. See8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1994) (enumerating requirements for becom-
ing a naturalized United States citizen).
. SeeYackle, supra note 88, at 857 ("By defining that which is deviant, the dominant forces
in society define as well that which is oppositional to deviance, namely the norm, and appropri-
ate that norm as a circular justification for dominance.").
3 Not every category creates, defines, and maintains the status of the privileged group. Ma-
jor league baseball players, for instance, are classified either as "American League" or "National
League" players for purposes of organizing the teams and scheduling the competition; neither
group of players enjoys superordinated status. However, in many instances, even a category sys-
tem created for reasons unrelated to group privilege end up producing subordinated and su-
perordinated classifications. Imagine a culture in which two functions must be performed:
gathering food and preparing it for consumption. In year one, all citizens perform both func-
tions, and the groups "gatherers" and "preparers" would not exist. In year two, te people
come to learn that the functions will be performed better, and everyone will be better off, if the
tasks are divided-the magic of specialization. For this functional reason, the category "food
producer" comes into being, with two classifications: gatherer and preparer. Though this so-
cial system was created for reasons unrelated to the privileging of either group, they will ulti-
mately vie for status and one will emerge as the privileged group, with membership require-
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privilege, either by directly assigning benefits or burdens on the basis
of classifications, or indirectly by permitting those in the relatively
privileged classification to identify themselves as distinct from the
less-worthy "others."'"
In this context, gender role deviation is a more helpful illustration
than citizenship. The labels "masculine" and "feminine" are entirely
social constructs, hopelessly bound up with gendered expectations
and norms, the product of cultural forces."' Given this meaning,
some traits or roles might be (and often are) masculine in one cul-
ture and feminine in another.'46 Traits a given culture ascribes as
predominately male and roles assigned predominately to men are
"masculine," simply by virtue of the society's own social structure;
while those traits and roles ascribed and assigned predominately to
women are "feminine." The otherness faced by people who do not
meet our gendered expectations-the fate dealt to women like Ann
Hopkins14' and men like "Andy Hopkins"15--is part of the process by
which our culture defines and reinforces the meaning of being a
"woman" and a "man."
Notwithstanding this recognition of the construction of gender,
however, the essentialist is right that women like Ann Hopkins exist
in every culture and in every era. There will be women who, relative
to other people (men and women), are unwilling or unable to master
and perform certain roles that, in our culture, are seen as "feminine."
Cultural norms alter the wrays and extent to which such individuals
manifest their inherent traits in outward behaviorYO but not the exis-
ments marking it off as "elite" and benefits by which it marks itself off as worthier. Thus, cate-
gorization may not ahys emerge from the desire to privilege, but the two are linked. almost
inevitably, at least in any set of circumstances that could even imaginably lead to an equal pro-
tection dispute.
144 SeeSamuel A. Marcosson, Romer and the Limits of Legitimac': StriptingOpponazts of Gay and
Lesbian Rights of Their "First Line of Defense" in the SameSx Marriage Fight. 24 J. CoX'L %rP. L 217,
244-50 (1998) (discussing exclusion from staus-conferring institutions as a key element of dis-
crimination against women and racial minorities).
45See LEviT, supra note 121, at 204-05 (discussing conceptions of masculinity and femininity.
and the wide array of cultural forces that produce them).
1l4 . at 187-88 (noting non-gendered nature of roles in several Asian and Native American
cultures, and examples of roles performed by women that are "gendered male" in our culture).
1 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plaintiff denied parmership in ac-
counting firm, at least in part because of perception that she was too 'macho." and %%as advised
to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up. have her
hair styled, and wearjewelry").
14 See Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Idrolo g and the Constmaion of Malenss, 43 UCLA
L REv. 1037,1100-1103 (1996). "Andy Hopkins" is tie mythical mirror-image of tie plaintiff in
Price 1ateho use a man deemed too effeminate to fit male stereotypes and perform well in tradi-
tionally male jobs. Just as with the real Ann Hopkins, Andy's characteristics are his o-si: tie
gendered implications that lead him to be perceived as "un-male" are social constructs.
'"Professor Levit reminds us that men who do not conform to gender expectations are. like
Ann Hopkins, victims of our policy of policing the "gender line." See LWrTr. supra note 121. at
13 (assuming the task of "demonstrating some of die uays conventional gender roles harm
men").
150 If gender lines are enforced by the criminal law, for instance, gender non-conformists will
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tence of such people. In another culture, "Hopkinsness" may reflect
traits or roles more typically expected of women, while in a third the
attributes may not be gendered at all. In those cultures, Ann Hop-
kins will not be a "gender outcast." She would not be part of the
"other" whom the law and other normalizing institutions identify in
making the category of gender meaningful.
Crucially, though, some other people will be. The presence of devi-
ance from assigned gender categories is timeless-and, it appears,
almost an essential feature of social organization. In all cultures, men
and women exist who depart to a significant degree from their own
society's constructions of masculinity and femininity and who experi-
ence this departure as an immutable feature of their self-conception.
The experience of otherness itself is essential in the sense that it ex-
ists across time and culture as the inevitable product of social organi-
zation.
This may seem a bleak way of looking at the social organization of
gender relations. I dismiss the possibility of an ungendered culture,
in which neither maleness nor femaleness is accompanied by gen-
dered expectations. These expectations, in turn, produce an inevita-
ble "cultural other," who experience their own condition as deviating
from the expectations. Worse still, it is inherent in the notion of
gendered expectations that this "deviating other" will fall prey to so-
cial disadvantaging aimed at inducing or coercing conformity. With-
out this pressure, the expectations are meaningless.
Of course, the mere fact that "otherness" is an inevitable, essential
characteristic of social organization does not mean that any particular
individual's experience as being a part of the other is immutable.
But that is precisely the point: The simple fact that a category is so-
cially constructed does not tell us, one way or the other, whether an
attribute and its resulting social classification is immutable. The an-
swer to that question requires examination of the classification and
the individuals within it.
The possibility of immutable classifications within a socially con-
structed category is not merely theoretical. Citizenship illustrates as
much. Our earlier pair, Smith (the Mexican citizen born in Juarez)
and Jones (the American citizen born in El Paso), are again illustra-
tive. If they had been born in precisely the same locations in 1825,
Smith and Jones would both have been Mexican citizens. And if they
had been born in 1836, Jones's citizenship would have been hotly
disputed, Texas having declared independence in 1835 but Mexico
not having recognized the validity of that act.
Plainly, citizenship/alienage are social constructs-an imposition
be less likely to display their non-conformity openly, instead doing so in more subtle and private
ways. See Marcosson, supra note 56, at 181 (noting that "people hide being gay to avoid dis-
crimination," but rejecting argument that "because repression alters behavior" te characteris-
tic cannot be immutable).
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of political, social, historical, legal, and economic forces on geogra-
phy.1M  There is nothing biologically inherent in Smith and Jones that
either divides or unites them; it has merely been changes in the law's
treatment of the geography of their birth that has created or abol-
ished any distinction between them.
Since the category of citizenship-as well as the classifications of
citizen and non-citizen-are social constructs, they would not be re-
garded as immutable by the pure social constructionist. That conclu-
sion, however, is relatively meaningless. Our real focus should be on
Smith and Jones. Whether Smith's status as a non-citizen in the
United States is immutable depends not on the simple fact that citi-
zenship is a social construct, but on the nature of the category and
the definitions and characteristics that serve to place him in the non-
citizen classification.
What does inquiry into Smith's classification reveal? Well, non-
citizenship is partially mutable. Someone arguing against the immu-
tability of citizenship would point out that Smith may be entitled to
seek naturalization, and for this reason may change her status as a
non-U.S. citizen.52 This does not, however, establish the mutability of
citizenship for all purposes.rs Part of the socially constructed distinc-
tion between citizens and non-citizens is this: Even if she becomes
naturalized and is otherwise qualified, Smith will forever be ineligible
to run for President.'_ Jones faces no such prohibition.
Smith experiences her disqualification from serving as President
of the United States as immutable. Having been born on one side of
a socially constructed line dividing two socially constructed political
units, she is immutably disqualified. For her, the easy demonstration
of the constructed nature of the category does not change the reality
of this immutability.
One answer might be to challenge the premise that a classification
can be immutable even when the category is socially constructed. In
the context of citizenship and the presidency, the definitions of "citi-
zen" and "president" are socially constructed and subject to altera-
tion. In that sense, Smith's ineligibility for the presidency is mutable;
all we need to do is reconceive our notion of the office and/or of
citizenship to no longer include natural-born citizenship as a defin-
5 It is beyond the scope of this article, but surely not unrelated to my point, that the con-
struct of citizenship is deeply entangled %ith the constructs of race and ethnicity. See Natsu Tay
lor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alie- Citizenship, 'Forignnss, " and Radal Hiaarcrl in Ar.erian
Law, 76 OR. L RE%. 261, 270 (1997) (noting that every potential route to U.S. citizenship %vas. at
least initially, "restricted by race").
152 See8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1994).
as It might not establish mutability for any purposes, if we accept that some traits hint are
technically mutable could be deemed immutable because it is so difficult, burdensome, or un-
fair to actually change them, or because the mutability is not entirely within the control of the
individual, as is the case with a person seeking U.S. citizenship.
1 U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § I ("No person except a natural born Citizen ... shall be eligible to
the Office of President....').
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ing criterion."l
That answer, however, is not ultimately persuasive. Constructive
immutability retains its power, because we must assess the mutability
question from the point of view of the members of the group rather
than at the level at which the category is socially constructed.'5 0 The
crucial attribute of immutability for legal and political purposes is
that the trait is not subject to the individual's voluntary, relatively un-
complicated decision to change her classification. Recall the context
in which we are considering the immutability argument: an equal
protection lawsuit. Ponder this dialog:
Smith: Judge, declare this law disqualifying me from the presidency un-
constitutional. It is a violation of equal protection because (in part) my
status as a naturalized citizen is immutable.
Government. Leave the law alone, your Honor. Her status is mutable. It
can be changed simply if the socially constructed definition of the presi-
dency changes. If the category is mutable, Smith's classification cannot
be immutable.
Smith: Wait a second. The government is telling you that my status is
mutable because it can be changed by a shift in the law, which it then says
is a reason not to change the law? And anyway, I can't change the defini-
tion of the presidency. It may be mutable in the hands of millions of
people, but not in mine. And my status as a naturalized citizen cannot be
changed.
M For instance, we might do away with the distinction between naturalized and native-born
citizens, either in general or with respect to the presidency in particular.
1 The social construction of race vividly illustrates this point. At one level, Anthony Appiah
argued that W.E.B. DuBois's racial identification was subject to his control and choice. See
ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY FATHER'S HoUSE 45 (1992) (arguing DuBois' own reasoning should
have led him to escape not only "the reality of American racism," but also the concept of race
itself); Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: DuBois and the Illusion of Race, in "RACE,"
WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 21, 22 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1986) (discussing how DuBois
came to see race as "unbiological"); see a/soJayne Chong-Soon Lee, Navigating the Topology of
Race, 46 STAN. L. REV. 747, 765 (1994) (concurring with Appiah's analysis). But Christine
Hickman convincingly demonstrates that this "choice" was not his. See Hickman, supra note 27,
at 1244-49. Although his racial identity was constructed, DuBois neither constructed it nor held
the power to de- or re-construct it. The definition of race-rigidly tied to "one drop" of Negro
blood-was outside his control in the sense that the law and social institutions would treat him
as Black regardless of his own self-definition. Nor has this changed as much as some might
suppose; numerous scholars have described their sense of having their perceived racial identity
not correspond to their own self-identification, or of the unfairness of rigid categories that deny
an individual's right to her own multiracial identity. See Gilanshah, supra note 31, at 197 ("[Flor
the multiracial movement, failure of the government to include a multiracial category would
result in cultural genocide.");Julie C. Lythcott-Haims, Note, Where Do Mixed Babies Belong?: Ra-
cial Classification in America and Its Implications for TransracialAdoption, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
531, 542 (1994) ("Any person claiming to be Black, or White, or Multiracial, should be permit-
ted to so classify herself. Although government agencies, social scientists and the law all make
use of racial classification for seemingly legitimate reasons, these entities have no right to tell a
person how to classify herself. The act of racial identification is personal; it is no one else's
business."). The culture has retained significant control over racial identification and has kept
racial identity substantially immutable at the individual level. See also supra pp. 654-56.
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Even if the category is socially constructed, the classification can be
immutable.
Thus, it is clear that opponents of immutability cannot rely on the
claim that since the category is socially constructed, an indiidual's
classification cannot be immutable. Immutability exists at the rele-
vant level of inquiry: the experience of those within the classification.
This argument is of considerable relevance to the sexual orientation
debate.
IV. SEXUALrIYAS CONSTRUCTVELY IMMUTABLE
Sexual orientation is the prototypical instance of a socially con-
structed category as to which an individual's classification may be
immutable. The category itself is socially constructed, imbued with
significance by means of legal and social distinctions created in order
to privilege one classification over others, and by the self-definition of
the members of the subordinated "other." But the attributes that
place each individual into one of the classifications are often immu-
table, and-perhaps more crucially-the category as socially con-
structed in our culture produces that experience. For each of these
reasons, a person's classification within the sexual orientation cate-
gory must be treated as immutable by the law. In this section, I will
first explain the constructed nature of sexual orientation,' * and then
turn my attention to the immutability of this socially constructed
category.
1 This point can be reinforced by another category. disability. Recall that Dean Ely used
disability as a paradigmatic case of an immutable characteristic, to which the Supreme Court
has applied only the lowest level of equal protection scrutiny. 5c supra pp. 658-60. But status as
either disabled or not, like citizenship, is to a significant extent socially constructed by legal
definitions. In Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999), the Court considered
whether an employer could rely on Department of Transportation ("DOT') safety regulations
to deny ajob to a trucker with monocular vision, even though lie had been certified for the po-
sition by the DOT under a waiver program. I&. at 555-56. Kirkingburg's status as 'disabled' or
not was not a function of his intrinsic condition, nor was it subject to his control. Instead, it was
controlled by the DOT regulations (which seemed to treat him as disabled) and tie waiver pro-
gram (which seemed to treat him as not disabled in a way relevant to job performance). By
permitting the company to rely on the safety standard uithout further justification. despite tie
ivaiver, the Supreme Court constructed disability to include Kirkingburg-reinforcing the basic
point that socially constructed categories can produce immutable classifications.
M As I will explain in greater detail in Part B of this section, I am, for purposes of this argu-
ment, an agnostic on the question of whether sexual orientation truly is constructed. Or, more
accurately, my view is that whether it is constructed depends on what that tern means. The
category plainly exists in part because of the social significance we attribute to it. If that social
significance were altered, the category would be altered along with it. But that does not entail
the conclusion that the category is entire!y constructed. Wlhen tie constructionist says that social
construction is the attribution of social significance, the attribution can be to a physical trait
that is not itself constructed-blood type, for instance. Or it may involve attributing signifi-
cance to a socially created trait, such as religion. Thus, die question on which I am agnostic is
whether the social construction of sexual orientation involves the attribution of significance to a
pre-existing reality, to a socially created distinction, or to a trait that is some of both.
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A. The Construction of Sexual Orientation
Ironically, one of the most persuasive arguments helping to estab-
lish that sexual orientation is a modem, constructed category has
been offered on behalf of the seemingly contrary claim that same-sex
sexual attraction pre-dates the supposedly "modern" category of ho-
mosexuality. Wayne Dynes argued:
A curious outcome of these centuries of oppression is that when the first
writings on homosexuality reached the general public at the end of the
nineteenth century, some individuals revealed to psychiatrists that, al-
though they had responded solely to members of their own sex since
adolescence, until then they imagined themselves unique in the whole world.
They had "constructed" their own sexual consciousness without any social
input-a feat that should be impossible according to social construction-
ist postulates. 159
Dynes's observation perfectly captures the distinction between the
category and the attributes that place people in one classification or
the other. The testimony he describes is powerful evidence that peo-
ple experienced same-sex attraction long before social construction
theory claims "homosexuality" came into being. At the same time,
Dynes fails to appreciate the significance of the isolation these people
also described. The isolation occurred precisely because there was no
understood, culturally identified category into which they could situ-
ate themselves.60 They required no social inputs to perceive their at-
traction to others of their own sex, but much more was required for
them to perceive themselves as something other than individuals in
this respect. A category had to come into being. In other words,
there is no conflict between the proposition, "Sexual orientation is a
twentieth century, socially constructed category," and the statement,
"People experienced same-sex attraction long before the twentieth
century."
The essentialist answers, however, that the isolation experienced
by people With same-sex attraction was not complete. To the con-
15 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HoNiosExUALrIY 1209 (Wayne R_ Dynes ed., 1990) (emphasis
added).
That is why the same phenomenon of perceived uniqueness is heard in the autobiogra-
phies of twentieth century gay men and lesbians as well. Throughout most of this century, two
of the characteristics of the homosexual classification have been its relative invisibility, see ALLAN
BtRUB]t, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR TwO
271 (1990) (pre-World War II generations "had invented the closet-a system of lies, denials,
disguises, and double entendres-that had enabled them to express some of their homosexual-
ity by pretending it didn't exist and hiding it from view"), and its unmentionability. See Yo-
shino, supra note 2, at 556 (noting the cultural force that required homosexuality to remain the
"sin that dared not speak its name"). These qualities preserved the feature noted by Dynes-
the isolation of the person who comes to identify him or herself as gay-well into this century.
In other words, the creation of the category did not automatically or immediately produce the
sort of "social inputs" that would dissipate the sense of uniqueness.
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trary, the historical record contains same-sex relationships-an obvi-
ous, fortunate departure from self-denial and detachment.f' These
exam les, however, do not constitute the creation of a social cate-
gory,'" which requires far more than simply the identification of
people with a particular attribute, and more even than a record of
people with identifiable life patterns and relationships. It requires
differentiation of that group from the dominant culture, a process
often triggered by the need felt by the superordinated group to set
itself apart and thus above.
Thus, it is not enough to point out that there have always been
people whose primary sexual attraction is to members of the opposite
sex. 3 Of course there have been, and to that extent, heterosexuality
is essential. However, the existence of heterosexuals has not always
been accompanied by a socially created category by which they have
been designated as the privileged classification. As a result,just as be-
ing like Ann Hopkins in one culture may not be part of the construc-
tion of gender, opposite-sex sexual attraction in another culture may
not reflect the social construction of sexual orientation.6
The attribute of same-sex attraction predates the formation of the
category "sexual orientation," yet society has come to recognize indi-
viduals as having an "orientation" and form an entire social structure
around that perception, only in the last 150 years.o In fact, the cate-
gory could not have formed previously, primarily because Western
culture was so adept-even expert-at repressing the expression of
the ever-present same-sex attraction and at preventing social organi-
161 See RICTOR NORTON, THE MYrH OF THE MODERN HOMOSEXAL 21621 (1997) (pro%iding
"lists" of pre-modem homosexmals, including numerous couples).
1 It is important here to stress that we are attempting to identify te sources and nature of
group-based oppression. After all, this article is attempting to identify powerful arguments to
be used in legal and social discourse for challenging such oppression. Thus, it is relatively un-
important that we can locate people within pre-industrial societies whom we can accurately de-
scribe as homosexual, or even pairs and wider groups ofsuch people. In fact, it ultimately mat-
ters little whether a category of sexuality existed before construction of the category with which
we are concerned. We are instead concerned with the category of sexual orientation that exists
in our culture. This category is a social construct, understandable only with reference to con-
temnporary social context.
SeeNORTON, supra note 161, at 12 ('[T]here is a core of queer desire that is transcultural,
transnational, and transhistorical, a queer essence that is innate, congenital, constitutional, sta-
ble or fixed in its basic pattern.").
164 My use of heterosexuality in this paragraph is intentional. In the endless discussion re-
garding whether sexual orientation is immutable, the focus is invariably on homosexuality. This
causes us to lose sight of the reality that heterosexuality, too, is a sexual orientation, and that
any insight into the construction of the category (sexual orientation) must take account of all
the classifications. Cf Robert S. Chang & Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Nothing ard Etnmthing:
Rac4 Romer and (Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual) Rights, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 2_09, 247 (1997) (criti-
cizing the perception that "the majority of the country that sees itself as 'white' does not have a
race and therefore is not protected by cvil rights legislation").
165 See Robert Padgug, Sexual Matts: On Cona-ptualizing Sexuality in Histm. in Fowsis OF
DESIRE, supra note 3, at 43,57 & n.28 (rel)ing on works ofjeffrey Weeks, accepting "second half
of the nineteenth century" as the period marking "the full emergence of homosexual role and
subculture").
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zation around the concept of same-sex sexual attraction.
This phenomenon is best illustrated by considering the role of re-
ligious institutions. The long decline in the governing authority of
religious institutions has been enormously important in the creation
of the category of sexual orientation and its classifications. In most of
Western society, churches have seen their influence over the law de-
cline in the last several hundred years as secular courts first rivaled
and then supplanted ecclesiastical courts,e as doctrines of separation
of church and state limited the influence of religions,"" and as mon-
archies whose rulers based their legitimacy in part on their "divine
right" to govern, and hence on the imprimatur of churches, gave way
to representative forms of governmentlce In combination, these fac-
tors have reduced or eliminated the role of churches in governance
in Europe and the United States.
Not unexpectedly, as this has occurred, the ability of religious in-
stitutions and actors to control behavior and construct the social real-
ity in which people live has also declined. This decline made room
for a relatively greater freedom of individuals to speak about and act
on their sexual understandings. The sin that once was unmention-
able became mentionable, and then openly discussed and consid-
ered, vastly increasing the likelihood that a twentieth-century Ameri-
can who experiences same-sex sexual attraction would, at some point,
connect with others rather than believe herself to be isolated and
unique. The decline also contributed to the development of im-
mensely important scientific and legal changes, such as contraceptive
methods (which continue to be opposed by religious forces"6 9), and
more freely available divorce. These, in turn, have fundamentally al-
166 SeeJack Moser, The Secularization of Equity: Ancient Religious Origins, Feudal Christian Influ-
ences, and Medieval Authoritarian Impacts on the Evolution of Legal Equitable Remedies, 26 CAi,. U. L.
REV. 483, 514-38 (1997) (discussing decline of ecclesiastical courts in England in ie centuries
following the introduction of royal courts after the Norman Conquest).
167 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16 See EdwardJ. Conry & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, Meta-Jurisprudence: A Paradigm for Legal Stud-
ies, 33 AMi. BuS. L.J. 691, 696 (1996) ("When Charles I was killed by Parliament, the persuasive
power of the theory of the divine right of kings died also. A part of the pillar of governmental
authority was chopped away. With Parliament ruling, historical jurisprudence was ascendant.
The perceived right to make law shifted away from God's king to those elected-those who rule
by the consent of the governed-to Parliament. So the pillar was shored up with a new source
of authority.").
169 See Elof D.B. Johansson, Comparison of the Availability of Contraceptive Methods in Selected
European Countries and the United States, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 471, 471 (1997) ("De-
velopment decisions about contraceptive products are heavily influenced by political and relig-
ious beliefs in addition to market and scientific research. The influence of politics and religion
with regard to contraceptives manifests itself at all levels of the development process-from
generating ideas, to applying for agency approval, to actual marketing efforts-and hampers
the development of new contraceptive products."); Brian J. Leslie, Note, Poland, Abortion, and
the Roman Catholic Church, 17 B.C. INT'L & COUP. L. REv. 453,468 (1994) (discussing tile Catho-
lic Church's support for a total ban on both contraception and abortion in Poland).
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tered the institution of marriage and the dynamics of opposite-sex re-
lationships."
Thus, the reconstruction of religion has rendered religious insti-
tutions less effective in monitoring and controlling conceptions of
sexuality. 7' They have been unable to prevent the social and political
interactions through which the modem category of sexual orienta-
tion has been created.' In that sense, the category came into being
as a positive development from the standpoint of sexual minorities:
The previously impossible had come to pass.
On the other hand, a central aspect of the creation of the cate-
gory was the immediate attribution of significance to the classifica-
tions, as a result of which they became privileged (heterosexuality)
and subordinated (homosexuality). The dominant group %as faced
with the need to define the classifications if it was to maintain a status
hierarchy in which it was at the top.'3 If there was going to be a rec-
ognized, defined "other," it must plainly be an unwolhy other. In the
process, the dominant group--now identifiable as "heterosexuals-
would also create and define itself. The behavioral norms of accept-
able sexuality, which had previously enjoyed the "super-privileged"
status of exclusivity, now had to be privileged not by their exclusivity
but by actual differentiation from the less-worthy "others."'7' Sexual
orientation was an altemative-and progressively less effective"'-
mechanism by which opposite-sex relationships were privileged.f'
170 See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Tmnsforrmalion of Airnrican Farni Law. 83
MICH. L REv. 1803, 1845 (1985) ("Abortion, neonatal euthanasia, and homosexuality are but a
few more examples of areas in which the changing nature and weight of religious views have
helged change legal views and language.").
1 See id ("[B]ecause religious iews are less universally and strongly held. statements of
moral aspiration linked to religion have slipped more readily from legal discourse. This change
is visible, for example, in the child-custody area, where evidence of concern for the moral wel-
fare of the child-as instanced, for example, by evidence that the parent sends the child to
Sunday school-is increasingly thought irrelevant. Because religious vies on marital obliga-
tions have changed, the move to no-fault divorce was eased, and perhaps even made more nec-
essary. Similarly, because religious views on sexual relations outside of nmrriage have changed,
the law's tolerance, and even encouragement, of such relations has increased... ." (footnote
omitted)).
- See Balkin, supra note 92, at 2340 (noting that the formation of status groups" is a 'sign
that... the [pre-existing) social hierarchy has started to become controversial and hence can
no longer hide itself under the camouflage of naturalness").
o7 See id. at 2333 ("Status hierarchies are kept in place by a systen of social meanings and the
attribution of positive and negative qualities. When this set of social meanings starts to weaken.
so too does the status hierarchy, and new forms of status competition become possible between
su?_erordinate and subordinate groups.").
See id. at 2335 (discussing the most effective systems of social hierarchy as those in which
"social expectations were preserved, social deviance %as invisible, [and] overt enforcement of
status norms was unnecessary").
11 The rise of the gay rights movement vividly illustrates the decline in the ability of the clas-
sification "homosexual" to stigmatize and, in so doing, to superordinate heterosexuality. In-
deed, the rise of the anti-gay movement and the ensuing creation of a "culture war" over homo-
sexuality also shows that the prior rigid status hierarchy which subordinated people %ith same-
sex desires has weakened. See iU. at 2333-34 (arguing that "movement from relatively taken-for-
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The essentialist over-reading of the presence of pre-twentieth cen-
tury same-sex attraction also ignores the shifting nature of same-sex
desire and its social meaning. The oft-discussed distinction between
gender and sex spills over into this issue as well; it cannot be said with
any reasonable confidence that the same-sex desire of nineteenth
century "homosexuals" resembled the desire of gay men and lesbians
of today. Was the desire prompted by physiological sex, or some
concept of gender that has been radically transformed in the past 150
years? To render a simplistic illustration, the basis for a woman who
expressed same-sex desire in 1850 might have been attraction to cer-
granted status hierarchies to relatively contestable ones is an important source of cultural strg-
gles," so that "intense social conflict between status groups emerges not at the height of a sys-
tem of social stratification but during its decline").176Reasonable minds can differ over the relative success the superordinated group has
achieved over time in maintaining its privileged status. Cultural forces demonizing sexual and
gender minorities have been potent and omnipresent since World War II, a phenomenon
linked to the perceived need to reinforce gender norms after women had moved into so many
traditionally male professions during the war. See LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT
LOVERS: A HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE IN 'VENTIETH-CENTURYAMlERICA 119 (1991) (noting that,
when women's labor was vital during World War II, "female independence and love between
women were understood and undisturbed and even protected," but that after the war, these
traits "were suddenly nothing but manifestations of illness"). These have ranged from cine-
matic portrayals of gay men and lesbians as sick, disturbed, and pathetic, see VITO Russo, THE
CELLULOID CLOSET: HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE MOVIES (1981), to the pre-1973 classification of
homosexuality as a mental illness by the psychiatric profession, seeJennifer Wriggins, Aaine's
"Act to Protect Traditional Marriage and Prohibit Same-Sex Marriages:" Questions of Constitutionality
Under State and Federal Law, 50 ME. L. REV. 345, 381 n.254 (1998), to the infamous portrayals of
gay men and lesbians in judicial opinions ranging from Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in
Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) (finding condemnation of homosexual sodomy
"firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards," and opining that "[t]o hold that
the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast
aside millennia of moral teaching"), to Justice Scalia's comparison of homosexuals to murder-
ers in his dissent in Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (arguing that the attitude that "cer-
tain conduct [is] reprehensible," including murder, is "the only sort of 'animus' at issue here:
moral disapproval of homosexual conduct"). Today, the religious right continues this tradition,
characterizing gay men and lesbians as unhealthy, dangerous child molesters, see Mary Becker,
The Abuse Excuse and Patriarchal Narratives, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1459, 1472 & n.72 (1998) (arguing
that "gay men and lesbians continue to be seen as likely abusers of children... [iln
part... because the anti-gay religious right identifies gay men and lesbians as likely child abus-
ers"). The murders of Allan Schindler, BillyJack Gaither, and Matthew Shephard demonstrate
that anti-gay hatred is hardly a thing of the past.
Nevertheless, compared to the era prior to the rise of the gay rights movement, it is diffi-
cult to quarrel with the proposition that forces attempting to reinforce the pre-existing hierar-
chy in contemporary America have grown gradually less effective. Anti-gay forces have been
unable to block repeal of numerous state sodomy laws. They have grown more isolated; the
courts have slowly edged away, as symbolized in the Supreme Court's move from Bowers to Ro-
mer, and even politicians who once courted anti-gay voters have shifted the tone, if not the sub-
stance of their positions. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Gay Voters Find G.O.P. Newly Receptive to Sup-
port, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1999, at Al (although GOP presidential candidates "have not
embraced a broader agenda," the "difference in attitude is striking"). Additionally, in the relig-
ious arena, churches have become markedly less monolithic in their opposition to gay and les-
bian relationships, with full acceptance in many denominations and ongoing debates in others.
Still, in acknowledging that the sweep of history has gradually reduced the authority of
churches and other social institutions to enforce anti-gay morality, it is important not to under-
estimate the contemporary power that remains, and its harmful consequences.
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tain gendered traits then more prominently and consistently associ-
ated with women. As gender roles have shifted, the substance of
same-sex desire has shifted along with them. For this reason, too, the
presence of same-sex attraction prior to this century does not dis-
prove the claim that sexual orientation is constructed.
However, that is only part of the story. While the construction has
been in part the handiwork of the dominant group establishing itself,
and has intersected with transitioning gender roles, it has also been
significantly shaped by the emerging "other." '" This is especially true
in the last quarter-century, as the homophile community transformed
itself into a more public gay and lesbian civil rights movement, which
dealt as much with seeking a new, liberated self-perception as it did
with traditional political aims." Subsequently, in a process that con-
tinues today, the identity thus forged began to splinter even further
as multiple perceptions of queer identity gave birth to a very different
social "other."'tm
It is appropriate to pause here to note that this obsenation greatly
lessens the force of the post-modem critique of gay and lesbian iden-
tity. The limited claim that there has always been same-sex as well as
opposite-sex sexual attraction, in lieu of the more problematic asser-
tion that sexual orientation is timeless, avoids the dilemma of accept-
ing the classification at a time when some queer studies scholars are
challenging the very premise of gay and lesbian identity.
My proposal also responds to the related concern that basing legal
arguments on the premise of gay, lesbian, or bisexual identity vali-
dates a category and classifications created to perform the specific
task of identifying the superordinated group's claims to moral and
political superiority, and hence to render sexual and gender minori-
ties an unworthy other'8 This claim has force; a classification im-
posed on a subordinated group is suspect from the outseL However,
that force is abated by the growing participation of LGBT communi-
ties in defining ourselves, lending the identities increasing legitimacy
17 SeeSteven Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social Construionismrn in FOR.tS
OF DESIRE, supra note 3, at 239,250-51 (describing sexual identity as "a complex developmental
outcome, the consequence of an interactive process of social labeling and self-identification");
DENNIS ALTMAN, THE HoMOSEXUALIZATION OF AMERICA, THE A.MERICrANrIT7TION OF THE
HOMOSExuAL 1-2 (1982) (noting that "the early activists ... produced one of the key social
changes of the [1970s] ... the establishment of a new definition of homosexuals").
See DENNIS ALTMAN, HOMOSEXUAL OPPRESSION AND LIBERATION 142-13 (1971) (discuss-
inj distinctive characteristics of the early-1970s gay movement).
See Halley, supra note 2, at 505 ("[R]emarkable changes in identity politics over the past
decade, most notably the emergence of queer identity and of an unrepentant movement of self-
described bisexuals, have complicated gay and lesbian communities. New voices are heard, of-
fering a sustained, community-based attack on the idea that subordinated communities should
endorse the identities through which superordinated groups suppress them." (footnote omit-
ed)Id (referring approvingly to the "attack on die idea that subordinated communities
should endorse the identities through which superordinated groups suppress diem").
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as a starting point for legal and political argument. 8'
In the end, however, it would not really matter even if sexual and
gender minorities have had no influence on the construction of the
identities that concern us. The fact is that legal argument operates
only within the social construct. Even if we resist the notion of organ-
izing around the concept of gay and lesbian identity, the reality is that
the law organizes us around it, utilizing the very category some social
constructionists would have the LGBT civil rights movement abandon
as unreal and/or harmful. But the category is not unreal simply for
having been socially constructed, and since it is real, we must try to
overcome its harmful origins and consequences rather than simply
hope it will go away.182
Certainly, it would be possible to challenge the sexual orientation-
based distinctions replete in the law by denying the existence of the
category itself, arguing that sexual attraction is organized on behav-
ioral and other attributes distinct from the gender-of-object choice.
But it is a remarkably weak argument. There are reasons that neither
the women's rights nor the African-American civil rights movement
attacked the existence of the categories of sex and race, even though
the legally significant aspects of these categories are every bit as so-
cially constructed as sexual orientation.'83 Instead, these movements
challenged the legitimacy of legal handicaps imposed on one of the
classifications (women, Blacks) within those categories.
One of those reasons is the inherent nature of an "equal protec-
tion" challenge; it is necessarily comparative. The structure of the ar-
gument requires the plaintiff to first identify the group or individual
Is] See Ian Hacking, Making Up People, in FORMs OF DESIRE, supra note 3, at 69, 83-84 ("[A]fter
the institutionalization of the homosexual person in law and official morality, the people in-
volved had a life of their own, individually and collectively. As gay liberation has amply proved,
that life was no simple product of the labeling.").
18. See Balkin, supra note 92, at 2359-60 (identifying the "status hierarchies" with which thte
Constitution is concerned as those where the status identity is not "due to any physical prop-
erty" of the group, but instead is "a contingent fact of social history," making the identity "a cen-
tral feature of one's social existence") (emphasis added). Professor Balkin thus recognized that
an identity can be valid and significant for constitutional purposes even if it is not the product
of biology or somehow "natural," but instead is the product of social construction. Professor
Balkin goes on to ask whether homosexuals exist in an "unjust" social hierarchy. Id. at 2361.
The answer to that question, he suggests, "does not depend on the existence or absence of so-
called immutable characteristics," but rather "on the social meaning of being homosexual." Id.
These are not, however, distinct inquiries. Balkin ignores the possibility that the presence of
immutability (perhaps as the product of social construction) is a crucial aspect of the "social
meaning" of homosexuality.
183 See Taylor Saito, supa note 151, at 266 ("Many scholars agree that what we call 'race' re-
flects socially constructed classifications rather than biological realities. Yet race is a construct
that has powerfully shaped individual and group identities. It has also influenced the creation
and maintenance of social and economic hierarchies which reflect not just differences, but rela-
tionships of domination and subordination."); IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FENINISNI AND THE
SUBVERSION OF IDENTrrY (1990) (discussing ways in which sex and gender are socially con-
structed).
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suffering the harm, and compare that group or individual to some-
one being treated better. ' The game itself accepts the existence of
classifications,'8 but argues that government has made something
more of them than is acceptable under the applicable test.
More fundamentally, it is ironic to hear post-modern lyrics put to
a constructionist beat. Social construction tells us that the category
exists precisely because the culture has created it by imbuing it with
legal, political, and social significance. It is jarring, then, to hear the
post-modem constructionist deny the legitimacy of the category "sex-
ual orientation" on the ground that it does not accurately capture the
essence (note the term: the essence) of human experience with
sexuality. But, of course, the constructionist point is that there is no
essential human experience outside of social context. Since that so-
cial context includes-indeed, for our purposes is dominated by-the
law's acceptance of sexual orientation as a legitimate category, effec-
tive challenges must be directed at the distinctions between the classi-
fications.
This difficulty is the mirror-image of the essentialists' over-reliance
on the existence of pre-twentieth century people with same-sex attrac-
tion. They focus on such historical evidence, even though it does not
contradict the argument that the contemporary category of sexual
orientation is socially constructed."s Similarly, post-modernists focus
on the purported invalidity of the contemporary category, positing a
future in which it is not the basis upon which people organize social
understandings. But their focus on the future is no more helpful
than the essentialists' focus on the past.
I grant, however, that this present-oriented analysis inevitably lim-
its the transformative power of equal protection arguments. It does
not seek immediately to transcend the social categories in and with
which we live. Not too much should be made of this, however;, it re-
mains true that legal and social victories can reshape a category, and
eventually contribute to a process of erosion that can end at a point
where the category loses all or most-or at least the worst-of its
meaning. To the extent that the privileged status of the favored
group is an embedded characteristic of the category itself, a program
of seeking greater equality between the classifications has the impor-
tant effect of breaking down the category. If, for instance, being sub-
ordinated is part of what it means to be Black in our culture,' then
184 See Rush, supra note 30, at 73 ("Analogical reasoning has been an essential component of
equal protection analysis since the early 1970s.").
185 CfJane Wong, The Anti-Essentialism v. Essentialism Ddate in Feminist Lgal Thror: The Debate
and Beyond, 5 WiM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L 273, 292 (1999) (concluding that in feminist theory.
.essentialism is unavoidable because there is always a need to define the category of 'woman.'
whether as white and middle-class, lesbian, or racial minority).
188 See supra pp. 689-70.
187 SeeFarley, supra note 27, at 473-74 ("To be thematized as black is a form of humiliation in
and of itself. ... There can be no such thing as good race relations for it is the category of race
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every piece of the system of subordination that is removed-i.e., the
more equality we achieve within existing institutions-is a step to-
wards breaking down the socially constructed category of race. We
should not ignore this important transformative function of equality-
based arguments.
But let us suppose that it is more problematic than I believe that
my argument begins by accepting rather than transcending socially
constructed categories. There remains a simple answer: It is impor-
tant to distinguish between means and ends. "Category transcen-
dence" may be the goal towards which a legal argument is deployed,
but it is not the argument itself.iss Powerful, socially constructed catego-
ries must be reckoned with if they are ultimately to be broken down.
B. The Immutability of Orientation's Classifications
Once we recognize that sexual orientation is socially constructed,
and that legal argument operates only within that construct, we have
established the "constructive" side of "constructive immutability." It
remains to establish the immutability of sexual orientation. The core
assumption of sexual orientation as a social category is that people
can be classified based on the sex and/or gender of those to whom
they are sexually attracted. This attribute-being sexually attracted
to others based in part89 on their sex-is experienced as immutable
by many individuals (whichever classification they may fit).
There are alternative explanations for this. For those persuaded
by the developing scientific evidence of a correlation between bio-
logical and/or genetic characteristics and sexual orientation, little
more need be said. Although it is possible to imagine an argument
that even a genetic explanation for sexual orientation would not es-
tablish its immutability, it is evident that those who accept the bio-
logical evidence virtually always take the further position that sexual
orientation is immutable. For this reason, I will direct this discussion
at those convinced that sexual orientation is not genetically linked, or
who even believe that object-of-gender choice does not constitute a
valid categorizing principle for human beings.
In the last section, I discussed the dynamic nature of the social
construction of sexual orientation. It has been in part reactive to the
decline of other oppressive forces, in part the product of the felt
need for dominant-group differentiation, and in part (and most re-
cently) the creation of sexual and gender minorities shaping their
itself which constitutes the humiliation. Blackness is the yellow star, the pink triangle, the scar-
let letter, and the bad reputation. To be black is to occupy the role of inferior-for-whites, spe-
cifically, to be black is to be available for racial humiliation.").
Moreover, I will discuss strategies to enhance the power of the constructive immutability
arqument to transform oppressive social institutions, infra p. 641.
Obviously, sexual object choice is influenced by additional factors-age, appearance,
congruence of sexual tastes, to name a few.
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own communities. In such an environment, it should hardly be sur-
prising that some people's engagement with the forces prodding sex-
ual and gender conformity will be radically different than others.
Moreover, these forces have continued to interact in the last half-
century, continuously creating a shifting reality within which people
are locating their sexual identity. Consider this possible experience:
1960: The force of conformity is so powerful that the 15-year-old's het-
erosexuality is experienced as entirely natural, unchosen, and immuta-
ble.
1970: The force of conformity has ebbed, so that tie 25-year-old may
perceive heterosexuality as being a chosen part of her identity, or as hav-
ing been imposed on her, leading to a process of choice dht may pro-
duce a different lived sexual orientation.
1980: The force of conformity has ebbed still further, and the 35-year-
old's experience with her sexuality may lead her to dismiss the whole
category of sexual orientation as having been imposed on her and reject
classification as either homosexual or heterosexual.
This dynamic understanding of orientation and social construc-
tion means that the classification may be immutable for some, muta-
ble for others, and a misleading and/or arbitrary label for others.
Thus, it is unsurprising that in our culture a large percentage of gay
men and lesbians (and heterosexuals, a point that is not often dis-
cussed or utilized despite its importance) perceive and describe their
same-sex attraction to have been discovered rather than chosen; as
relatively fixed, rather than fluid, and as constitutive of part of their
identity.
For such a hypothetical person, Jane Hopkins, being sexually at-
tracted to members of the same sex is no different than being the
biological child of Ann and Andy Hopkins. The first characteristic
constitutes her sexual orientation, the second her genetic inheri-
tance. Neither is a characteristic she chose, and neither is subject to
change by means of her own conscious, voluntary decision-making.'
To the extent that we accept autobiography and self-description as
valid, this body of evidence supports the premise that sexuality is at
least sometimes immutable. 9 '
But we need not rely solely on such testimony. Ironically, the so-
cial constructionists' persuasive arguments about the constructed na-
ture of sexual orientation actually help to establish the immutability
of the classifications of sexual orientation. If we agree that the cate-
190 There are, of course, levels of immutability. The identity of Jane's biological parents is
entirely unalterable, while the color of her fingernails is relatively within her control. Charac-
teristics are "immutable enough" if they are not subject to simple volitional, rapid change udith
no or little psychic or physical harm. A requirement that all employees paint their fingernails
red might be wrong on some other basis, but it is not subject to the immutability critique.
19I will discuss the significance of the contrary stories related by other people who experi-
ence their sexual and gender identity as mutable, itfra pp. 638-41. Respect for tie narratives of
immutability does not require silencing or ignoring the alternative narratives of mutability.
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gory is socially constructed, the next question must be "What have we
built?".'- In the area of sexuality, one facet of our construct is the
rigid social constraints and pervasive system of penalties imposed.
upon people who do not conform to expectations regarding gender
and sexuality. They are so pervasive, in fact, that they operate in the
earliest times of our lives, attempting mightily to channel us into the
expected classifications. Indeed, inducing the perception of immutability
can be seen as the whole point of the social construct.
In such a construct, it would be surprising if many of us did not
experience our sexuality and gender as received rather than chosen.
For those who conform to the constructed norms, it seems the most
natural course in the world-the individual hardly differs from a rock
made inevitably smooth by centuries of running water. Both the rock
and the conformist see their status as immutable; "How could I be
otherwise?" each asks.
At the same time, this overwhelming force in favor of the su-
perordinated classification also operates on sexual and gender non-
conformists. For them, its significance is not that it makes conformity
seem natural and innate, but that it influences the perception of
competing drives towards non-conformity. Others have spoken to the
crushing force of heterosexist 93 and patriarchalt paradigms, but one
point has gone unnoted: Resistance to that life-long, omnipresent
pressure requires extraordinary counter-forces. Just as the conform-
ist experiences conformity as a natural condition, so too do many
non-conformists live their classification as a natural, innate condition,
so powerful that not even the most extreme social conditioning could
alter it.'95
This phenomenon, in which both the conformists and non-
conformists experience their own identity as immutable, should not
M SeeJames Weinrich, Reality or Social Construction?, in FORMS OF DESIRE, supra note 3, at 175,
183 (noting as evidence that homosexuality is socially constructed that "the pattern of homo-
sexuality differs a lot from culture to culture").
See Rush, supra note 30, at 90 ("Long before a child is even concerned with marriage, he
or she is socially indoctrinated with the heterosexual norm and expectation. The image and
idea of heterosexuality are visible almost anywhere-on billboards, television, children's books,
the bestseller list, movies, theater, and even on the PTA.").
19 See SUZANNE PHARR, HOMOPHOBA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM 39-40 (1988) (describing the
"profoundly sad" impact of sexism on women's lives, including women who "held themselves
back from people and things that would not be acceptable in a sexist world," who "took roads
prescribed for them, rather than those their hearts yearned for," and as a result "suffered such a
toll on their mental health and psychic energy").
395 Vera Whisman's penetrating interviews with lesbians and gay men repeatedly demonstrate
this phenomenon: descriptions of intense social opprobrium from family and friends and the
perception that all the suffering and pressure was futile because the individual's orientation was
unchangeable. See VERA WHISMAN, QUEER BY CHOICE 13-15 (1996) (discussing Noel's initial
denial of his homosexuality and belief it was "horrible," but also his perception that, "I just feel
it's something innate. I don't think of it as a choice," andJessica's questioning, "Why was I born
like this?" and her mother's response, "You were not born like this. This is what you
choose .... You could've been with a guy.").
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be surprising. When we talk in vague terms about a category like
sexual orientation as "socially constructed," we refer to a bewildering
array of forces that create social categories and understandings. So-
cial construction posits that the ways in which people identify the na-
ture of sexuality have shifted in so fundamental a way that the cate-
gory of "homosexual" has come into being in the last century and a
half, changing radically just in the last fifty years. It would be surpris-
ing if forces sufficiently powerful to transform culture in such a rela-
tively short time did not also have a profound effect on self-
identification-profound enough that people experience their sexu-
ality and gender identity as having never been consciously chosen
and as being immutable.
What should we make of the widespread (though not universal)
perception that one's classification (though not always other peoples'
classification 97) within the socially constructed classification of sexual
orientation is immutable?' 9' Among other things, it is a marker of a
vast social system exerting powerful influence over individuals.'"
That system is a status- and norm-preserving one, designed to pro-
duce conformity to accepted sexual norms. And the category itself is
an integral part of that system-a construct meant, in part, to main-
tain the dominant position of the superordinated group." In con-
trast, classifications as to which people perceive a relatively high de-
gree of mutability are those in which the social forces impelling
19 Some relatively mild versions of social construction admit of this possibility. SerCarole S.
Vance, Social Constrution Theoiy: Problems in the Histo of Sexualit, in Ho.t.sXUALm', WHIcH
HOMOSEXUAuIY? 13, 18 (Dennis Altman et al. eds., 1989) (discussing theorists who accept that
"the direction of desire and erotic interest are fixed,* even if its expression and social signifi-
cance may vary across cultures).
19 See Laura A. Gans, Inverts, Peneris, and Converts: Sexual Orientation Conversion TheraPT and
Liabilit 8 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 219 (1999) (discussing claims of ability to change homosexuals'
sexual orientation through "conversion therapy"). Anti-gay forces repeatedly sound the theme
that the sexual orientation of gay men and lesbians can be changed, but they have not been
made to answer the question whether the same holds true for heterosexuality. That is one rea-
son why the immutability argument must be made as to sexual orientation in general, rather
than homosexuality in particular. See infra pp. 641.
1 Even those opponents of the LGBT movement who ardently deny that sexual orientation
is immutable steadfasdy refuse to address the issue of whether-assuming they themselvs are
heterosexual-they believe they could voluntarily choose to alter their opposite-sex sexual at-
traction.
9 Of course, there can also be a simpler explanation for the perception of immutability. It
could be accurate, and the characteristic (e.g., height) might be immutable wholly apart from
the influence of social categories. If so, then the perception (by itself) would not give rise to an
inference of sub- and superordinated classifications, although the moral arguments against us-
ing it as the basis for legislative classifications would still come into play. Sesupram pp. 670-80.
But we are assuming for the sake of the discussion that sexual orientation is immutable only
because of the influence of the social construct on individual experience. Ste supra pp. 696-98.
Hence, our focus is more narrow. What is the significance of the %idespread perception that
peoles' classification within a socially constructed categorizing system is imnmutable?
See supra pp. 689-91 (discussing decline of oppressive forces that prevented the expression
of same-sex attraction as having produced the need to construct the category 'sexual orienta-
tion" in which homosexuals would be the subordinated classification).
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conformity are less pronounced.
Race demonstrates the correlation between the experience of
immutability and a social system of subordination. Racial identity in
the United States has been constructed over hundreds of years in a
way that has strictly policed the racial line between whites and Afri-
can-Americans.2 0 ' The legal classification of a person with any Black
ancestry as Black has made a person's social race Black-immutably
Black-without regard to any contrary self-identification she mightd , 202
develop. The deep connection between this construct of racial pu-
rity and systemic racial oppression is plain. °3
One might respond to this analogy by arguing that the system of
racial classification has enforced conformity to racial identities di-
rectly through rules assigning people to one race or another, thereby
making immutability a legal reality, while the system of sexual and
gender conformity has utilized stereotyping and socialization to
"fool" people into perceiving their classification as immutable. But
this response ignores the reality that racial, sexuality, and gender
identity are all created and enforced by both methods: legal rules es-
tablishing classifications, and ingrained social norms. The taboo on
interracial marriage, for instance, once took the form of a legal rule
enforcing racial identity,20° but this legal barrier has been replaced by
social P. ressures pushing conformity to the norm of intraracial mar-
riage. And while the experience of sexual orientation as immutable
is primarily a function of socialization, the rigid classification system
of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell",2° demonstrates that immutability can be a
legal reality in this category just as it can be with race. 207
-0 See supra pp. 654-56 (discussing social construction of race rendering status as African-
American immutable).
" Or even if she never had the opportunity to develop any racial self-identification. See
Hickman, supra note 27, at 1250-51 (relating 1996 story of baby, with white mother and Black
father, who died the day after she was born and was removed from an all-white church cemetery
a few days after the burial when the Deacons discovered her father's race and "voted to com-
mand that the coffin.., be removed from their graveyard").
M See Rush, supra note 30, at 79 ("The historical and social underpinnings for the 'drop of
black blood' rule run far and deep in this country and function to promote the continued sub-
ordination of Blacks."). Even in contemporary America, where the racial line is policed less
strictly than 100 or even 40 years ago, the opportunity for individual control over social and le-
gal recognition of race remains limited. See Hickman, supra note 27, at 1250-51 ("There is room
for choice but ... we must remember that even now at the end of the twentieth century, many
choices are still made for us because of our race.").
04 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment); Hickman, supra note 27, at 1179 ("A Negro could not buy
out of her assigned race; she could not marry out of it; nor were her children released from its
taint.").
05 See SHIPLER, supra note 113, at 113 (discussing disfavor with which interracial marriage is
still regarded, even as acceptance of integration in other settings has increased).
%6 See supra p. 653 (discussing virtually irrebuttable presumption that homosexual "conduct"
determines that the servicemember is homosexual).
207 SeeYoshino, supra note 2, at 556-57 ("'Don't ask, don't tell' must thus be seen as an at-
tempt by the state to sustain the epistemic contract of gay erasure even as that 'contract' be-
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Testimony of experienced immutability is, in short, evidence of
the presence of social hierarchies, and of superordinated and subor-
dinated groups. This evidence is, in large measure, the reason courts
should be wary of legislatures that classify on the basis of immutable
characteristics. Such classifications inevitably build on pre-existing
structures of disadvantage, save for the rare instance in which the
dominant group legislates in a way favoring the subordinated classifi-
cation. "  In this observation we discover the rest of the answer to
Dean Ely's challenge to "tell us exactly why we should be suspicious of
legislatures that classify on the basis of immutable characteristics.""
It is crucial here not to confuse two quite distinct arguments. The
first is that we should be suspicious of distinctions based on immuta-
ble characteristics because of their immutability. This is not my primary
argument. Professor Yoshino has a point when he observes that the
premise I have already described-that it is %rTong to penalize people
for a characteristic that is beyond their power to chang4--is "widely
accepted," giving us no reason to be suspicious of legislators' capacity
to "consider [immutability] in making their determinations.
On the other hand, Yoshino's point is undermined by the close
link between systems of class-based subordination and the perception
that classifications are immutable. Legislators may in the abstract rec-
ognize the moral sensibility that people should not be penalized for
immutable characteristics, but that recognition can be overwhelmed
by the legislators' membership in the superordinated social group.
Unknowingly, Dean Ely demonstrated this in his own iteration of the
process argument when he argued: "Surely one has to feel sorry for a
person disabled by something that he or she can't do anything about,
but I'm not aware of any reason to suppose that elected officials are
unusually unlikely to share that feeling.t t  Indeed. Elected officials
comes ever more damagingly removed from any meaningful notion of consent. Although gays
are now less prone than they historically have been to having their identities manipulated in the
broader culture, the military seeks to retain the anachronism of gay erasure by force of law. To
recognize that the state is doing through coercive means what the culture can no longer sustain
through persuasive ones is to recognize that the state is exacerbating the manipulation effect
suffered by gays ); Chang & McCristal, supra note 164, at 255-56 (criticizing Supreme Court's
decision in Hurley v. Irish-Amnerican Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Bostan, Inc., 515 U.S. 557
(1995), for constructing an identity of "homosexual" that "ignorled] their self/group descrip-
tion," and constituted a "refusal to see the real identity that these gay/lesbian/bisexual indi-
viduals as a group claim") (emphasis added).
This is, I should note, yet another reason that race- or gender-based alfirmative action is
different in kind from invidious discrimination, even though they share the common cdraacter-
istic that each classifies on the basis of race or sex. Segregated public schools build upon and
reinforce a hierarchy of privilege for whites. Race-based admissions to universities undercut
that same hierarchy.
ELY, supra note 2, at 150. The immorality of using such classifications, discussed supra pp.
670-80, was the first part of the answer.
210 Seesupra pp. 671-75 (discussing moral dimension of penalizing immutable traits).
2_n Yoshino, supra note 2, at 517.212* See ELY, supra note 2, at 150.
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are likely to share that feeling. But the "feeling" Ely describes has
both an "attitude-toward-immutability" component and a substantive,
attitude-toward-disability component, the latter of which is captured
in the expression that we "feel sorry" for people with disabilities. Leg-
islators who share the feeling Dean Ely describes will be moved only
in part by their attitude towards immutability in general, and much
more by the pity viewpoint that creates and perpetuates discrimina-
tion against people with disabilities. If the presence of an "immu-
tability sensibility" were enough, legislators would be moved not to
feel sorry for people with disabilities, but to recognize their equal
status. But instead, because they are predominantly members of the
superordinated group of people without cognizable disabilities, they
share Dean Ely's unthinking, reflexive reaction of pity.
The point here is not that legislators are ogres, and certainly not
thatJohn Hart Ely is an ogre. It is that the process of group subordi-
nation leads members of the privileged group to share certain pre-
dictable, negative attitudes towards members of the subordinated
group(s). These attitudes produce discrimination. Their precise na-
ture varies; it may be disgust in the case of homosexuals, mistrust in
the case of African-Americans, and pity in the case of people with dis-
abilities. But whatever collection of attitudes prevails, it will tend to
be the basis for the actions of dominant-group members, including
legislators.
Well, then, Yoshino and Ely might respond, what we should really
be looking for are those attitudes, not for immutability. The diffi-
culty, however, is that courts must look for all the indicia that systems
of subordination are affecting government actions, decisions, and
policies. Certainly, expressions of "feeling sony" for people with dis-
abilities, or that "all blacks are lazy," or that "all Jews are greedy" must
not be ignored. But since the experience of immutability is an indi-
cator of a system of subordination, it is also an indication of the sort
of process failure Dean Ely identifies as a basis for judicial interven-
tion, even if attitudes about immutability itself would not suffice. So
even if immutability itself is not a sufficient basis for suspecting possi-
ble breakdowns in the legislative process, immutability tells us some-
thing about the nature of the specific social category under consid-
eration. That "something" is the presence of a deeper system of
social subordination, anathema to the purposes of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
At an even more basic level, individuals are creatures of the social
framework into which they are born. The social constructionist posits
a Michael Hardwick, born with all of the innate, genetic, biological
213 See, e.g., D.R Nation: Pityfests a Thing of the Past? Maybe ELECTRIC EDGE, Sept/Oct. 1997, at
http://www.ragged-edge-mag.com/sep97/dmat9.htm (last visited January 24, 2000) (quoting
Easter Seals employee explaining that the organization phased out its telethon in part because
it "wanted to avoid pity").
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characteristics he possessed, but born in seventeenth-century Russia,
and denies that this earlier Hardwick could be gay because the classi-
fication itself did not exist for him. Whatever his desires and sexual
behavior, he would not have been "gay" in the sense that his twenti-
eth-century doppelganger is. From this, the constructionist con-
cludes that the trait is not immutable.
But the hypothetical is meaningless for this discussion. We are
asking how the law (which is of this culture), treats the actual Hard-
wick (who is of this culture), and his sexual orientation (which is of
this culture). They are all part of the same social construct. Indeed,
law itself is one of the "constructing" institutions which has created
the category' 4 and with its numerous and extraordinarily important
distinctions between the classifications "heterosexual" and "homo-
sexual" has contributed to the reality that these classifications are ex-
perienced as immutable.
This is true even ifJane Hopkins and Michael Hardwick are wrong
to perceive their attraction to women and men, respectively, as im-
mutable. Jane's sexual attraction to other women may be the product
of a complex series of social interactions; her very understanding of
herself as a "lesbian" may be the result of societal labeling and the
creation of a category that did not exist in 1799 and will not exist in
2099. Nevertheless, so far as the legal doctrine of equal protection is
concerned, and so far as the moral underpinnings of the immutabil-
ity argument are concerned, it really does not matter whether the
characteristic is socially constructed or not; it need only be experi-
enced at the individual level as immutable. '2 15 In legal and political
terms, the important point is that constructive immutability is no less
potent than the more simple, essentialist versions of the immutability
argument.
Nor is it surprising, though, that Jane Hopkins is not the only
voice speaking to this matter. The categories we have constructed are
not as well-defined as society pretends, and individual experience
with the classifications varies across a whole range of other factors.
Perhaps most importantly, the institutions and forces that have con-
structed the categories by the way they have defined the classifications
are themselves subject to ongoing reconstruction. While Jane might
be an example of the fifteen-year-old person's perception (that the
force of non-conformity is so strong that she experiences her sexual-
ity as entirely natural, unchosen, and immutable) ,216 "Terry" Hopkins
may represent the twenty-five-year-old in the example, experiencing
234 See CAss R SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITIMON 4-6 (1993) (discussing concept of
.status quo neutrality" as flawed because it "disregards the fhct that existing rights ... are in an
inortant sense a product of law").
See supra pp. 654-56 (discussing definition of 'immutability" to indude traits experienced
as immutable).
216 See supra p. 697-98.
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his opposite-sex attraction as a choice, while "Dave" Hopkins may ar-
ticulate the thirty-five-year-old's understanding that the whole cate-
gory is meaningless and that his sexual attraction is largely or entirely
unaffected by the sex of his partner. There is, in short, a diversity of
experiences with the immutability of sexuality, and it makes no sense
to decide the merit of the immutability argument looking at Jane,
Terry, or Dave as if theirs was the only relevant experience.
What to make of this? Some have worried that reliance on the
immutability argument in such an environment risks limiting the
gains achieved only to those who experience their sexual orientation
as immutable, or at least that it is unrepresentative and therefore dis-
empowering for "mutable gays. '1 8 Others have observed that it limits
the transferability of the gains to other civil rights struggles by creat-
ing an immutability "requirement" other groups might be unable to
satisfy,219 and that it shares the limitation inherent in other equality-
based arguments that it demands access to but does not transform
inherently oppressive institutions!" Still others have cited the "pity
problem": the fear that the immutability argument presents homo-
sexuality as an "unfortunate condition"-coming dangerously close
to accepting the implicit premise that homosexuality is bad-and
constitutes a plea for pity rather than a demand for equality and re-
spect.n'
These fears are not insignificant, but do not provide adequate
grounds for rejecting immutability, for both strategic and legal rea-
sons. On the strategic level, sexual and gender minorities face a vex-
ing issue arising out of the diversity of their experiences. Immutabil-
ity represents just one of these realms of diversity. Even a casual
observer of the gay and lesbian rights movement over the past quar-
ter-century has heard the wide range of stories told by individuals-
stories that differ in innumerable ways. There are disparate experi-
ences with public and private discrimination, with family relation-
ships, and with the intersections between oppression on the basis of
sexual orientation, gender identity, race, economic class, and na-
tional origin. "2 Issues of class, race, gender, and ethnicity have all
217 See WHISMAN, supra note 195, at 6 (noting the gender disparity by virtue of which "the vast
majority of gay men in the U.S. do understand their homosexuality as an orientation they did
not choose or create," but "lesbian identities span a continuum, from a model of lesbian iden-
tity as a conscious political choice to a determinist model like that of most gay men").. See Pickhardt, supra note 2, at 951 (expressing concern that immutability argument
"risk[s] misrepresenting and thus dividing the communities that they should be protecting").
219 See Yoshino, supra note 2, at 502 ("The immutability factor withholds protection from
groups that can convert, leaving them susceptible to legislation that pressures them to do so.").See supra note 117 (discussing opposition within LGBT community to seeking equal access
to marriage because of its patriarchal structure).
221 See Pickhardt, supra note 2, at 949 (criticizing immutability argument because it reduces to
thequestion, "'Why would I choose to be something so clearly and utterly undesirable?'").
- See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativit); Critical
Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1999) (summarizing prior article in
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created tensions about which goals to pursue, how to prioritize them,
and how to seek them. Careful assessment of the ramifications of this
multi-level diversity is crucial.
Efforts in this regard have been made. Janet Halley attempted to
bridge the immutability gap by proposing a legal strategy based on
what she called a "merged approach" somewhere between pure es-
sentialism and pure constructivismu based on the observations that
some biological traits are not immutable_2 and that even some con-
structed traits may be immutable at some levels."2
But Halley'sproposal of a compromise she calls "weak behavioral
constructivism"- fails to achieve the common ground she seeks,
while forfeiting most of the power of the immutability argument.
While she posits the notion that "some other form or forms of human
variance are primary,"7 she insists that such essential categories not
include "gender-of-object choice as the essential substrate of behav-
ioral constructivism."2-s But since lesbians and gay men are classified
as such based on their "gender-of-object choice," setting this trait
apart as the one thing that cannot be deemed immutable denies
those classified as gay or lesbian the ability to argue from immutabil-
ity.229 Worse, it denies gay men and lesbians the ability to frame the
immutability argument as a helpful narrative. The stories they would
tell consist of the very claim Halley places off-limits: that their sexual
attraction is primarily to members of the same sex and that they ex-
perience this fact of their lives as immutable.! Instead of the precise
which Hutchinson "asserted that the various social identity categories and systems of oppression
are 'inextricably and forever intemined,' [and] that the failure of gay and lesbian legal theo-
rists to interrogate and challenge racial and class subordination produces essentialist theories
that invariably reflect the experiences of class and race-privileged gays, lesbians, and bisexuals"
(footnote omitted)).
Halley, supra note 2, at 546.
224 Id at 548.
Id. at 552-53 ("[It is possible for a constructist to claim that sexual-orientation identity is
mutable across the range of human possibility, without making the distinct claim that it is mu-
table in a given person, or even in a given society or era.").
-6 Id. at 560-66.
-7 Id. at558.
= Id.
a2 Professor Halley sees her proposal as a compromise because, she asserts, some sexual ob-
ject choices other than genderwhich might be seen as essential -might be more likely to produce
regular correlations" with gender-of-object differences. Id. But for gay men and lesbians who
experience their orientation as immutable, it is the gender-of-object (and not differences that
correlate with gender-of-object) that is the immutable thing. Indeed, the very terminology Hal-
ley uses--cafling sexual orientation classifications "gender-of-object chaiin-revcals that her
proposal rejects the very premise of the immutability argument: thit tese are not choices at
all. Id. (emphasis added).
=0 Some of the most important and moving narratives weave together the experience of im-
mutability with the despair of gay and lesbian young people. The combination of the shame
they feel, and the unalterable quality of their status, produces a sense of being "doomed" to a
life they have been taught is sinful and disgusting. As one person explained, 'I thought I -,as
destined to a life of perversity, sickness, loneliness and eternal damnation. I can still remember
the pain that made me want to die." Gay/Lesbian Youth in Crisis, at hup://duke.
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story-line testified to by many lesbians and gay men, this approach
substitutes an artificial and convoluted tale in its place.
Nor is this exercise necessary to ensure that the gains generated
by the immutability argument are shared by lesbians and gay men
who do not experience their classification as immutable. If we as-
sume that the immutability argument will have a net positive effect in
achieving LGBT civil rights and equality, then the only harmful effect
of using immutability would be if that positive effect were not enjoyed
by all members of the community it is intended to help. This, in
turn, would happen only if the legal and social response to immuta-
bility would be to say, "OK, good point. It is unconstitutional and un-
fair to discriminate against people based on an immutable character-
istic, so we'll grant equality to all of you who pass an 'immutability
screening.' You others, for whom your classification is a relatively vo-
litional matter, you're out of luck." It should be obvious, I think, that
this response is unlikely in the extreme,2' meaning that all sexual and
gender minorities would benefit from the gains produced by use of
immutability.""
Still, positive legal outcomes purchased at the price of rendering
invisible and/or silencing part of the community are of uncertain
value-even if that part of the community shares the resulting legal
gains. This is the difficulty with Janet Halley's proposal: Even if it
meets with courtroom success, it does not include "immutable" gays
in its sweep. The same holds true in reverse: Even if "mutable" gays
and lesbians share in the gains produced by the immutability argu-
ment, the risk of non-inclusiveness remains.
The broader problem is that the diversity of the community-
communities, really-of LGBT people poses a genuine dilemma for
the lawyer and the political activists seeking a common strategy for
progress. With so many quite distinct (sometimes conflicting) stories
to tell, it is difficult to settle on one approach that even nears
consensus.
usask.ca/-ssglus/youth.hunl (last visited on Oct. 23, 2000) (emphasis added) (quoting a
twenty-three year old survivor of a suicide attempt).
23 If for no other reason, the response is unlikely because finding a genetic contribution to
sexuality would not be the same as allowing confident identification of gay and non-gay people.
See Spitko, supra note 2, at 615-16 n.227 (arguing that potential program of "antigay eugenics"
as a reason to avoid reliance on biological and genetic explanations for sexual orientation is
"divorced from reality"). The unlikelihood of an "immutability screening" in the case of sexual
orientation contrasts with its obvious application as applied to the example of PFB, raised supra
p. 653. For PFB sufferers, who cannot shave without serious medical consequences, a beard
should be deemed immutable, even though it plainly is not for most men. As a result, govern-
ment should be required to have a better justification for applying a no-beard rule to those with
PFB than to others. When the basis for deeming a trait immutable is a medical condition like
PFB, it makes sense to limit the benefit of the immutability argument to those diagnosed with
the condition.
22 See Spitko, supra note 2, at 616 n.227. ("Even those with a same-sex desire who believe
that their sexual orientation is 'constructed' and mutable would share in the protection likely to
derive from judicial recognition of [the biological influence on sexual orientation].").
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Constructive immutability is a consensus-accommodating ap-
proach because it is consistent with a heterogeneous portrait of the
community. Its agnosticism on the issue of whether there is a bio-
logical or genetic basis for sexual orientation-the "nature versus
nurture" question-avoids alienating those who find the scientific
evidence unconvincing or tentative. It accepts the notion that, while
same-sex attraction has existed for centuries (if not millennia), the
modem understanding of homosexuality has developed and contin-
ues to evolve in response to social, economic, religious, and political
forces in the last century. In this way, it validates the sense some have
of an innate quality to their sexual attraction, but also the certainty
others have that the entire category must be understood as part of a
broader system of social subordination, and the perception still oth-
ers have of a chosen sexuality.
Given its premise that even a socially constructed category can
produce immutable classifications, the power of constructive immu-
tability does not depend on proof that the nature of gay, lesbian, bi-
sexual, or transgendered identity is historically fixed. Most impor-
tantly, it does not depend on proof that all people experience their
sexual identity as immutable-simply that enough of us do to demon-
strate the subordinating roots of the category.
Thus, constructive immutability depends on no premise denying
the existence of sexual and gender minorities whose identity is voli-
tional and mutable. Nor does it call on them to be silent or fail to in-
clude them in the legal and political story being told. Indeed, the
fuller understanding of what "immutability" involves-that part of
what is immutable is the sense of being an outsider in a culture with
different expectations and norms-would comfortably include the
understanding of many LGBT people who do not experience their
sexual attractions as immutable.
Constructive immutability also has the power, perhaps unique
among all equality-based arguments, to make the case to transform
social institutions, even as minority groups seek access to them. Con-
structive immutability emerges from the idea that social categories
are an element of a far broader system of subordination, one so per-
vasive that it produces the experience that a characteristic is immuta-
ble even if the category is socially constructed*' Building the argu-
ment thus not only affords the opportunity to call attention to the
oppressive and discriminatory qualities of social institutions; it is re-
quired by the nature of the argument. For instance, rather than call-
ing for recognition of marriages between members of the same sex by
idealizing the institution of marriage, constructive immutability could
include marriage's patriarchal elements as examples of the broader
system of social subordination. Its potential to contribute to institu-
See supra pp. 696-702.
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tional reform should not be ignored.
Finally, the risk that immutability comes across as a plea for pity is
genuine. As Vera Whisman notes:
If we argue against only the "possible to change" assertion, we leave un-
challenged the more insidious assumption that it is desirable or necessary
to do so. And to the extent that homosexuality is acceptable only if it is
not chosen it remains stigmatized, illegitimate, deviant. Added to that
logical weakness is an emotional one; as D'Emilio... asks, "Do we really
expect to bid for real power from a position of 'I can't help it'?"
23
However, this risk is a by-product of the unfortunate reality that the
debate on this question has focused too much on homosexuality, the
classification, rather than on sexual orientation, the category. Janet
Halley has written extensively in terms of whether homosexuality is
socially constructed, while Rictor Norton answered the construction-
ists by writing a book entitled The Myth of the Modern Homosexual This
is primarily due to the place of sexual minorities as the subordinated
group, creating the obvious rhetorical impetus to talk in terms of how
those groups should and should not craft equal protection argu-
ments.
While the concentration on homosexuals is understandable, and
the rhetorical effect predictable, this is not sufficient reason to es-
chew the immutability argument. Any argument can be made poorly,
but our focus ought to be on the argument's impact if and when it is
made well. An argument that sexual orientation is immutable, care-
fully framed to emphasize that this is true of homosexuality and heterosexu-
ality, would avoid the "pity problem. "  As I will attempt to show in
the next section, constructive immutability can achieve each of these
goals.
V. A BETYER WAY: CONCRETE USES OF CONSTRUCTIVE IMMUTABILrIY
It is relatively easy to propose abstract approaches in the context
of a law review article. Translating those approaches into useful ar-
guments is the real test of the proposal's value.2 In this section, I will
234 WHISMAN, supra note 195, at 6 (quoting JOHN D'EnuLio, MAKING TROUBLE: ESsmis ON
GAY HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THE UNIVERSrIY 187 (1992)).
9M- See, e.g., JOSEPH STEFFAN, HONOR BOUND: A GAY AMIERICAN FIGHTS FOR THE RIGHT TO
SERVE His COUNTRY 158-59 (relating conversation where Steffan's friend asked whether he
could "decide that you're going to be straight... to like girls from now on," to which he re-
plied: "That would be just as easy as your waking up tomorrow and deciding that from now on
you were only going to be attracted to men."). As Steffan pointed out, "I found it remarkable
that he had never viewed my sexuality in the same way that he viewed his own. He had only en-
visioned it as a deviation from some universal norm." Id. at 159.
2M It is also a test too often ignored or even disdained by authors. See Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 35
(1992) (criticizing the prevalence in the legal academy of the "'impractical' scholar," who "pro-
duces abstract scholarship that has little relevance to concrete issues," with the result that
"judges, administrators, legislators, and practitioners have little use for much of the scholarship
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sketch out the ways the constructive immutability argument can be
utilized in three important realms: the courtroom during constitu-
tional litigation challenging anti-gay discrimination, the legislature
during debate over a bill protecting sexual and gender minorities
from discrimination, and the intimacy of family life as a teenager ex-
plains to her parents that she is gay.
A. Constitutional Litigation
In a case challenging the constitutionality of the military's "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the immutability argument would have its
greatest potency in illustrating the effect of the rigid classification of
servicemembers into categories of sexuality, and in tying that classifi-
cation into the broader social pattern of anti-gay discrimination. It
could be framed in the following way:
The statute and accompanying regulations create an almost irrebuttable
presumption that a servicemember is homosexual based on a remarkably
broad array of supposed homosexual "conducL" Indeed, the list of
"conduct" is so broad that it includes even statements of homosexual-.237
ity, a breadth expanded still further by a startling array of "statements"
the government has, in practice% deemed to constitute statements of a
servicemember's homosexuality.
In this fashion, by operation of statute, regulation, and enforce-
ment, the government has created an immutable class of persons who
are first defined as homosexual, regardless of their own self-
identification, and then discharged from the military. Such rigid po-
licing of the line between a favored and a disfavored group is hardly
unknown to American law, and is anathema to the core purposes of
the Equal Protection Clause.
The nation's history of racial subordination Nwas marked by a simi-
lar legal construction of racial identity, the "one drop" rule by which
a person with virtually any Black ancestry was deemed Black, and %vas
then subject to the entire spectrum of legal and social mistreatment
ranging from slavery to Jim Crow to segregation. It has been a crucial
component of such a system that the line be drawn and maintained
so as to preserve the "purity" of the favored group." Thus, this Court
that is now produced by members of the academy").
See supra p. 653 & note 19 (discussing "conduct" to include "sttcments).
n According to the Servicemembers' Legal Defense Network, the military currently initiates
investigations based on private statements made by a sericemcmber to ps)dbotherapists. doc-
tors, Efmily members, and close friends. Indeed, the military has violated die temis of die pol-
icy itself by instructing health care providers and even chaplains to report a person's state-
ments-even ambiguous questions-regarding possible same-sex attraction. See
SERVICENMEBERS LEGAL DEFENSE NETWOR, CONDUcT UNBECOMING: THi Fir ANNe4uAL
REPORT ON "DON'TASK, DON'TTELL, DON'T PURSUE" (Mar. 15, 1999), at hup://www.sldn.org.
2-9 See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Coaor-Blind 44 STAN. L REV. 1. 30-35
(1991) (proposing that definitions of race are based on interrelated concepts of 'white racial
purity" and "white domination").
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should be deeply suspicious of the dejure immutability that the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy has created.
The difficulty is not merely one of an overbroad irrebuttable pre-
sumption misclassifying non-gay servicemembers. Instead, the policy
is emblematic of an infinitely broader, historical national practice of
punishing any expression of deviation from the norm of heterosexu-
ality. This pattern operates across the entire spectrum of our na-
tional life and profoundly affects every person in America, straight
and gay, almost from the moment we are born.
This Court can put to one side the unhelpful debate over what de-
termines each individual's sexuality. What it must not ignore, how-
ever, is the widespread perception-among straight and gay people
alike-that sexuality is not chosen and that changing it is not volun-
tary in any meaningful sense of the term.2"° Most heterosexual
Americans would reject the suggestion that they either chose their
sexuality or could easily change it. This experience of immutability
may be explained in part by genetic and biological factors, but even if
that answer is found wanting, it plainly owes much to the enormous
pressures our society exerts to conform to the expected pattern of
heterosexual identity and conduct. And the lesbian or gay man's
contrasting understanding-that her or his sexuality diverges from
this norm-must be the product of counterforces sufficiently power-
ful to overcome the influence of the same lifelong compulsion to
conform. Not surprisingly, then, the experience of sexuality as im-
mutable is as common among homosexuals as it is among hetero-
sexuals.
These pressures, which have often taken the form of legal penal-
ties, are symptomatic of a system of subordination. This is true of sex
discrimination, where the operation of gender role stereotypes has
already been recognized by this Court as a form of sex discrimina-" 41
non. And it has long been true of the racial caste system as well,
within which both Blacks and whites have been taught that their race
carries with it contrasting roles and limitations, systematically enforc-
ing the definition of race. The fact that sexual orientation is often
experienced as immutable, together with the way in which the mili-
tary policy immutably characterizes servicemembers based on a re-
markably broad and rigid definition of "homosexual conduct," indi-
cates the extent to which "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" offends the equality
principle embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment.
This example is revealing in a number of ways. First, it demon-
*40 SeeTanney, supra note 86, at 139 (describing Liz andJohn Sherblom's book MUCH MORE
THAN SEXUALITY: LISTENING TO 70 GAY PEOPLE TALK ABOUT THEIR LIVEs (1996), and noting
that "every one of the lesbians and gay men who told their stories spoke of the moment when
they understood they were gay," using words like "realized" and "admitted," and that "[n]one
used any form of the word 'choice'").
-4 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (acknowledging how gender
stereotypes can contribute to sexual discrimination cases).
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strates that the factors the Supreme Court traditionally has used in
deciding the appropriate level of scrutiny are interlocking rather
than stand-alone arguments. The "brief" I have sketched makes im-
plicit or explicit reference to immutability, expected relevance, ' and
a history of discrimination against sexual and gender minorities. '*s
Second, it shows that these factors can be used to support an
equal protection argument even in an era of no tiers of scrutiny (or
one marked by tiers that are no longer outcome-determinative).n4
Rather than directing the analysis at the category distinct from the ac-
tual government policy being challenged, the argument would be
couched in terms of how the particular policy being challenged
serves or advances a form of inequality that offends the core purposes
of the Equal Protection Clause. The advocate would not be aiming
for a level of scrutiny when she addresses each of the factors. Instead,
she would be establishing the constitutional violation itself by show-
ing the Court that the particular policy ("Don't Ask, Don't Tell") is
linked to a broader system of social disadvantaging (a history of dis-
crimination), in many instances creating or reinforcing a perception
or experience that an individual's classification is outside his control
(immutability) that has no legitimate, rational justification (low ex-
pected relevance).
B. Legislative Debate
In a floor debate over a bill to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964
to add "sexual and gender identity," a Senator or Representative
could use constructive immutabilit, to buttress the argument that
anti-gay discrimination is irrational ' and to overcome the inevitable
status-conduct distinction that would be raised by opponents of the
bill. Such a speech might look something like this:
I rise in support of the bill. We have heard much from the opponents of
this measure to the effect that this Congress should not infringe on the
rights of ordinary, decent Americans to act on their deeply held religious
beliefs. Indeed, I hold in my hand a letter from a voter in my district,
who holds the view that homosexuality is a sin. She tells me that her un-
willingness to hire a gay man or lesbian is based on her religious convic-
dons and that it is wrong for this Congress to legislate her beliefs into il-
legality. This voter, as it happens, has been a neighbor of mine for over
2&2 See supra pp. 658-664 (discussing low "expected relevance" as a factor in ie level of soru-
tiny applied in an equal protection case).
These arguments could and should, of course, be greatly amplified in an actual Supreme
Court brief, the history of discrimination, for instance, would need to be documented and
traced in careful detail. My purpose here is simply to provide a preliminary blueprint for how
the arguments I have made in this article could translate into effective advocacy.
244 See supra pp. 664-68 (discussing developing law that appears to be abandoning or reducing
the significance of the level of scrutiny).
245 See supra pp. 674-75 (discussing inadequacy of irrationalit)-ased arguments to overcome
the autonomy-based arguments made by opponents of anti-discrimination smtutes).
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twenty years.
At the same time, I firmly believe that prejudice and hostility towards
homosexuals is irrational, based on a devastating and tragic misreading
of our religious tradition. Nevertheless, those who take the position on
the other side are entitled to their view, and I bow to no one in my ad-
herence to the principle that we should not unduly interfere with indi-
vidual freedom. If all that were at stake here was my belief that homo-
phobia is irrational, I would try with all my might to convince my
neighbor and friend that she should change her mind on this issue-but
I would not support a bill forcing her hand.
But this bill is very much in the tradition of the great civil rights advances
of the last forty years, from passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991. Opponents of those laws, too,
claimed it was wrong to tell employers whom they had to hire, and busi-
nesses whom they had to accept as customers.246
But they were wrong, because the fact is that the discrimination barred by
these laws was not just irrational. It was also fundamentally wrong, and
the same is true of discrimination against gay men and lesbians and
transgendered men and women. Most Americans agree with the simple
proposition that such discrimination simply is wrong.
But even if they did not, the unfairness is undeniable. In committee
hearings, we heard moving testimony from John Smith, a gay man who
was fired from his job when his supervisor learned Smith was gay, even
though Smith had, for four years in a row, received the highest possible
job ratings. When he was fired, the company's only explanation was to
hand Smith a pamphlet trumpeting "ex-gay ministries" as a way for Smith
to change his "abnormal" and "sinful" sexual orientation.
Smith spoke to the committee about how difficult it had been for him to
accept his own homosexuality. As a teenager he had repeatedly at-
tempted to date and form romantic relationships with women, because,
as he put it, "All I ever saw and heard on television, on the movies, and
from my family told me that's what I was supposed to want." But despite
the intense pressure, he knew that was not who he was. It took John
many years to accept-not choose, but accept-his sexuality. As he put
it, "If everything I saw, heard, and went through didn't make me straight,
I finally realized that my being gayjust wasn't going to change. And then
it hit me: Why should I change? I'm a good person just the way I am."
Think of it. An excellent worker, fully qualified for his job, was thrown
out of work for something that had nothing whatsoever to do with his
abilities, but rather for a quality that is for him, as it is for most of us, not
one he can change.
246 See Marcosson, supra note 56, at 149-51 & nn.30-36 (discussing autonomy-based arguments
made by opponents of the Civil Rights Act).
247 See Americans Strongly Support the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) and Equal Job
Opportunities for Gay and Lesbian People, at http://www.hrc.org/featurel/tlepoll.html (last visited
September 8, 1999) (reporting results of 1997 poll showing 80 % of Americans believe that
homosexuals should have equal rights in job opportunities, and that 68 % supported tie Em-
ployment Non-Discrimination Act, which would bar anti-gay discrimination).
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And even if he could change it, it is unfathomable to me that we would
want employers intruding on an area of their workers' lives so fundamen-
tally private and personal. Some have claimed that homosexuality is a
choice, at least when it comes to engaging in homosexual conduct. But
was John Smith's employer making a decision about conduct? He %as
never even asked about his conduct, and the very notion that he might
have been is chilling.
More fundamentally, is firing people because of their private conduct
really any different from firing them for their sexual orientation itself?
For those of us who are straight, we take it for granted that part of what
that means is that we will, at least sometimes, engage in sex with a person
of the opposite sex. And I, at least, would be aghast if someone proposed
some sort of bizarre deal that I could be protected from discrimination if
and only if I agreed I wouldn't have sex.
The bottom line is that this bill would protect millions of Americans from
discrimination that is both irrational and wrong. All of us have a race,
and a sex, and we expect not to have that work against us when we apply
for ajob or rent an apartment. And all of us, straight or gay, have a sex-
ual orientation, and we should be able to expect not to have that work
against us, either. I hope you will support this bill.
This speech, like the equal protection brief, illustrates the mutu-
ally supporting aspect of immutability and other arguments against
discrimination. It does not rest on immutability alone, but uses it as a
response once the irrationality argument is met wvith the answer that
government should not infringe on people's freedom to be irrational
if they so choose. Even as it lends support to the irrationality argu-
ment, immutability is in turn bolstered by the privacy point. When
opponents attempt to draw a distinction between status and conduct
(i.e., even if the status of sexual orientation is immutable, the indi-
vidual still chooses to engage in sexual conduct), the advocate can
stress the offensive nature of any inquiry into private sexual behavior,
while still emphasizing that penalizing a person for sexual conduct is
not different in any meaningful way from penalizing them for sexual
orientation.
The key point is that when critics of the immutability argument
proclaim that it should be abandoned because it does not stand alone
as a persuasive argument, they unproductively hold it to an unattain-
able standard. No argument by itself will carry the day, either in win-
ning an equal protection lawsuit or in passing anti-discrimination leg-
islation. The real challenge-and this is true for almost any advocate
in almost any context-is to figure out how all the partially persuasive
arguments work together to create a fully persuasive case.
The legislator's speech also avoids the "pity problem" that can
undermine the effectiveness of the immutability argument.2 John
248 See supra p. 707-08 (discussing potential for immutability argument to descend into a plea
for pity).
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Smith's narrative affirmed not just that he could not change his sexu-
ality, but also that there was no reason he should want to. And the
legislator carefully talks about sexual orientation as a category includ-
ing both heterosexuals and homosexuals, subtly prompting members
of the favored classification to consider their own status as they con-
sider the rules that will govern the category as a whole. To the extent
that heterosexuals consider their own status immutable, this will sub-
stantially reduce the likelihood that they will equate "I cannot change
my status as homosexual" with "Take pity on me-I may do bad
things, but I can't help myself."
Finally, the speech also avoids taking a position on the origins of
each individual's sexual orientation. In describing John Smith's
story, the legislator refers to the intense pressures Smith felt growing
up to conform to the expectation of heterosexuality, and simply says
that "he knew that it was not who he was." Articulated in these terms,
the immutability argument neither accepts, rejects, nor depends
upon theories of biological causation. It simply relies on individual
experience with sexual identity.
C. Talking
As Tom Stoddard reminded us, neither court victories nor legisla-
tive triumphs will achieve genuine equality for sexual and gender mi-
norities. These "rule-shifting" strategies must be accompanied by"culture-shifting" strategies which talk to, educate, and change the
hearts and minds of the majority.ss Some of these can take place on
a mass scale-more positive portrayals of lesbians and gay men on
television and in the movies, for example. But they must also take
place on a smaller scale, via individual conversations with those
249 If anything, the narrative implies that it was a process of socialization-the forces pressur-
ingJohn to be heterosexual-that he came to understand his gay identity. This at least suggests
a link between the social construction of sexual orientation and individual identity. More im-
portantly, however, it argues that the basis forJohn's identity is less important than his experi-
ence with it as immutable.
See Stoddard, supra note 10, at 969-70 ("New Zealand had already put in place many-al-
though certainly not all-legal reforms for which lesbians and gay men in the United States had
longed from the beginning of their (our) movement to assert civil rights.... According to my
understanding of the gay rights movement, such a development should cause lesbians and gay
men to shed their previous condition of fear and hiding, to-in the argot of our movement-
.come out." But, I soon discovered, most gay people in New Zealand still did not feel safe
enough to "come out," even though their laws now offered them protection.... I was
confounded by my discovery. As a lawyer working for social change, I had assumed-and
hoped-that changes in the rules that governed a society would inevitably lead to some form of
larger cultural transformation.... But my trip to New Zealand suggested that I was mistaken in
my assumptions about the ways that the law acts as a catalyst for social or cultural change.").
See id. at 975-76 (attributing the culture-shifting success of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
"a continuing passionate and informal national debate of at least a decade's duration ... over
the state of race relations in the United States," which "took place every day and every night in
millions of homes, schools, and workplaces").
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around us. One example: coming out, as in a teenager's dialogue
with her parents. Immutability can be just as crucial to her conversa-
tion as it can in legal fora.
Dear Mom and Dad,
It's been six months now since I left home to start college. I's been so
amazing here-mthe professors, so much studying. I know, you've heard
all about it already!
But there's something else I need to tell you about, and it's so hard even
to write this. Please forgive me for not talking to you both about this face
to face, but Ijust don't think I could get the words out
So here goes... I'm a lesbian. God, I can't even believe I just wrote iL
Then again, you probably can't believe you just read it. Daddy's little
girl, a lesbian. I can guess what you're thinking. How can that be? She
played with dolls, she never played sports, she dated JerTy all through
high school. None of the things you probably thought would be sure
signs. Don't deny it, Mom-remember when you asked me if David
might be "that way" because he didn' try out for sports?
But you know, none of that matters. I played with dolls because those
were the toys I had, and the ones my friends wanted to play with. And I
guess they were fun, at least for a while. And I didn't try out for sports
because I was afraid to. I was afraid it would be a dead give-away, and
then everyone would know my secret. That's why I dated boys, too.
Jerry was so nice, not like most of the guys in high school. He never pres-
sured me to have sex, even though he wanted to. And by going out with
him, no one would suspect that I was attracted to girls. That's so awful-
Jerry was a disguise, I guess. But it's true.
But he wasn't only a disguise. That's kind of the way I think of him now,
but at the time, it was more, hey, if I date him and kiss him, if I just do all
the stuff everyone else is doing, I'll be like them, and then hormones or
instincts or whatever it was that was supposed to make me start actually
wanting to be with him would kick in.
But all that time, it didn't happen. Instead I looked at girls in school,
and thought about being with them, and wanted a girlfriend! You
probably don't want to be reading this. When my friend Ben, who's gay,
told his parents about how much he was attracted to men, his dad said it
made him sick to his stomach and he threw Ben out of the house and
told him never to come back. 'a
Please don't think that. It's who I am, or part of who I am at least, and I
couldn't bear it if I knew that who I am makes you want to vomiL
This fear of being discovered is due in great part to the enormous social consequences
that result when gay and lesbian teenagers come OUL Sa'Teemu Ruskola, Minor Disregard: The
Legal Consintion of the Fantasg That GCy and Lesbian Youth Do Not Evist, 8 YA.LJ.L & FF-twwt
269, 303-04 (1996) (discussing abuse during high school that renders gay and lesbian youth
invisible).
53 This is notan exaggeration. SeeTanney, supra note 86. at 103 (relatingstor)'of a teenager
whose father responded to his coming out by saying, i[wihen you commit suicide. I'll help
you.") (citing Liz SHERBLOM &JOHN SHERBLOM, MUCH MORE THAN SEXU.ALm': LisENING TO
70 GAYPEOPLETALKABOUTTHEIR LIVES 65 (1996)).
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It's not a phase, if that's what you're thinking. I don't know why I'm
this way. To be honest, I can't imagine what it's like not to be this way.
Just like you guys can't imagine being anything other than what you are, I
guess. And you know what? I can finally say that I wouldn't want to
change even if I could. I'm happy with who I am, including being a les-
bian.
Oh, I know what else I wanted to say. You told me once, Mom, that looks
aren't so important, that you really fall in love with the person inside the
body, because they're kind and gentle and generous and funny. And I
knew as soon as you said it that it was true. And the more I thought
about it, I realized that if it's the person inside that matters, then it was
OK if that person happened to be a woman. Does that make sense?
Maybe not. But I know it helped me feel like a good person even when
sometimes I was just sure I was totally bad because of being a lesbian.
I love you both.
Ann.
This letter is a personal narrative, one that would not be told by
everyone in the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered communi-
ties.: 5 But it is Ann's story, and it is crucial to her message that her
parents understand that being a lesbian is not a "phase," but instead
is a permanent feature of her character. They must also hear of the
pressures she always felt to conform, and conceive of her sexuality
not as a function of outward traits like playing sports (or even having
sex with women), but as a part of her identity.
It would be incoherent for Ann to mute the immutability thread
in her narrative. If "coming out" is an essential feature in a campaign
of "culture-shifting,"2 then it should be apparent that the goal is to
See Colleen A. Sullivan, Kids, Courts and Queers: Lesbian and Gay Youth in theJuvenileJustice
and Foster Care Systems, 6 LAW & SEXUALITY 31, 43-44 (1996) (cautioning that "it's just a phase"
and "you're too young to know" can be typical responses parents give when a child discloses
sexual difference) (citing Two TEENAGERS IN TWENTY: WRITINGS BY GAY AND LESBIAN YOUTtI
26,37,51, 75, 101,112, 167, 172 (Ann Heron ed., 1994)).
25 A very different story can also include immutability as an important element. Professor
Elvia Arriola's discussion ofJesse, the central character in Leslie Feinberg's novel STONE BUTCH
BLUES illustrates this:
Feinberg's character, Jesse, struggles from the time of childhood with her sexual and
gender identity by dressing up in her father's clothes. One day Jesse runs away from
home because she is fed up with being humiliated for her cross-dressing or harassed by
her school peers for her emerging identity as a different kind of girl. She runs, looking
for the people and the places that will accept her for liking girls and dressing tip like a
boy.... There are many underlying tragedies in Jesse's story, including the loss of loves
never forgotten. The tales of brutal violence she and her butch buddies experience for
their mannish dress and demeanor draw attention to the historic role that violence has
played in the lives of those women and men who most obviously transgress society's gen-
der norms-such as butch lesbians and drag queens. But Jesse's story is also an account of
an adolescent girl and a young woman painfully butting up against gendered norms she felt she
could not obey.
Elvia R. Arriola, The Penalties for Puppy Love: Institutionalized Violence against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual
and Transgendered Youth, 1J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 429,433 (1998).
2.% See Kay Kavanagh, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Deception Required, Disclosure Denied, I PSYCH~oL.
PUB. POL'Y& L. 142, 156-57 (1995) (discussing research showing that heterosexuals with openly
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shift the culture to a place that is open and accepting of sexual mi-
norities as we really are. That is true of a teenager's disclosure of her
sexual identity to her parents, and it is true of the wayv sexual and
gender difference is presented to a broader audience 'ia mass media.
Finally, the immutability narrative, whether related in living room
conversations, on television talk shows, in congressional debate, or in
courts, must be told together with another message Ann sent to her
parents: Even if she could change, why should she? Immutability is
part of who some gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people
perceive themselves to be. It is also one reason why it is wvrong to dis-
criminate against sexual and gender minorities. But it is not a neces-
sary element of a demand for equality and respect. It must also not
be understood to be an implicit assent to the notion that if only it
were not immutable it should be changed, or, worse yet, that the law
could legitimately coerce the decision to change.
CONCLUSION
Immutability has been prematurely dismissed by constitutional
scholars. It captures an important moral imperative, long reflected in
our law, that the immutability of a characteristic is one factor in the
way people ought to be treated. The idea is neither complex nor
revolutionary-in fact, its simplicity and consistency with the legal
landscape are important factors explaining immutability's power.
The insights supplied by social construction theory, which to this
point have been seen as debunking immutability, actually help us to
understand its validity. A trait can be immutable because genetics
made it that way, or because customs made it that way, or because le-
gal rules made it that way, or because some unquantifiable combina-
tion of factors made it that way. Standing alone, it is not sufficient to
justify legal or social change, or establish a constitutional violation.
That should be no surprise; few arguments are sufficient standing
alone to accomplish those tasks. Fortunately, though, those seeking
change rarely are limited to a single argument standing alone. That
is why it is important to make the fullest and best use of all the argu-
ments, in combination. Immutability should be part of the mix.
gay acquaintances are more likely than others to accept gay people in general).
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